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Sie wollen Würfel spielen mit den kleinsten Würfelchen oder tanzen 
sehn, was schwer zu sehn ist: die Zwerge des Daseins, die lustigen 
Urkörperchen: aber sie nennen’s Wissenschaft und schwitzen dabei. 
Aber Kinder sind es mir, die ihr Spiel wollen: und wenn etwas Lachen 
bei ihrem Spiele wäre, so wollte ich ihre ‘fröhliche Wissenschaft’ 
gutheissen. 
 
Friedrich Nietzsche 
 
 
 
 
 
Some are tempted to think of life in cyberspace as insignificant, as 
escape or meaningless diversion. It is not. Our experiences there are 
serious play. 
 
Sherry Turkle 
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To my fellow players 
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acronym derived from Playful Identity Group…) I thank Jos – my philosophical 
mentor and promotor – for the effort he put into my thesis. I am particularly grateful for 
all the playroom he allowed me during its composition; in terms of rules, but also 
physically, by allowing me to have the playroom mostly to myself (we shared offices!). 
I thank my fellow PhD candidate Michiel, with whom I entertain a very friendly 
relationship since the beginning of the research project, and who motivated me time 
and time again with his enthousiasm, but who also understood like no one else the trials 
and tribulations of writing the dissertation. I thank Valerie and Joost for their clever 
comments on my drafts and all the humour and positive vibes they brought to our 
monthly meetings. 
 My cat Sunny needs extra mentioning, for the priceless joy she gave me when playing 
with imaginary mice, during my countless sessions in front of my computer screen. 
And last – but certainly not least – I have to thank Jiska, my playmate, without whom I 
would not have made it to the finishing line. Who came into my life at exactly the right 
moment and who gave me the positive energy and playful mood I so desperately 
needed. Who taught me that science is by far not the most important game in life.  
I am glad that – for now – it is ‘Game over’.  
 
Jeroen Timmermans  
Rotterdam, August 2010. 
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Prelude 
 
 
In July 2010 Facebook had more than 400 million active users. 400 million people who 
on average have 130 digital friends, who create 70 pieces of content each month, and of 
whom 100 million even access Facebook through their mobile devices.1 These people 
share their photos, keep their friends posted on their whereabouts, subscribe to user 
groups and visit the pages of old school mates. Since its foundation in 2004, Facebook 
experienced explosive growth and new applications, such as games, mobile features, a 
gift shop and Facebook Ads were added almost monthly, making it the most important 
social network site on the web. When asked about their reasons for using Facebook, 
users mention qualities such as being given a platform to present themselves; to 
maintain connections with others; to meet new people; to articulate their social 
networks, or to engage in romantic or professional relationships (Cf. Ellison, Steinfield, 
Lampe 2007: 1).   
  On the other hand, Wikipedia offers anyone knowing how to start up a web browser 
to easily find as much as fifteen different methods – some of them described in their 
every detail – for committing suicide. On ‘suicide-blogs’ depressed youngsters share 
stories, overtly discuss their plans, and ask advice on what pills to use in order to die 
the quickest.2 Although at first glance these sites might seem effective ways to offer 
help and mutual understanding in times of crisis, the result is frequently counter-
effective, handing morbid suggestions to already insecure kids and helping them cross 
the ultimate line. To shockingly quote a 16-year old girl on zelfmoord.nl: “Every day 
we talk through msn and fantasize about what it would be like in Heaven. Two weeks 
ago we started collecting pills. By now I get them from almost anywhere. From my 
parents’ medical aid kit or from friends. Soon I will have a lethal mix. Then, finally, I 
shall find peace.”    
  These are all matters of identity. They deal with adolescents asking themselves 
important questions in the course of their lives: Who do I want to be? What do I want 
to look like? Where do I want to go with my life? Is there a meaning to my life? How 
                                                
1 Source: http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics#!/press/info.php?statistics 
2 See for example: www.zelfmoord.nl (‘suicide’.nl) 
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can I end my problems? Stories such as the ones above indicate how tremendously 
important the phenomenon of identity has become in our societies: it – literally – is a 
matter of life and death. Lately, talk of identity seems to be everywhere: religious 
identity clashes lead to acts of terrorism; national governments eat their brains trying to 
integrate all the different ethnic minorities in their nations into a peaceful and socially 
viable whole, and our excessive lifestyles are increasingly threatened by the disrupting 
effects they have on the environment. We discuss our national identities, sexual 
identities and corporate identities. It appears that everybody either wants to be 
someone, wants to be member of a distinct and respected community, or maybe even 
has to be someone in order to make it in this highly competitive world. Yet, somehow, 
no one really seems to know how.  
  Identities forge worlds and write histories.3 The ideas persons cherish about 
themselves, about the societies they partake in; collective ideas about moral, the order 
of state and appropriate behaviour, they all decide how we build our societies, how we 
deal with one another, and how we prefer to live our lives. Who we are, or at least who 
we think we are, to a large degree shapes how we construct our lives. Now that the web 
has turned into an all-pervading part of our daily lives and since it has become 
impossible to imagine a life without it, this urges us to pose the question whether using 
the world wide web impacts how people conceive of themselves, their place in the 
world and, consequently, their intentional behaviour?4 Does visiting web pages alter 
our body of ideas? Does designing a homepage change its designer’s self-conception? 
Does visiting political or religious forums put our worldview upside-down? How is our 
moral frame of reference affected by our wanderings through the global matrix we call 
the World Wide Web? Compare it to the massive impact of the first charts of the world 
and the maritime shipping in the sixteenth century on our worldview, developments 
that set the pace for the history of visual globalization that culminated into the picture 
of the earth taken from outer space in the middle of the last century. Thanks to those 
media, people scattered around the globe became aware of both the fact that they 
                                                
3 Obviously, this applies the other way around too! 
4 Although web access is growing rapidly around the globe, in the daily lives of many people on this 
planet the web plays only a marginal or even completely absent role. Yet, since I write about those 
people who do have access to the web, I will make this disclaimer only once, fully aware of the political 
and economic restrictions a lot of people still suffer from.    
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inhabited this one, blue planet, and of the implications this has for our collective 
predicament.  
  It may be helpful to give another small example to indicate the kind of mentality 
changes I seek to illuminate. Let us take up a classic: gender issues. Dressing up like a 
woman was never as easy for males as it is nowadays: you only need signing up for 
Second Life. Although research has shown that people generally stick rather close to 
their real life personae, a considerable part of participants in these kind of virtual 
worlds or role-playing games effectively do change their appearance significantly or 
might even adopt another sex.5 Of course, there are those players who are already 
transvestites, for whom virtual reality offers no more than another stage to act out an 
alternate identity they already desired long before. So nothing new for them. But what 
about those men who present themselves as women just for the fun of it? Maybe 
because they think to get some kinky sort of arousal out of it? Is this just harmless play 
or could there be more to it?  
  In behavioural psychology it is common knowledge that in order to know herself, a 
person has to take the roundabout route of studying her conduct, instead of merely 
engaging in self-complacent introspection, that is, to measure her effect upon others, 
and infer her own personality from those reflexive self-analyses. Now, suppose an 
infamous Don Giovanni enters Second Life disguised as an attractive woman. After the 
initial euphoria over his new, lush body and the pleasures that go with it, he notices the 
unpleasantly high rate of attention he gets from male inhabitants of this second world. 
They even get so aggressive and obtrusive in their attempts to court our twisted Don 
Giovanni that he eventually decides to retransform his character into a male to return to 
a normal (second) life. Could it be that a man is less likely to harass an attractive 
woman now that he can virtually slip under her skin in cyberspace and get a feeling of 
what it is like to be hassled all the time?6 Could it not be the case that he becomes 
aware of an objectionable kind of behaviour he did not pay attention to before, and alter 
it accordingly? He may well end up looking at gender issues differently altogether. The 
same might apply to other topical issues: how we treat foreigners, or how we deal with 
                                                
5 For an extensive review of the implications of online gender swapping see: Turkle 1995: 210-32. 
6 Maybe a remark on gender issues, in avoidance of all too critical receptions or even disillusioned 
readers: since the chosen topic of this book is highly vulnerable to gender issues, I have chosen to opt, if 
possible, for the grammatical gender of words when using their relative pronouns. So when referring to 
persons I will consequently refer to them in the female mode. No offence guys.  
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persons that adhere to deviant religions. The recent plague among young people of so-
called cyber-bullying, leading to severe discomforts and even mental complaints of 
adolescents, may serve as another example of how powerful the web7 can be in 
influencing personal identity.  
  Examples as the ones just given do provide us with a strong indication that the web 
has a bearing on identities, but it has yet to be seen in what precise changes this impact 
resides. That is what this book is about. Do humans who use the web think differently 
about themselves and the world compared to how they did before the introduction of 
this medium? Can we establish a connection between people’s changing identities and 
the introduction of the web in their lives? If we ask them about their identity, do they 
tell us a different story than they did before? Both the content of self-conceptions, as 
well as the process by which those are formed and how this affects their content 
reflexively, will be dealt with. After all, writing an autobiography is a far cry from 
maintaining a website. To narrow down the above research question and apply more 
focus to the research, I take French philosopher Paul Ricoeur’s theory of narrative 
identity as a vantage point for this exploration into identity. Older, linear media, such as 
books and letters, invited to the development of the theory of narrative identity, which 
served as a powerful theory to describe identity construction in the pre-digital age. The 
question is, whether this theory still applies under the condition of the far-going 
digitalization of our lives?   
  We have to keep in mind, though, that human identity consists of more than the 
knowledge that settles in the narratives people consciously tell about themselves. 
Equally important, if not more on a social plane, is the question whether they behave 
differently too? An employer who is used to googling every applicant without 
(morally) questioning this procedure any further? Vast parts of our behaviour never 
even reach the level of conscious self-knowledge unless we practice ourselves in hours 
of psychoanalysis. The same goes for a lot of our inclinations. For example, several 
psychological researches have shown how unaware we are of our biases towards other 
people: close observation learns that non-racist behaviour is virtually impossible, 
although we may very well faithfully pledge to adhere to a principal of non-
discrimination and think to act accordingly (See: Wilson 2002: 189-90). So, by far not 
                                                
7 For convenience, I will mainly use ‘the web’ in the text, instead of ‘writing world wide web’ in full 
every time.  
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all the changes a medium induces make it all the way to our conscious self-image. Yet, 
as this research is concerned with peoples’ explicit, conscious self-conceptions, I 
restrict myself to a philosophical analysis of web pages and users’ overt 
communication on weblogs and social network sites.  
  As a medium, or rather the medium of our time, the web fulfils several functions in 
our lives: first and foremost, obviously, it is an ICT; an ‘Information and 
Communication Technlogy’. It spreads information for those who want to send it into 
the world, and collects information, for those in search of it. The web, though, is not 
only an instrument for the exchange of information: it is also a medium for the 
construction and communication of individual (personal) and collective identities. 
Individual users as well as cultural, ethnic and religious groups increasingly use 
homepages and weblogs as a means to discuss and master their identities. Equally 
important for mastering identities is the potential the web offers in terms of self-
expression and the reflection on identities, on homepages and weblogs for instance. 
Next to those ‘symbolical’ functions, the underlying internet serves – in terms of the 
infrastructure it provides – many other goals, ranging from storing data (it is by far the 
world’s biggest database), to wiring money and rendering virtual presence possible 
(skype, videoconferencing, chatting). Not in the least, the web is there for 
entertainment and doing business, which is by sheer number and revenue its principal 
raison d’être.    
  From this vast list of usages, the focus in this study is on the web as a means for self-
expression and communication, notwithstanding the fact that the other functions play 
their part too in terms of their impact on users’ identity. So, what happens to how 
people think of themselves and to their ideas on how (social) life should be lived as a 
consequence of using the web? Therefore, the main focus is on the mental effects of 
using the world wide web as a tool for self-expression and communication, its impact 
on peoples’ self-conceptions and their moral stands. This book is a philosophical 
investigation into the medium-specific characteristics of the web in relation to the 
construction and expression of individual and collective identities. It seeks to answer 
the question whether use of the web necessitates transforming the theory of narrative 
identity construction towards a theory of playful identities? 
 
 20 
As the expressive and reflexive dimensions of the construction of personal and cultural 
identities are its main focus, the textual and hermeneutical description, analysis and 
interpretation of websites and weblogs are central in this study. This approach is 
reflected in my style of writing, which – as the reader will soon experience – might be 
quite unorthodox for a doctoral thesis. I adjusted style to content, in order to narrow the 
gap between form and content as much as possible. Also, in the light of the subject – 
identity – I deem it most fruitful to write a text, which is as close to the reader’s own 
experiences as possible. After all, as I stated before, it is not so much how scientists 
think about what humans are and how their identities are constructed, but rather how 
humans conceive of themselves that decides about how societies are built and politics 
is made.8 Whether human beings are free or only think to act freely, for example, may 
be a highly debated and very exciting scientific and philosophical problem, but fact is 
that in the Western world we built our society upon the supposition that we are free 
and are capable of acting rationally. As Kenneth Gergen rightly remarked: “Beliefs 
about the self seem pivotal to all our undertakings. We believe that as normal human 
beings we possess reasoning powers, emotions, conscience, intentions; these beliefs are 
critical to the way we relate to others” (Gergen 1991: VIII). That is why I base my 
analysis predominantly on the (popular) expressions of identity and people’s explicit 
self-understanding. As a consequence, I draw on qualitative research, the power of 
which lies in its interpretative strength, not so much in its statistical rigor.  
 
The book has been written according to what could be called a kind of Hegelian logic: 
starting with a rather abstract, conceptual analysis I then move on – piece-by-piece – to 
penetrate the more concrete layers of late modern identity and work my way through to 
the results of the web analyses that have been carried out. Because of the emphasis on 
the reflexive aspect of identity formation, I apply a philosophical perspective on the 
matter. The problem of human identity is by its nature a highly philosophical one. 
Since its genesis it bears the traces of the great thinkers of the past: Aristotle, 
Descartes, Locke, Kant, and many more. They still provide the conceptual basis of 
current research on identity and force us, by their profound insights, into dialogue with 
                                                
8 It goes without saying that scientific insights in some cases do influence public opinion, be it 
sometimes long after they have been established. Think for example of the impact Enlightenment 
philosophers had on our modern discourse of freedom or Darwin’s theory had on now common ways of 
reasoning in matters concerning nature.   
 21 
them. An example of the influence historic ideas can have on current opinions is that 
many Westerners nowadays share the Romantic idea that somewhere deep concealed in 
them there is a metal box containing their true identity, turning their lives into the quest 
of the proper key to open this magic box and discover who they really are. Although 
this view is widely disputed within the scientific community, it still lies at the heart of a 
powerful discourse with tremendous societal implications. In chapter 3 I return to this 
issue.  
  That is why the first part of the book addresses the problem of (human) identity in its 
bare form. What is (human) identity? What are we actually talking about here? Because 
the concept of identity is used in numerous discourses – be it psychological, 
sociological, legal or any other – there is little consensus on its meaning and precise 
definitions are often lacking. Therefore, part one of the thesis seeks to clarify the highly 
ambiguous and enigmatic concept of identity, and it offers a discussion of what I deem 
its most significant aspects. The focus in the first chapter is on the what of identity: 
what is ‘identity’? What phenomenon do we refer to when we use the word identity? In 
addition, a philosophical exploration on the main issues that circulate in the debate on 
human identity is performed. It comprises an analysis of identity-related concepts such 
as subjectivity, selfhood, narrativity, the mind-body relationship, memory, character, 
personal identity and self-identity, and ecological and reflexive self-awareness, leading 
up to a definition of how I understand human identity in this book.  
  In chapter 2 attention is directed to the how of human identity; to the manner in which 
identities are constructed. How do people form their self-conceptions? What 
psychological, linguistic and sociological tools are used to get to an outspoken self-
image? Paul Ricoeur’s theory of narrative identity, which – as I declared above – 
serves as the vantage point of this research, will receive extended commentary in this 
chapter.  In the third chapter, then, I look deeper into the content of current Western 
self-conceptions. Here, I will also take into account the role media played in the 
building of our identity. What are the responses people give to the question of who they 
think they are? Where do these self-descriptions come from? Why is it that identity is 
such a 'big issue' these days? What are the main elements of our self-descriptions and 
where do they (historically) stem from?  
  On the basis of this introduction to the phenomenon of identity, I elaborate on the 
paradoxes that beset modern conceptions of identity. The analysis leads to the 
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conclusion that three major paradoxes lie at the heart of the modern, western narrative 
on personal identity: 1) There is the apprehension, stemming from the Enlightenment, 
of human beings as self-conscious, rational and autonomous creatures, contested by the 
Romantic view of humans as being driven by (often unconscious) moods, feelings and 
incentives, resisting conscious control. 2) Nowadays we seem to be split, more than 
ever, between the (selfish) wish for self-expression and personal growth on the one, 
and the need for communication and community on the other hand. The world wide 
web – with its tendency of encapsulating and uniting people at the same time – is a 
paradigmatic playground for this tension in the modern moral. 3) For one we believe in 
the idea of a fixed, stable personality, hidden somewhere in the depth of our soul. On a 
daily basis it is even unimaginable not to suppose some sort of ‘core personality’ that 
pervades all social roles we play. Human interaction would become impossible 
altogether if we were to lose the ability to predict the behaviour of others to a certain 
degree. On the other hand, however, there is growing awareness of the deep impact of 
environments on human conduct and people’s perception of situations and the 
subsequent changeability of identities that goes with it. Both in psychological and 
sociological studies the evidence for how little we are in control of our own actions 
mounts up (Cf. Wilson 2002: 43-66). Identity then becomes a highly flexible composite 
of the social activities we engage in and their influence on how we feel, act and judge, 
without supposing some sort of core identity behind all the social faces we pull.9  
 
In the second part of the thesis, I use this analysis of human identity as a stepping stone 
for the discussion and understanding of online identity practices. In preparation of the 
main argument, in part two I move on to the other grand theme of this study: 
playfulness. It may come as a surprise to the reader to encounter an explanation of 
playfulness no earlier than after some hundred of pages into the thesis. I purposely put 
it there, as to put extra emphasis on the new route that was turned onto when digital 
media hit the road, which is reflected in the composition of the thesis itself. 
                                                
9 A paradox is a thing that has two opposite features, and therefore seems in conflict with itself. Under 
closer inspection, though, both poles of the opposition turn out to be true. In this case, I will demonstrate 
that the internal conflicts pertaining to Western identities, in part stem form the same, underlying media 
developments. In order to avoid an overkill of the term paradox in this thesis, I sometimes use familiar – 
though not equivalent – terms such as tension, opposition, ambivalence, conflict, etcetera. I ask the 
reader to keep the paradoxical nature of the phenomena I describe in mind.  
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  Chapter 4 aims at shedding light on the concepts of play, game and playfulness, as 
well as on serving as a bridge between the first part on identity in general and the 
second part on web identity. It sets the stage for the understanding of how identities can 
be understood as playful. We will see that human identity can be called playful, 1) 
insofar as it is constructed in the tension between social, technological and commercial 
determination on the one, and creative-autonomous appropriation of media and self-
expression on the other hand. In the English language this distinction is aptly expressed 
by the familiar concepts of 'game' and 'play'; 2) insofar as playfulness expresses the 
tension between individual and collective behaviour; 3) insofar as playfulness points at 
the ‘playing’ with and experimenting with reality; by doing this, I am in a position to 
grasp the complex, antagonistic phenomenon of identity in two, powerful concepts; and 
4), insofar as playfulness points at the ‘as-if’ character, and the frivolity that are 
characteristic of web practices.   
  The final three chapters, then, focus on instances of playfulness in the realm of the 
world wide web. At first glance, writing about ‘playful identities’ may seem somewhat 
far-fetched altogether. What do the phenomena of play and human identity have in 
common? Yet, on further inspection a wealth of possible connections between the two 
of them opens up. Let me mention just a couple of the (non-digital) areas where play 
and identity meet. For starters, we all know the importance of games and play-like 
behaviour in raising children: games are important educational tools, they help with 
developing social skills, they contribute to the shaping of the body, and they can have a 
big effect on children’s self-consciousness. As human beings develop an identity over 
the course of their youth, games and playful situations frequently cross their path. But 
also after adulthood has been reached, playfulness remains a pervasive feature of 
human life, such as in the playing of social roles or religious rituals. Also consider the 
importance of hobbies or other ‘passions’ in people’s lives, which can have tremendous 
importance for their sense of identity. One could ask whether it is possible to 
investigate identity without considering playing at all? As will be shown down the path 
of this investigation, the entangling of identities and instances of playfulness becomes 
even stronger when we add the world wide web to the equation. 
  In fact, in response to the question about the relationship between media and identity, 
as posed earlier in this introduction, the principal thesis I advocate in this book is that 
there are sound grounds to conceive of identities in our age of digital media as playful 
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identities. The concept of playfulness adequately links the fundamental paradoxes of 
late modern identity, as I briefly explained them above, to the ambivalences that were 
introduced by using the world wide web as a source of meaning, information, self-
expression and communication. We could summarize the process of identity formation 
in the present age of digital media as a continuous oscillation between the opposite 
poles of personal autonomy and techno-economic determinism; between individuality 
and collectivity; between the local and the global; and between being and appearance. 
Now, the playfulness of modern, online identity resides in three ambivalences of play 
in particular: autonomy and heteronomy, individuality and collectivity, reality and 
appearance, as I explain in chapter 4.  
  In chapter 5 I present the central case of this thesis. Via an analysis of social 
movements, politically orientated sites and eco-weblogs, it will be shown, how playful 
presentation of statements, jokes, humour and satire serve as a medium for producing 
critical and subversive messages and facilitate resistance against (social, economic and 
political) systems. I describe so-called ‘green blogs’ at length, which allow for an apt 
example of how all the mentioned aspects of playfulness merge in an online 
environment. Aspects of play as freedom, as well as those of frivolity, 
open(minded)ness and counter-culture are prominent features of those kind of websites.  
  On the basis of the case about green blogs, in chapter 6, the ambivalences of play will 
be coupled with the aforementioned identity paradoxes, and will be explored in the 
realm of the world wide web. The first one is the tension caused by the freedom of 
play(ers) on the one hand, and the heteronomy and rule-bound character of game-like 
situations on the other. We can summarize this aspect of playful identities as playing 
with rules.   
  I then elaborate on the second ambivalence – playing with others – consisting of a 
peculiar mix of individual interests and collective behaviour, which I observe in the 
playfulness of social network sites. I tentatively explore the ramifications of the world 
wide web as a social medium, in which playful, light, frivolous self-presentation of 
people seems a way of covering up the utter seriousness of social bonding and the 
pressure underneath the social process. On the web we are more than ever caught 
between the two tendencies of individualization and capsularization on the one, and 
communication and community building on the other hand. The web is both a source of 
reflexive uncertainty and computer-mediated isolation, and serves as a new, high-tech 
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layer of social cement. The focus here is on social network sites and the paradox they 
create between being alone in front of a computer screen and talking to the world at the 
same time. Also coming to the fore in this context is the tension between living in a 
highly mediated, globalized world and the construction, expression and experience of 
personal and local identities.  
  Also in chapter 6, the third ambivalence expresses the tension between play as 
creating a world of appearance, a kind of second, experimental reality, and ‘normal’ 
reality. In this case of playing with reality there is a direct connection of online 
behaviour and personal identity. In online environments we witness playful probing of 
identities and the discovery of alternative stances and new ideas, but all of this has very 
real consequences. A playful environment encourages us to do ‘as if’, to pretend, and to 
take on roles beyond the ordinary. This role-playing can become so strong an 
experience as to forget what the ‘real’ world is or to import characteristics into it. The 
gap between reality and appearance closes. I will look into the implications for human 
identity of online identity experiments and the possibility for people to ‘play with 
themselves’. As opposed to narrative theories on identity, the concept of playfulness 
emphasises the open and multilinear character of identity, just like a game virtually has 
an endless number of possible variants and outcomes. Like the way games are played 
over and over again, human identities remain under construction over the course of a 
life. And just like life, games have a high degree of uncertainty (about the outcome) 
attached to them: their course cannot be pre-determined. Play always contains an 
element of make-believe: it is accompanied by an awareness of a second reality as 
opposed to real life. When playing we seem to engage in our ‘second lives’: we shift 
between the worlds of being and appearance.  
  At the end of the sixth chapter and in the final chapter then, I return to Paul Ricoeur’s 
theory of narrative identity, and suggest the concept of playful identity, not so much as 
a critique, but rather as an extension of his theory in the light of new media 
developments. Because it offers more space to incorporate web-specific elements like 
multimediality, interactivity and virtuality than the theory of narrative identity does, I 
argue that the theory of playful identities provides us with a better toolkit to understand 
today’s identity. The main goal of this undertaking is to achieve a better understanding 
of what it means to live a human life in times of global, digital media. The conclusion 
will be reached that in order to fully grasp the web’s impact on users’ identities, we 
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have no choice but to extend the theory of narrative identity towards a theory of playful 
identities. 
 
The sheer speed of technological innovation turns any analysis of it into a perilous 
undertaking. Any academic study of social change runs the substantial risk of 
investigating the impacts of a technology that has already been replaced by its 
successor the moment the results are published. The researcher’s plight gets even 
trickier if he happens to be a philosopher, who, by nature of his discipline, is always 
too late for history. How can someone whose insights do not sprout before dawn 
contribute to a field as fast-moving and capricious as that of new media?          
  Well, the book you hold in your hands right now hopefully shows that it can de done. 
And it is by far not the only one on the topic. The number of publications on media 
alone indicate that there obviously is still something important to say for us 
philosophers, even though we might sometimes seem like nothing but an unworldly 
bunch of conceptualizing dinosaurs from a distant, classical age, a bit blown away by 
the wondrous technical achievements of modernity. Actually, it is precisely because of 
the reason just mentioned that there is so much value in a philosopher’s contribution to 
the fast-growing field of media theory: not a single technological innovation in history 
stood by itself or came out of the blue, but always was, and will always be, a product of 
its socio-cultural surroundings. Therefore, it is inevitable to study the history of man 
and his ideas in order to understand our current psycho-technological predicament. It is 
this what philosophers do. In this case, being late turns out to be a virtue.  
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Chapter 1 
Who am I ? 
 
 
 
 
1.1  The question after identity 
 
We try to work out who strangers are even when merely observing them. We work at 
presenting ourselves so that others will workout who we are along the lines that we 
wish them to. We wonder whether so-and-so is doing that because of their identity. 
And we talk. We talk about whether people are born gay or become gay because of 
their upbringing. About what it means to be ‘grown up’. About the difference between 
the English and the Scots. About the family who have just moved in round the corner: 
we shake our heads, what can you expect, they’re from the wrong part of town? About 
‘Arabs’, ‘Mulisms’, ‘rag heads’ and ‘terrorists’. We talk about identity all the time 
(although we may not always use the word itself). 
Richard Jenkins  
 
Have you ever dreamed of being someone else? As most of us you probably have. 
Maybe you imagined yourself being an influential and loaded CEO, driving a fancy 
sportscar outside your Beverly Hills villa. Or you pondered upon what it would be like 
to impersonate the president of the United States. Or you may have fantasized, during 
one of your ordinary days at the office, about adopting an extremely outgoing character 
and turning into an extraordinary Casanova, in thrilling conquest of sensual paradise. Or 
maybe you, quite the opposite, pictured yourself as being one of the great thinkers of the 
past and wondered what it would be like to have the all-encompassing mind of 
Immanuel Kant, or the outrageous genius of Friedrich Nietzsche.  
  But is this still you? Who exactly is transforming into someone else? What would it 
take for you to become, say, Brad Pitt, or Beyoncé, and stay yourself at the same time? 
Obviously, in all these instances some hybrid creature is likely to emerge from the 
desired transformations, that simultaneously turns into another and will still always be 
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the same. The paradoxical – and for some perhaps desillusional – truth of these kind of 
fictitious personality swaps lies in the fact that one cannot think of anyone but oneself 
undergoing those changes. It is sheer impossible to conceive of any perspective on 
one’s identity different than one’s own. For if not so, it would no longer be you turning 
into Brad Pitt. ‘You’ would simply cease to exist, which causes the experiment to lose 
its purpose altogether.  
  Although these kind of examples of swapping identities seem restricted to the world 
of (science) fiction for the moment, they are less surreal than one might think. We are 
all subjected to profound transformations on a daily basis, even if we may not be aware 
of it. The molecular changes our organisms undergo within a 24-hour time-span 
roughly amount to somewhere into the region of billions. Nonetheless, when waking up 
in the morning there will not be a glimmer of doubt in your mind whether it is still you 
reluctantly dragging yourself out of bed towards a revitalising shower. This experience 
of staying the same human being goes on – providing circumstances of 'normal' health 
– throughout our lives. A person may call into question every aspect of her life, and 
repeatedly alter her looks, profession, whereabouts, religion and anything else she 
likes, but somewhere deep down the unshakeable knowledge of remaining the same 
human being at all times and in all places persists. This first-person experience of 
identity ultimately constitutes the bedrock of human identity.  
  As far as we know, an animal does not have a sense of selfhood the way humans do, 
that is, it will not wake up in the morning thinking ‘hey, it’s still me jumping around in 
this forest’. Human beings do not just ‘endure’ as bodies in time, but they also 
‘perdure’ their existence. That is, they hold a reflective attitude towards their being in 
time, and they are existentially concerned for their own being (Cf. Noonan 2003: 100, 
Heidegger 1993: 191-200).10 Without a minimal amount of reflection there would be 
no experience of self-identity whatsoever, hence relegating humans to the 
consciousness level of animals.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
10 We have to keep in mind here that it is a thin and meandering line between the human and the animal 
reign. Higher species such as primates, dolphines and elephants are known to have some rudimentary 
form of self-awareness as well. 
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1.1.1  Self-identity and personal identity 
 
Following Godfrey Vesey (1974) I shall designate this elementary form of self-
awareness our self-identity. Self-identity comprises our ‘basic, primary, fundamental 
and radical’ sense of identity, complementing our so-called personal identity. Personal 
identity on the other hand constitutes a ‘subsidiary, secondary’ layer of identity 
containing the symbolic mediations we tend to use to give a satisfactory description of 
ourselves (Cf. Vesey 1974: 32). Another way of explaining these different modi 
essendi of human identity would be by viewing them as a primary and a secondary 
reflection on identity. It goes without saying that even the elementary experience of 
self-identity presupposes a reflexive stance, just as the subsidiary personal identity 
does11. A person needs a minimal amount of reflective distance towards herself in order 
to perceive of herself – even if this comes down to a mere, nonconceptual experience of 
selfhood – as being the same organism in different times and places. For there to be 
identity – that is a sense of something staying the same over time - one has to make a 
diachronical comparison, relying on the capacity of memory, which presupposes 
‘objectifying’ oneself in some sort of way.12 Even without consciously thinking ‘here I 
am’ all the time, I hold the firm belief, without any doubt, that it is me living here and 
now.  
  As Dan Zahavi states convincingly in Subjectivity and selfhood: “Self-consciousness 
is not merely something that comes about the moment one scrutinizes one’s 
experiences attentively (let alone something that only comes about the moment one 
recognises one’s own mirror image, refers to oneself using the first-person pronoun, or 
is in possession of identifying knowledge of one’s own life story). […] In its most 
primitive and fundamental form, self-consciousness is taken to be a question of having 
                                                
11 The reader will come across the words ‘reflexion’ and ‘reflection’ on countless occasions. The 
difference between them, as I use them, is that whereas ‘reflection’ means thinking about something 
(which can be oneself but also something else) - so, it refers to our capacity of thinking - ‘reflexion’ 
always implies that someone is thinking about herself.   
12 It is debatable whether the use of personal pronouns is necessary in order to have this basic experience 
of self-identity. I am inclined to think that reflectivity does not imply using a pronoun. I do not have to 
be engaged in an active thinking of myself in terms of an ‘I’ for intuitively knowing that I’ve stayed the 
same human being, for retaining the same first-person perspective.  
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first-personal access to one’s own consciousness; it is a question of the first-personal 
givenness or manifestation of experiential life” (Zahavi 2005: 15).13  
  The secondary reflection on who we are leads us into the realm of our social, 
symbolically mediated identity, generally going by the name of personal identity. 
Humans typically set out on an introspective quest for discovering the different aspects 
of their identity, revealing the traits that turn them into themselves and distinguish them 
from others. We then not only become conscious of ourselves qua selves, which 
happens on the level of self-identity already, but we give this sense of selfhood flesh 
and bones by expressing14 our very personal identity.  
  For now, let us take a first, preliminary look into the self-designating tools people use 
in order to depict themselves. What are the categories people rely upon in speaking 
about themselves when being asked for their identity? You would probably get an 
answer somewhat like this: “Hi, I’m Theresa, I live in Boston, Massachusetts. I’m a 
tall, blond woman aged 33 and work as a public relations officer. I adhere to no 
particular religion and I’m married to my husband Michael. People always say I have a 
nice and warm personality and when I’m not working I play tennis or hang out with 
friends. Besides that, I love travelling.” This is supposedly the standard pattern of self-
referentiality Westerners apply when thinking about themselves or expressing their 
presumed identity to others. From this example we can deduce a couple of general 
things. 
  First of all, we see people in the process of self-identification referring to hard, 
relatively unchanging body features, such as their gender, figure, characteristic marks, 
their ethnicity, age, and so forth. Secondly, an important constituting factor in the 
palette we use to draw the picture of ourselves are psychological dispositions involving 
our desires, inclinations, temper, moods, character traits, memories and likes and 
dislikes. Thirdly, there is a significant reference to biographical facts like our name, 
address, profession, life’s history, circle of friends, family, hobbies, place of birth and 
the like. These first three levels of self-description make up our so-called forensic 
identity, referring to our being recognisable to others as a particular human being, our 
                                                
13 Sahavi does not discriminate between self-awareness and self-consciousness, which I will do in this 
chapter.  
14 This may be an autodialogue. We don not necessarily have to express it to others, self-reflection 
suffices here. Also, other modes than language exist to express identities. E.g. clothing, behaviour, 
participation in social networks.    
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being numerically identical to ourselves. It is these aspects of our identity that get a 
burglar traced and thereafter convicted when facing a witness in a police line-up.  
  Finally, we live by a certain worldview containing our moral stands, our religious 
(dis)beliefs, our political affinities, and other convictions about life. Forensic features 
mentioned above become bestowed with meaning in the light of these moralistic 
outlooks. A person’s gender, for example, is not some neutral, context-independent 
personal mark, but evokes different connotations in different social surroundings and, 
consequently, influences her self-image.15 Generally, we could state that by expressing 
and thereby integrating our physical, psychological, biographical and moralistic marks, 
we try to establish a representation of ourselves that matches our 'experience' of 
identity as closely as possible.16  
 
 
1.1.2  The concept of identity 
 
Before continuing the excavation of the intricate layers of human identity it might be 
useful to do some clearing of the concept itself. What are we actually talking about 
here? I have used the term numerous times already, invoking different connotations 
each time, but lacking a straightforward definition. As goes for almost any 
philosophical concept, there is little agreement on the actual meaning of the concept of 
identity. There are probably as many definitions as there are books on the problem. 
Nonetheless, although one of the first things every aspirant philosopher gets taught, is 
that clear cut definitions of concepts are hard to get by in philosophy, I will at least try 
to bring some clarity into the matter. So, let us have a closer look at the concept itself 
by reverting to its roots and stubbornly add another definition before moving on.17  
                                                
15 In the sixth section of chapter 2 I will have a look into the cultural and contextual biases of identity 
formation.  
16 In day-to-day use people hardly distinguish between different concepts of identity. Forensic, 
psychological or moral identity; they are all uncritically used under the header of identity. An item on 
criminality in the eight o'clock news, hence applying a forensic concept of identity, may easily be 
followed by an item on lifestyle, under the very same banner of identity.  
17 A great number of books and articles have been published in the past decades about the problem of 
identity, investigating it not only from a philosophical, but also from a political, sociological, 
technological, psychological and moral point of view. E.g. Castells 2004, Gergen 1991, Zizek 1997, 
Giddens 1991, Metzinger 2004, Ricoeur 1994, Bauman 2006, Damasio 1999, Van den Berg 2009, 
Jenkins 2004, Spitzer 2004. Despite this vast amount of literature, I deem it desirable – in fact because of 
this multitude of theories – to develop a comprehensive account of human identity into which crucial 
aspects of those views have found their way.  
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  There are two ways of tracing the word 'identity' ethymologically. In the first reading 
the word ‘identity’ is a derivative composition of the latin adverb idem (‘same’) and the 
noun entitas (‘being’). In that case, identity literally means 'the same being'. It clearly 
refers to our common use of identity as diachronical similarity, that is, a thing staying 
the same over time. In other words, a thing’s identity is what enables us to recognise it 
at different moments in time as precisely this very same being. The similarity can 
reside in its shape or, in case of a person, her behaviour or personality. 
  In the second reading, we cut the word 'identity' into the latin definite pronoun 'id' and 
the noun 'entis', the genitive of 'ens18', signifying a 'being in itself'. Understood thus, 
identity means 'the thisness of a being in itself'. So, a being's identity describes its 
nature, the qualities that render it precisely that being and no other. In a somewhat 
medieval fashion we could purport that a being’s identity represents its inner kernel, its 
essence, the principle feature which makes it into what it is. The identity involves a 
being’s essential ingredients, devoid of which it would be something different. Identity 
then becomes the principium individuationis, the single trait or assembly of traits that 
renders it uniquely distinguishable from all other beings. 
  If we now combine these two complementary connotations of the word 'identity', the 
following definition occurs: whenever we apply the word identity to a being, we refer 
to the enduring set of unique characteristics, which lend the being its individuality and 
decribes its essential features, thereby also rendering it recognisable over time. The 
identity of a being comprises the qualities that give it both endurance, by referring to 
the source of temporal permanence within it, and spatial diversity from other beings. 
The two antipoles of identity are difference (synchronically) and change 
(diachronically). Yet, Hegel’s lessons in dialectics apply here too: no position without 
negation. Without its antipoles, any statement of identity would be senseless. 
Therefore, paradoxically, the concept of identity simultaneously stands for sameness 
and distinction. Identity means persisting distinction. In the case of human beings, 
these two aspects of identity usually coincide: what distinguishes a person from others 
is what gives her temporal sameness and recognisability, whether this is her particular 
looks or her particular character.19 
                                                                                                                                         
 
18 The exact historic meaning of the word ‘identitas’ remains unclear, since it has ambiguous origins.   
19 This excludes by no means the social dimension of identities. A substantial part of a person's identity 
is what she has in common with others, rather than what distinguishes her from the rest. Take nationality 
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1.1.3  The experience of selfhood 
 
Returning to Vesey’s distinction between self-identity and personal identity, we are 
now in the position to ask ourselves: what is the idem of the beings that we are? What 
is present in us that persists over time in such a way that it bestows us with the 
profound and distinctive experience of self-identity? What justifies my claim of being 
the same person as the young lad that 14 years ago adventurously set out for the city of 
Rotterdam to submerge himself in the world of academic sciences? In spite of 
everything happening in between I still hold the firm belief of being the same human 
being. As Marres puts it: “No matter how heterogenous my experiences are, I recognise 
them as experiences that are mine or have been mine. What now founds this 
fundamental unity, which causes all those mental processes to be mine?” (Marres 1991: 
146).20  
  In a slightly old-fashion argot we could ask: what is the substance – in its original 
ethymological sense of ‘something underlying’ – of our identity: what lies beneath our 
experience of selfhood? What does it take for me to wake up tomorrow morning as 
myself, like the way I did all the past mornings of my life? What is it that I experience, 
whenever I have the experience of staying the same person, even though my body and 
personality have since changed? (Ibid: 147) Paul Ricoeur, too, acknowledges this to be 
the nub of the question after identity: “…permanence in time thus becomes the 
transcendental of numerical identity. The entire problematic of personal identity will 
revolve around this search for a relational invariant, giving it the strong significance of 
permanence in time” (Ricoeur 1994: 118). I might decide to turn my life upside down, 
quit my research job and look for some menial work in the port of Rotterdam, and still 
wake up as the same Jeroen tomorrow morning. (At four o'clock probably, due to the 
new time table!) Why is that so? What causes a human being to wake up every morning 
inescapably being herself? Why is it that we are always fettered to ourselves?   
  Vesey summarizes the argument by differentiating between a so-called unity question, 
searching for the diachronic principle of self-identity, and the identity question, 
searching for the synchronic principle of recognition and individuality. Vesey puts the 
                                                                                                                                         
as an example. That what is distinctive, can be both of individual and of collective nature. Identities are 
not primarily individualistic or collective; in each in human being a unique mix of the two exists. I will 
come back to this in section 6 of the next chapter.  
20 Author’s translation. 
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unity question this way: “In his lifetime a person has many sensations, feelings, 
emotions, thoughts, memories and so on. All these experiences have one thing in 
common: they are all his experiences, they are all in his mind. But what is it for 
different experiences to have this in common? What unites a person’s present 
experiences with the past experiences? Is it a matter of their all being related to one and 
the same self-conscious self, or of their all being related to one and the same continuing 
experience which acts as a sort of background to them, or of their all being related to 
each other in some way, or what? What is the principle of unity?” (Vesey 1974: 7).    
  In the following sections, I will go along with Vesey’s suggestion that in answering 
the unity question, and thereby discovering the principles that unite our senations over 
stretches of time, we will hold a (partial) answer to the identity question, by having 
discovered some of the features that discern a person's identity from others’. The 
answers to the unity question roughly fall into three categories: the so-called simple 
view, a psychological approach and a somatic explanation of the problem of identity 
(Cf. Olson 2002: 6). The next three sections try to give an answer according to this 
tripartition. Alongside this search for the substance of self-identity, notice will be taken 
of several doctrines that played a central role in the history of Western thinking on 
identity: an analysis of Cartesian thought will be provided in section 2, an account of 
John Locke’s thoughts on personal identity in section 3, and a return to Aristotle in the 
fourth section. 
 
 
 
1.2  Descartes' legacy  
 
Aber das Ich ist der finstere Punkt im Bewusstsein,  
wie auf der Netzhaut gerade der Eintrittspunkt  
des Sehenerven blind ist, wie [...]  
das Auge alles sieht, nur sich selbst nicht. 
Arthur Schopenhauer 
 
The most famous and striking answer – avant la lettre – to the unity question has 
undoubtedly been given by René Descartes. Although Descartes never went into the 
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question after personal identity expressis verbis, his ideas still provide footing for a lot 
of contemporary theories. In modern debates his position goes by the name of the so-
called 'simple view' on identity. According to its adherents the experience of identity is 
something in itself, something irreducible. We seem to experience our identities in an 
autonomous ontological domain, which is reducible neither to the body exclusively, to 
the psyché, nor to some other primary substance alone (Cf. Noonan 2003: 95-97, Olsen 
2002: 6-7). As Noonan writes:  
 
"Persistence of body or brain or psychological continuity and connectedness are 
criteria of personal identity only in the sense of evidence: they are not what 
personal identity consists in [...] personal identity is an ultimately unanalysable 
fact, distinct from everything observable or experienceable that might be 
evidence for it. Persons are separately existing entities, distinct from their 
brains, bodies and experiences." (Noonan 2003: 16).21  
 
The simple view has its phenomenological origins in the experiential fact of self-
identity, as I described in the opening example of the former section: the mysterious 
experience of staying the same human being in all times and places, despite all the laps 
of memory we might have, life-changing events, and the continuous changes our bodies 
are exposed to. Charles Taylor similarly observes: "Who among us can understand our 
thought being anywhere else but inside, 'in the mind'? Something in the nature of our 
experience of ourselves seems to make the current localisation almost irresistible, 
beyond challenge" (Taylor 1989: 112). Since the roots of this stance go all the way 
back to Descartes' philosophy, it might be useful to have a closer look at his ideas. 
  
 
1.2.1  Body and mind 
 
Descartes was the first modern philosopher to teach us that truth does not dwell 
somewhere in the Heavens or in God, but lies within us. In order to access this truth, 
Descartes deployed an introspective method of increasing abstraction: refraining from 
                                                
21 Noonan does not differentiate between self-identity and personal identity. Here he apparently uses the 
term personal identity referring to what I call self-identity. 
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all modalities of body and mind, he pushed through to the pure, substantial, self-
reflective cogito, which makes up the indubitable, irreducible epistemological ground 
of reality. Descartes discovered that a human being can doubt everything, apart from 
herself as a thinking being. "I am not this assemblage of limbs called the human body; I 
am not a thin and penetrating air spread through all these members; I am not a wind, a 
breath of air, a vapour, or anything at all that I can invent or imagine, since I have 
supposed that all those things were nothing, and yet, without changing this supposition, 
I find I am nevertheless certain that I am something" (Descartes 1968: 105). The ego 
cogito constitutes the fundamentum inconcussum onto which the widespread tree of 
human knowledge has been built. There is no knowledge I possess with greater clarity 
and firmness than the one of myself as res cogitans.  
  Descartes went on to call this our essence: "I rightly conclude that my essence 
consists in this alone, that I am a thinking thing, or a substance whose whole essence or 
nature consists in thinking" (Ibid: 156). He concluded that the soul cannot be but 
immaterial: "... I concluded that I was a substance, of which the whole essence or 
nature consists in thinking, ... this 'I', that is to say, the mind, by which I am what I am, 
is entirely distinct from the body, ... " (Ibid: 54). To Descartes the soul was the idem, 
that which stayed the same within the somatic stream of transformations and all the 
affects that besiege the human body, founding this sameness on a sense of inner life, 
which ultimately needs neither the body nor any other corporeal nature (Cf. Karther 
2003: 53). 
  It can hardly come as a surprise that Descartes' ideas still strongly influence our view 
of what self-conscious persons are. Be it that he may have been wrong on a couple of 
notorious occasions, Descartes expressed some intuitions on human consciousness that 
are difficult to refute. Even more so, he caused a revolution in our worldview, which I 
will explain later in this section. For now it is important to keep in mind that Descartes' 
reflections on body and consciousness have provided us with the matrix that still 
underlies current debates on human identity.  
  After the mechanization of the worldview in the seventeenth century, which entailed 
the end of animistic theories on the relation between mind and matter, three ways of 
explaining the human mind were left: either one endorsed a radical, ontological 
distinction between mind and body, or one reduced spiritual phenomena to emergent 
properties of an underlying, cerebral substratum, or, finally, one reduced all phenomena 
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(both spiritual and material) to an all-pervading spiritus, in for example the idealisms 
of Berkeley and Hegel. In the remainder of this subsection I will deal with some of the 
paradoxes provoked by Descartes' own position of an ontological dualism. A position, 
which, as the upcoming examples will show, has become accepted on many levels. 
  Let us for a start take up the example of a neurophysician who, after a long day at the 
laboratory of submitting people to experiments that uncover the fallacy of 
consciousness, on her way home unluckely hits a cyclist with her car. When facing a 
judge after having been sued by the unfortunate cyclist, it is very unlikely that she will 
walk free by referring to the neurophysiological processes that uwittingly caused her to 
hit the cyclist's bike. Our physician will pay! (Or her insurance, if she is lucky..) One 
cannot build a modern, constitutional state on a conception of consciousness as 
completely determined by neurophysiological processes. Our society has been founded 
upon the undisputed assumption of personal autonomy. That is why we regard the 
driver as a rational, freely acting subject and hold her responsible for her deeds. It also 
explains why we punish a murderer more severly than someone committing 
manslaughter, since murder implies the mental intention to kill another human being. 
We built our legal system on the assumption of being autonomous, self-conscious 
creatures, as a result of which we hold the driver of the car, being a rational, freely 
acting subject, responsible for the accident.  
  We have become used to living with the supposition that the mind is in command of 
the neurological steering wheel of the body. On a political, moral or juridical level, in 
almost any department of ordinary life – save maybe for philosophy and neurosciences, 
which of course can hardly be called ordinary! – is the Cartesian distinction between 
mind and body effective, granting causal powers to the former. In the above case, we 
depart from the idea that the car driver as a thinking and acting subject steered her car 
freely and wittingly into a certain direction. The post-Cartesian struggle in mental 
healthcare may serve as another example of our ambiguous notion of how minds work, 
and of some of the awkward cultural splits this dualism entails. It has resulted in the 
perennial controversy between psychologists and psychiatrists on how to treat mental 
illness. Alternatively, consider how we are used to refer to ourselves, by using terms 
such as 'my' or 'your' body, which is probably the best evidence for how deeply 
ingrained Descartes' intuitions have become in folk psychology – or maybe even: how 
right he was! The simplest of all examples probably is the expression ‘my body is 
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aching’. Whose body? Instead of saying ‘the body that I am’ (which would be more 
correct as I will show in section 4) we use a genitive: it is me and my body!22  
  This way of thinking gets perfectly ‘embodied’ in all sorts of cultural phenomena. 
Bodies are often experienced as an obstacle when exerting our postulated 
psychophysical freedom. Many people still see the body, with all its spatial boundaries 
and kinetic limitations, as a dungeon of the soul, whether they are neo-platonic 
cyberfreaks, two people passionately in love in vain trying to become one, or a tennis 
player just not able to execute her shots the way she had in mind. As I mentioned 
earlier, Descartes’ legacy is strong enough as to make the conviction persist of the 
mind as the driver operating the wheel that steers bodily movements. We use all kinds 
of tools – from bicycle to artificial limbs and EPO – to overcome physical restrictions 
of bodily movement. On the other hand, although it might seem that we are eager to 
leave our bodies behind in a world of (science) fiction in which our boldest fantasies 
become real, we are still very much attached to our bodies in terms of sensatory 
arousal, fitness, health, beauty and self-image. Thanks to modern medical and 
pharmaceutical technologies the body has become part of the reflexive project of the 
self (Giddens 1991). On the basis of her identity, that is, her (desired) self-image, a 
person may choose to transform her appearance by means of clothes, fitness training, 
body adornments or even surgical procedures. All of such interventions rest upon a 
Cartesian mind-body dualism.   
 
 
1.2.2  Subjectivity – Rationality – Autonomy  
 
The reason why it became possible since the Enlightenment to conceive of human 
beings as fundamentally free and able to ‘mold’ the body, lies in Descartes’ conception 
of rationality and the way in which it has been considered since then. Rationality 
became instrumental. Because we were able to grasp the mechanical order of things, 
we deemed it possible to influence their course. "Gaining insight into the world as 
mechanism is inseparable from seeing it as a domain of potential instrumental control" 
(Taylor 1989: 149). This is what Enlightenment means: throwing light on reality in 
                                                
22 The way our language works probably has a large influence on our view of the mind-body relation. 
The grammar of indo-european languages favours constructions as the one above, using a genitive and 
substantivizing both body and mind.  
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such a way as to X-ray it, grasp it, and as a result steering it. A contemporary medical 
docter, for example, is able to perform surgery and heal a patient because of the precise 
knowledge he has of the human body (which is a fairly recent thing), while a geologist, 
to give a completely different example, is able to trace precious fossil resources in 
favour of human ends because of knowledge of soil quality, sedimentary layers, 
movement of the earth’s crust and paleontological data. This modern notion of 
‘mastery’ can be traced back to Descartes' Discours de la Methode: "For they [some 
general notions concerning fysics, jt] caused me to see that it is possible to attain 
knowledge which is very useful in life, and that, […] we may find a practical 
philosophy by means of which, kwowing the force and the action of fire, water, air, the 
stars, heavens and all other bodies that environ us, as distinctly as we know the 
different crafts of our artisans, we can in the same way employ them in all those uses to 
which they are adapted, and thus render ourselves the masters and possessors of 
nature" (Descartes 1968: 78). As far as the human organism is concerned, Descartes 
conceived of the mind as the command post which operates the body’s motions by 
controlling the 'spirits animaux' (Cf. Taylor 1989: 143-58). According to Descartes, we 
are free because we understand. That is why, as Bacon noticed before Descartes, 
knowledge is power.  
  It is important to keep in mind, though, that people were not all of a sudden free and 
rational, but they started conceiving of themselves as autonomous because of their 
being rational. Enlightenment meant discovering the power of rationality as a source of 
human freedom. Whereas in older worldviews people had no choice but to resign to 
their destiny, in the new paradigm they thought they could actively take life in their 
hands. In his book Eurotaoism German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk shows us that this 
freedom de facto means the freedom to move, thereby turning mobility into the essence 
of modernity (Cf. Sloterdijk 1991: 25-48). Abandoned by God and relegated by 
modern cosmology to an insignificant side-arm of the galaxy, humans have liberated 
themselves since the Renaissance from the medieval religious shackles, relying on their 
moral rationality, scientific knowledge and technical ingenuity. As maître et possesseur 
de la nature (Western) men pushed God from his throne and became to consider 
themselves as the intelligent designers of civilised society. As a consequence of this 
paradigm shift in the West, which was called Enlightenment only later, we suffer from 
the moral disease of deeming life worthy and meaningful only if we lead an active, 
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creative life. The type of freedom that distinguishes us from the rest of nature resides in 
our ability to initiate a non-intuitive sequence of movements spontaneously, based on a 
pre-existing idea in our heads. Being free means having the ability to set in motion a 
chain of events at any given time. The concept of human freedom, which has been 
phrased primarily in moral and political terms of progress, de facto boils down to a 
logic of physical acceleration. ‘I run, therefore I am’, a contemporary Descartes could 
have written.23 The myth of endless economic growth that modern man believes in, 
following in the wake of this mental turn, can partially be explained, as we saw earlier 
this chapter, by the shift from vertical to horizontal creation of meaning: instead of 
trusting on God’s mercy we feel we have to create our well-being, pleasures and 
material comforts ourselves during our short telluric stay.    
 
 
1.2.3  Descartes’ heritage 
 
It is not miraculous that Cartesian ideas still appeal to us today. His influence on 
science, philosophy and even common opinion can hardly be overestimated. 
Notwithstanding a couple of flagrant mistakes, Descartes expressed some fundamental 
intuitions on human consciousness which are difficult to refute. He did not only cause 
an epistemological revolution, but also a far-reaching change of perspective on our 
portrayal of mankind. Until the present day Cartesian ideas on mind and body provide 
the matrix that encapsulates the discussion on human identity. We can distinguish at 
least three major influences of Descartes on subsequent history.  
  Firstly, modern scientific methods adhere to the principle of radical doubt, that is, 
scientific theories should be regarded as hypotheses, should be falsifiable and are 
therefore under constant scrutiny. We could contend that Descartes' scepsis has been 
institutionalised (Giddens 1991). Secondly, Descartes and his contemporaries stood on 
the brink of the mechanization of our worldview. Parallelled to his instrumental view 
of rationality, it lead to the assumption that humans possess the intellectual capacities 
to improve their own fate. Also it lead to their self-declared stewardship over nature.  
                                                
23 Or better, were he a car-driving Descartes: ‘I am in a jam, therefore I am.’ 
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  Thirdly, as already mentioned, we are strongly inclined to separate mind and body, 
and view the mind as the true headquarters of our identity. Who would dare say that the 
identity of someone suffering from a severe paralysis caused by a car crash has been 
definitely altered? Probably, her self-view will have changed, but we are certaily 
dealing with the same person (Cf. Karther 2003: 50-1). Everyone knows the example of 
the worldfamous British natural scientist Stephen Hawking, who has been struck by a 
devastating neuromotor disease. Yet, although his body has stiffened almost 
completely, restricting his movement to eyeblinks and tiny finger movements, making 
him communicate thanks to a computer interface only, we still regard this person, on 
behalf of his mental characteristics, as the same Stephen Hawking from before his 
illness.   
  We cannot simply dismiss Descartes' conception of the soul all too easily, because of 
modern sociological insights into the constructedness and liquidity of human identity, 
or because of the amounting neuro-experimental evidence against it. It still has a firm 
basis in phenomenology and everyday life. As Sherry Turkle righlty notices in her 
book on modern identity:  
 
“.. for many people it is hard to accept any challenge to the idea of an 
autonomous ego. While in recent years, many psychologists, social theorists, 
psychoanalysists, and philosophers have argued that the self should be thought 
of as essentially decentered, the normal requirements of everyday life exert 
strong pressure on people to take responsibility for their actions and to see 
themselves as intentional and unitary actors. This disjuncture between theory 
(the unitary self is an illusion) and lived experience (the unitary self is the most 
basic reality) is one of the main reasons why multiple and decentered theories 
have been slow to catch on – or when they do, why we tend to settle back 
quickly into older, centralized ways of looking at things” (Turkle 1995: 15).  
 
By implication, we should not throw Descartes’ theory of the cogito out with the 
bathwater. If we do so because of the fact that nowadays we understand personal 
identities to be mobile and decentered, then we fall prey to a categorical mistake: we 
compare apples to oranges. Descartes is clearly referring to a different type of identity: 
the one I termed self-identity.  
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  The question remains what causes this autophenomenological experience of identity? 
Should we, such as the adherents to the simple view do, surrender to the cogito as an 
unfathomable factum? Or is it possible to discern at least some minimal requirements 
that should be met in order for a human being to have an experience of self-identity?  
 
 
 
1.3  Remember me 
 
The past is something we can see, but cannot touch. 
Chinese saying 
 
If there is one quality required in order to have an experience of identity, then it is a 
decent working memory. We owe it to our memory that our daily portion of sleep does 
not disable the continuity of our identity. A loss of the ability to recollect past 
experiences and acquired knowledge would unarguably imply a loss of identity as well. 
Humans have at least three types of memory. First, there is motoric memory. We share 
this most basic form of memory with all other living creatures that have a central 
nervous system. The majority of movements we produce get stored by our organisms 
through frequent repetition without ever making it to consciousness. It ranges from 
elementary skills such as walking to complex operations as playing an  instrument in a 
big orchestra and the unconscious coordination of arms, legs and senses while driving a 
car.  
  Besides this motoric memory humans have an event memory: the ability to recall past 
events, often called autobiographical memory. Finally, humans have a factual memory: 
they are able to store non-experiential facts. From my history courses I recall, for 
example, that the Western Roman Empire fell in the year 476 post mortem Christi, but 
simultaneously I remember having a lunch date with an attractive colleague next 
Friday.24 All three of these forms of memory intermingle and are crucial to our 
experience of identity. If I suddenly happened to lose the ability to drive a car, or would 
suffer from instant long-term amnesia, or lost my capacity to store new information, 
                                                
24 For the tripartition, see Noonan 2003: 9. 
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then this would have severe consequences for my sense of identity, if not wiping it out 
altogether.   
 
 
1.3.1  Locke’s conception of personal identity 
 
John Locke was the first philospher in history to suggest that memory might be the 
most significant criterion for diachronic identity. In the chapter Of Identity and 
Diversity in his Essay concerning human understanding (1690), Locke coined the 
problem of personal identity and gave it its prominent place on the philosophical 
agenda, which it currently enjoys more than ever. A generation later, Hume even went 
so far as to claim: "Memory alone, […] is to be considered as the source of personal 
identity" (Hume 1964: 542). Thus, Locke stands at the outset of the so called 
‘psychological approach’ to the identity question as I mentioned at the end of section 1. 
Since Locke's influence on the debate on personal identity is still felt today, one can 
safely contend that the debate moved in Locke's impressive footsteps ever since (Cf. 
Noonan 2003: 24). Many recent debates – in anglo-american literature predominantly – 
on the consequences of brain transplantation and artificial intelligence, for example, 
refer directly back to Locke, by connecting to an age-long tradition of pondering the 
possibility of a migrating consciousness. Something that according to Locke is 
possible, as we will see hereafter. 
  Locke discriminates between a human being and a person. A human is a body that is 
situated in spacetime, consisting of multiple substances, and obtaining its characteristic 
form due to a formal principle of organisation (we would probably call that DNA-code 
nowadays). It is this unique, to each individual specific, pattern of organisation, which 
renders humans identifyable. Human identity consists in this peculiar organisation of 
life, this unique collection of bodily features that is recognised by others. Therefore, in 
Locke's view, the body does belong to the identity of a human, but not to personal 
identity.  
  He describes a person, on the other hand, as a "thinking, intelligent being, that has 
reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in 
different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness, which is 
inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it: It being impossible for 
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anyone to perceive, without perceiving, that he does perceive" (Locke 1975: 335). So a 
person is a self-conscious, thinking being. From this we should not infer that,  
according to Locke, persons equal Cartesian minds. On the contrary, Locke strongly 
opposes Descartes, who puts consciousness and the thinking substance on a par: "For 
the same consciousness being preserved, whether in the same or different Substances, 
the personal Identity is preserved" (Ibid: 338). Locke refuses categorically to declare to 
which substance this thinking being belongs, whether it is of bodily, spiritually or even 
God-like nature. No matter the substance it migrates to, as long as the same 
consciousness is preserved, personal identity remains intact.  
  One of the explanations Locke gives for this maybe somewhat peculiar notion of 
identity lies in the fact that every human being is composed of billions of elementary 
particals, that belonged to many other creatures in the past and will go into many 
others, after they will have gone through the life-cycle of a particular body. A carbon 
molecule is indifferent to whether it is stuck in me or in flower! Still, despite of its 
‘neutrality’, I do have (self)conscious experiences. Apparently, the nature of the 
substance consciousness resides in – as long as it sustains intelligent human life – does 
not matter that much.    
  A person is – put in a spinozistic fashion – a thinking mode within any substance that 
is capable of having representations. A person has an identity, in as far as she is able to 
combine past and present representational contents in the same consciousness.25 
Personal identity resides in the self-perception of a thinking thing as being the "the 
same thinking thing in different times and places. […] For since consciousness always 
accompanies thinking, and 'tis that, that makes every one to be, what he calls self; and 
thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists 
personal identity, i.e. the sameness of a rational Being: and as far as this consciousness 
can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of 
that person" (Ibid: 335).26 One could say, a person consists of a stream of thoughts that 
became self-conscious, i.e. conscious of their occurence in the same thinking thing. 
                                                
25 Although memory is evidently presupposed here as a necessary condition for having self-identity, 
Locke does not use the term itself anywhere!    
26 Just as we saw with Noonan, Locke does not make a distinction between self-identity and personal 
identity. Again, when Locke speaks of personal identity, he refers to what I term self-identity. Personal 
identity is in Locke’s view determined by psychological identity.   
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  That is why I deem the concept of psychological identity very apt to describe Locke's 
view on identity: it is the psyche, the thinking thing, that stays the same over time. For 
Locke, personal identity requires the (self)conscious recollection of a former state of 
mind. If persons did not have this ability to recall past mentals states, then having an 
experience of personal identity would become impossible. Clearly, in Locke's 
perspective, only healthy, rational humans with a decent memory are eligible for 
becoming persons.  
 
 
1.3.2  Questioning Locke’s view 
 
Locke’s analysis calls for a couple of important questions. First and foremost, the 
crucial problem – what underlies the experience of identity? – still lingers in the 
background. Locke has undoubtedly discovered an important prerequisite of having an 
experience of identity, but he did not explain its kernel. What precisely is staying the 
same, and why so? Locke seems to have fallen victim to a circularity in his argument: 
should there not be some sort of identity already, in order for a person to remember 
herself as staying that particular person? What underlies this similarity? Let me explain 
my objection with the following example.  
  A couple of years ago I got my master in Philosophy. There is no doubt in my mind, 
that the person now writing these lines is the same as the one graduating at that 
glorious moment. What justifies me in drawing this conclusion? Suffices the memory 
of the ceremony? I can remember events I haven not witnessed personally, but which I 
heard of at second hand or saw on television. I can even think of fictitious events. 
Furthermore, the mental image I have of myself does not necessarily diverge from that 
of other persons present in that situation. I can picture myself lecturing just as well as I 
can picture the audience listening. So it looks like I need to have a concept of identity 
already, that is, I have to know that it was me who graduated on that sunny day, in 
order to remember myself as being part of it. Memory alone does not explain why it is 
the same consciousness remembering itself.27 (Cf. Marres 1991: 27) 
                                                
27 I still think I am justified in identifying myself with the doctorand; in the next section I will explain 
why.   
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  A second argument against Locke’s theory concerns the reliability of our memory. 
Our memory is highly fragmented: it is full of laps; on average we spend every day 
eight hours asleep; vast parts of the time we are awake get occupied with routine work 
that disappears in the dark abyss of oblivion immediately. Just try to remember what 
you did in the last 24 hours and you will see how difficult remembering accurately is, 
let alone all the thousands of days of your life that went by without leaving a trace!  
Human biography consists of a few, precious instants of discontinuity which, by briefly 
breaking the monotony of everyday life, illuminate the gloomy night of our personal 
histories.  
  In addition, it remains to be seen whether the scarse moments we do remember make 
up for trustworthy representations of what actually happened. Our memory is fallible. 
Sometimes we even wittingly distort the truth: do we not make our beloved partner just 
a tiny bit more handsome in our imagination? And can I not have dreamed something 
realistically to such a degree that I start asking myself whether it really happened or 
not? Besides, forgetting is a law of life. Remembering means selecting. We would 
become crushed psychologically by the weight of all the memories and thoughts we 
had to carry, if every experience stuck in our consciousness. We are compelled to put 
things aside, for not to drown in the vast sea of negative emotions, self-doubts and 
embarrassing moments.   
 In the third place, memory in itself is only the intellectual capacity that enables the 
praxis of remembrance. It is the actual remembrances that form the building stones of 
our identities. Remembering does not mean the opening of a neatly organised and 
unchanging cerebral drawer, such as it was long thought of, but our memory stands 
under constant reconstruction. Neurological research has shown that our memory 
works as a living network, rather than an antique cupboard. This causes remembrances 
to be continuously redefined. History is written time and time again: both on a personal 
as on a societal level. Just think of the witnesses of car accidents who, despite of the 
fact that they witnessed the same accident, all recount different happenings. The 
definite book on history does not exist: our history lies in the future. Every time we 
recall things, we change history and alter the content of our identities along with it.   
  The fourth objection I want to raise leads up to the argument that will be unfolded in 
the next section. It concerns the overall possibility of consciously experienced 
memories. A person may have knowledge of her past happenings, but is she capable of 
 49 
reviving that past moment? Can she have exact knowledge of the state of mind she is 
referrering to? Can she – as presently (self)conscious being – recollect exactly what it 
was like to undergo that experience? Take for example the well-known act of looking 
at childhood photographs. As soon as I spot a picture taken of myself, I know on my 
parents’ word that it is me. But there is no way I can deliberately and consciously recall 
the particular situation I was in. Even if I were to have some shreds of memories, it is 
still impossible to recall the entire situation and to genuinely ‘copy’, so to speak, my 
former state of consciousness.   
  The one big difference between live experiences and memories is the body. Memories 
are mental images of events that on an earlier moment in time have been lived through 
psycho-physically. Although my heartbeat speeds up, my blood pressure rises and I 
become warm and sweaty when having certain (non-specified!) memories, they are still 
only superficial reminiscences of the ‘real thing’. Only thoughts, which never existed 
somewhere else than in the mind, can be mentally repeted undilutedly. To go back for a 
moment to the earlier mentioned example of my graduation: it is impossible for me to 
revive the exact affective, neurophysiological and hormonal reaction I had, when the 
members of the committee fired their difficult questions at me. In that respect, the 
‘feeling’ of oneself, seems to stand ‘out of time’: life consists of unique moments 
impossible to hold on to. Although we may experience an emotional reaction whilst 
thinking of a past event, or remember having had a certain feeling at the time, ‘feeling 
back in time’ seems utterly impossible. The present is a timeless moment, caught up in 
an ever-vanishing non-spot between history and future. An eternal truth so to say. Yet, 
I still remain convinced of staying the same person over the course of time. So I ask 
again: what causes this autophenomenological experience of identity?   
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1.4  The ecological self 
 
  The original distinction between self and other is a deep biological principle; one  
might say it is the deepest principle, for biology begins in self-preservation – in the 
emergence of entities (the simplest replicators) who resisted destruction and decay, 
who combatted, at least for a short time, the Second Law of Thermodynamics, and 
passed their capacity to do this to their descendants. 
Daniel Dennett 
 
Descartes' philosophy of nature marked the demise of the centuries-old, graeco-
christian view of the body as ‘animated matter’, and it succesfully launched the idea of 
the body as a mechanical device, subjected to the laws of nature. Nevertheless, 
although this meant a fundamental rupture within our view of the ‘human animal’ split 
into body and mind, even Descartes could not deny granting a body to the soul in order 
to host it during its stay in this world. We all know the problem Descartes had to deal 
with in consequence, in relating these two substances to each other. As the following 
quote from Paul Ricoeur asserts, finding the ‘pineapple gland’ is as difficult in the 
twentyfirst century as it was in Descartes’ days: “…understanding the way in which 
our own body is at once a body like any other (situated among other bodies) and an 
aspect of the self (its manner of being in the world) is a problem of vast proportions” 
(Ricoeur 1994: 33). Let us take up the challenge. I want to propose two ways of tracing 
the body’s role with regard to our (experience of) identity, thereby giving two examples 
of the ‘somatic approach’ to the problem of identity. 
 
 
1.4.1  Ecological selfhood 
 
To begin with, the discovery of the body’s boundaries commences as soon as a human 
being leaves the primordial body: its mother. Newly borns immediately set out on the 
adventurous journey of learning where their own organisms end and the rest of the 
world begins. An elementary form of self-awareness grows when a neonate starts to 
coordinate the movements of its limbs and to perceive the relative distances between 
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itself and its surroundings.28 In an article on self-knowledge Ulric Neisser calls this 
notion of selfhood the ecological self: “The ecological self is the self as perceived with 
respect to the physical environment: ‘I’ am the person here in this place, engaged in 
this particular activity” (Neisser, in: Kolak & Martin 1991: 386). Neisser conceives of 
the ecological self in the first place as the visual center of perceiving the position and 
movement of the body. Ecological self-awareness – after the Greek ‘oikos’, meaning 
‘home’ – comes down to an organism’s (implicit) knowledge of its own boundaries in 
relation to its environment, and to control its movements accordingly (Ibid: 389-90)29.  
  This elementary kind of self-awareness is, on different levels, present in the whole of 
the biosphere. From the simple receptiveness of bacteriae to the complex, symbolical 
consciousness of humans, all living creatures are defined by their egoistic striving – 
this is what Spinoza called conatus – for the preservation of their own organisms 
amidst a harsh, impinging outer reality. Compare it to what Daniel Dennett writes 
about the genesis of selfhood: “So a minimal self is […] something abstract which 
amounts just to the existence of an organisation which tends to distinguish, control, and 
preserve portions of the world, an organisation that thereby creates and maintains 
boundaries” (Dennett, in: Kolak & Martin 1991: 358). This original form of 
‘selfishness’ is one of the generic features of all living nature. Dennett even calls it, as 
we read in the exergue opening this section, its ‘deepest principle’.  
  The edges of the body make up for the divide between self and other. When thinking 
of myself I think in the first place of a body, located in space and time. (Try it!) 
Consciousness is always situated spatially. I am first and foremost ‘this thing here’. I 
am the spatial center of perceiving the world. The denominizer ‘self’ refers in this case 
to a thinking, perceiving and sensitive body. It refers to the psychophysical totality, 
situated in spacetime, that I am. It is what Neisser called the ecological self. It has to be 
acknowledged, though, that some bodily parts seem more indispensable for evoking an 
experience of self-identity than others. Although every part of our body provides neural 
                                                
28 I call this self-awareness rather thans self-consciousness, since it concerns a pre-symbolical type of 
self-referential knowledge.  
29 Neisser observes that this boundary can be shifted outward by clothes or a vehicle like a car, which we 
experience as our second skin. So the ecological self does not necessarily coincide with the biological 
body. One could go even further and argue that by virtue of planning future actions, the (human) 
ecological self extends itself in time. Equally, cyberspace could be said to expand the ecological self 
spatially.  
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input and interacts with other internal or even outer parts, the brain obviously seems the 
prime candidate for constituting identity’s headquarters. In the vast pool of literature on 
personal identity, the strong version of this thesis goes by the name of the brain 
criterium.  
  The brain criterium involves the opinion that only the brain is responsible for the 
existence of self-identity, which, subsequently, wanders with the brain. The time-
honoured problem of the migration of souls has almost become reality thanks to the 
nigh technology of brain transplantation. If one replaces the brain of a body by another 
one, what will be the identity of the newly composed hybrid? Imagine the situation of 
waking up in a completely different, ‘pimped body’ – supposing for the moment this 
were possible – would you not hold the opinion of still being the same person, in spite 
of the new, fancy shell?  
  Yet, according to the theory of ecological selfhood, this can be no other than a thought 
experiment. For the time being, it is only the naturally grown body that supports 
ecological selfhood, and by consequence the experience of self-identity. One of the 
arguments against the brain criterium is, that a brain has developed the way it did only 
in a particular body. Every combination of body and brain is unique. In a different 
body the brain would not be the same and the neurological tuning between brain and 
the rest of the body would be lacking completely. The brain is not formed by genetic 
instructions alone, but develops in interaction with the rest of the body. Even more so, 
it is constantly subjected to impinging outer forces, such as nutrition, environment and 
cultural influences. It is a well-known medical fact that behaviour influences the brain, 
just as much as the brain causes behaviour. If I were to engage, for example, in long-
term mathematical training my brain would show different neural connections and 
brain activity from the situation in which I would spend my days reading pulp-fiction 
novels. 
 The insights about the bodily foundation of self-awareness I put forward in this section 
might seem at odds with what I said earlier about core-selfness and the first person 
perspective in relation to Descartes’ and Kant’s philosophies. However, the fact that 
every first person perspective is necessarily tied to a body, does not abrogate its 
existence at all. In the end, this is one of the most important lessons philosophers of 
mind such as Descartes and Kant taught us, namely that whenever we talk of human 
identity, we have to take the existence of this first person perspective into account. In 
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fact, up until the present day no theory whatsoever achieved to cogently disprove the 
existence of a first perspective in human beings. Therefore, although I do certainly not 
adopt Descartes’ dualism, I do acknowledge the existence of self-referentiality as a 
uniquely human feature in itself. 
 
 
1.4.2  Matter and form 
 
This brings me to the second attempt at providing self-identity with a bodily 
foundation. One of the first great philosophers will have the final saying in this section. 
I want to look into two of Aristotle's works to extract a second formula to go deeper 
into the relation between mind and matter, between body and soul: his Physics and his 
work on the soul, De Anima. In the Physics Aristotle unfolds his classic theory on 
causality, of which mainly the so-called causa materialis and the causa formalis are of 
importance in this argument. Once they have been created (causa efficiens), the 
material and the formal cause are the principle causes of all living creatures. In 
Aristotle's theory of 'hylomorphism', a body is seen as the matter, of which the soul 
(anima) is the essential form (Cf. Aristotle 1995: 28). Every organism strives for 
expressing its original potential – which comes with every living composition of matter 
– in its final form. To a human organism this ‘animation’ means both being alive, and 
expressing its typical human nature, which resides in its powers of reason, perception, 
and automobility (Cf. Aristotle 1995: 32). Because of this unique combination of soul 
and body one cannot transport the soul to just any arbitrary other body: every living 
creature has its own, distinguishing soul. Therefore, we cannot describe the relation 
between body and soul as the one between a computer and its software, as is often 
claimed in modern literature on consciousness (Cf. Karther 2003: 25).  
  All parts of the body – its organs – have to be fine-tuned to enable animated life. 
According to Aristotle a human being is a naturally formed, functionally organised 
body, which aspires to optimize its natural endowment of being a thinking, perceiving 
and self-moving body. So, man’s essence, that which turns a human being into the man 
or woman he or she is, is neither body nor mind, but the threefold complex of natural 
form, matter and their supplementarity. The moment the organism stops thinking and 
exhails its last breath, an inert, disintegrating pile of atoms is what is left over. Being 
 54 
animated and being alive are equal to Aristotle. That is why he conceives of the human 
being, very progressively, as the animal rationale, without needing to dissect it 
radically from the animal reign.30 Humans share their basal, organic functions with 
animal creatures, and developed on top of that an extra layer of rationality. Human 
identity gets determined, in contrast to the view held by later Christian or postcartesian 
philosophers and theologists, not by the soul alone, but by the inextricable unity of 
body and soul in every animated being. 
  I introduced Aristotle, because one could say that his material-formal principle of 
identity has been identified as DNA in modern moleculair biology. Our genetic code 
provides us with a relatively constant form over the years, and renders us forensically 
identifiable. This results in the peculiar fact that, although every seven years almost any 
molecule in my body is being replaced by a new one – apart maybe from some 
stemcells –, my identity remains the same. Ricoeur elucidates this notion of identity by 
referring to a hammer which, even if one changed its head for a spare part, would still 
be recognised as the same hammer, even though it physically is not. The same goes for 
the human body. The molecules it has been built of have no personality. They are not 
even alive. Life is the mysterious, emergent quality that originates from the interaction 
between molecules, gathered in cells. Even more miraculously, and probably the 
biggest wonder in the entire cosmos: molecules have organised themselves in such a 
way into human beings as to become conscious of themselves. All the knowledge we 
possess, the books written, and the plays staged spring from this unfathomable moment 
of accidental, autogenetic reflectivity. The extraordinary moment when nature 
mysteriously got a voice.  
  Yet, every one of the molecules a human has been built of is replacable. A person now 
living has been assembled of molecules of millions of deceased former hosts. I could 
well bear the molecules that once made up Aristotle, Newton or Kant within me! I am 
nonetheless myself and not Immanuel Kant – luckily! –, neither some sort of formless 
composition of all those persons. In every cell of me lies my unique genetic code 
(potential), which ensures every new cell to fit into the original blueprint. This also 
explains why the brain, notwithstanding the daily decay of thousands of braincells, can 
maintain its functionality and store information. The experience of self-identity 
                                                
30 This is one of Aristoteles’ insights that was criticised fiercely by Martin Heidegger, who explicitely 
refused to view the human as ‘animal rationale’, for in his view, men (‘Dasein’) and animals are 
ontologically two completely different creatures (Cf. Heidegger 1993: 14, 48-50).   
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persists, because its overall shape and patterns of interaction stay intact over many 
years, and the brain never loses – apart from some cases of dementia, brain traumas or 
other neuronal diseases – its innate potential of reconfiguring its own tissue and 
learning new things. It appears that self-identity is somehow due to formal similarity. 
In this sense the I is pure form. It is the self-referential experience of staying the same 
person over time that mysteriously rises out of the particular configuration of the 
elementary particles that make up its substratum. This cognitive mechanism of formal 
continuity turns the I into so steady a beacon in an ever-changing material world.  
  This formal congruence explains why I can be sentenced today for a crime I 
committed five years ago, without a soul witnessing the felony. The idem of a human 
being, as far as we can objectively establish it, consist of his specific form, the self-
sustaining arrangement of her molecular structure. For that reason, the art of 
establishing DNA-profiles provided us with a strong tool for determining an 
individual’s numerical identity. Numerical identity means that a thing always coincides 
with itself and only itself, and will never be anything else as long as it exists. 
Monovular twins provide us with a good example to explain this concept: although 
they are qualitatively identical, i.e. naked they look the same, they are nevertheless 
numerically two different individuals. No matter how much a person changes in the 
course of her life, numerically she stays the same person. From juvenile dusk till the 
dawn of life every human being passes through a unique path through spacetime. There 
is a formal continuity between any two moments in a lifetime, precisely because of the 
genetic sameness that gets reproduced with every new cell.31 Therefore, we could better 
call this dynamic numerical identity. After all, in case of a human being, both matter, 
shape and properties such as behaviour, do change. It is merely the overall structure 
that remains. Growing old is a process of preserving a kernel of identity in a constantly 
changing context. If it was not for this dynamic numerical idenity, a human would 
really become someone else in the course of time.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
31 One of the causes of aging, by the way, is probably a deficient copying mechanism, that is, a string of 
DNA is not copied entirely during replication, causing cellular disfunctions.  
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1.4.3  Conclusion: the bodily foundation of self-identity 
 
It seems that in order to have an experience of self-identity at least two conditions have 
to be met: firstly, there has to be a body that stays the same over the course of time in 
terms of formal organisation. The formed body provides with the continuity that lays 
the foundation for all other aspects of human identity. Without it, identity would vanish 
in all its appearances. This is what I called dynamically numerical identity. Secondly, 
there has to be the case of ecological selfhood. A creature (probably a human one) has 
to be neurologically equipped to evoke this particular kind of experience of 
(self)identity. We may now bring the two approaches together by stating that human 
bodies are generally formed in such a fashion, as to enable a conscious experience of 
ecological selfhood, due to the specific neurological wiring and sensetory make-up of 
the human organism.  
  In my view this type of selfhood originates in the deeply rooted biological principle, 
pertaining to all living creatures, of interacting continuously with their environment and 
through that way developing a ‘sense’ of selfhood, which in human beings developped 
itself to such a high degree as to enable us to refer to ourselves reflexively using 
personal pronouns. Put somewhat more bluntly: when depicting myself as ‘I’, this ‘I’ 
refers to an organism that experiences itself in its bodily identity, that is, in staying the 
same organism. In the following passage, the renowned neurologist Antonio Damasio 
summarizes the biological origins of selfhood in a nutshell:  
 
“I have come to conclude that the organism, as represented inside its own brain, 
is a likely biological forerunner for what eventually becomes the elusive sense 
of self. The deep roots for the self, including the elaborate self which 
encompasses identity and personhood, are to be found in the ensemble of brain 
devices which continuously and nonconsciously maintain the body state within 
the narrow range and relative stability required for survival. These devices 
continually represent, nonconsciously, the state of the living body, along its 
many dimensions. I call the state of activity within the ensemble of such 
devices the proto-self, the nonconscious forerunner for the levels of self which 
appear in our minds as the conscious protagonists of consciousness: core self 
and autobiographical self. […] If this idea is correct, life and consciousness, 
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specifically the self aspect of consciousness, are indelibly interwoven” 
(Damasio 1999: 22-23). 
   
  According to this theory it is the sameness of perspective, the endurance of an 
organism’s specific mode of percepting itself and its environment, that basically 
accounts for the experience of self-identity. Human beings experience themselves as 
identical, because of their lasting neurologically induced outlook on the world. Over 
time this causes a relatively stable experience of being-in-the-world. In this view, I 
cannot possibly be anyone else besides myself, not even when dreaming of being 
someone else, or in getting under someone else’s skin by imagination. Here we come 
across what is presumably one of the eternal, psychological schisms of mankind: by 
nature of our thinking, we always aspire to be elsewhere or someone else, yet we are 
tragically chained to ourselves. That is why at the earlier mentioned graduation party 
there was only one possible precursor of me. Only the guy standing behind the lectern 
had the same neurological outlook on the world as I currently have.    
 
 
 
1.5  Me, myself and I  
 
Das Subjekt ist etwas am Leibe. 
Friedrich Nietzsche 
 
1.5.1  Answering the unity question  
 
Now that we have caught up with some of the all-time classics on identity, the moment 
has arrived to wrap things up. The above exposition allows for a tentative, preliminary 
conclusion. The question that set off this journey into the roots of human identity was 
the so called ‘unity question’ I posed in section 1. What are the reasons for 
experiencing sameness over time? What lends unity to all the aspects and experiences 
that coalesce into me? In the attempt to answer this question we discovered – in order 
of profoundity – the following constitutive layers.   
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  As a bottomline fact there is our physical constitution. It needs no further stressing 
here that the body is, in its particular form, the conditio sine qua non of any experience 
of identity whatsoever. Even counterarguments that abnegate its vital role in 
constituting identity, as the ones we have encountered in section 3 about implanting 
one’s stream of consciousness artificially into a machine, cannot deny the necessity of 
some sort of underlying, physical machinery that causes an idiosyncratic outlook on the 
world. Next to the downloading of all the necessary biographical and characterological 
data, this new ‘organism’ would still need to be manufactured in such a way as to cause 
the same experience of being in the world. It would have to think of and perceive the 
world in exactly the same manner as its former host, only then an ongoing sense of 
identity will be possible.  
  These considerations lead us to the second premise of self-identity: having ecological 
self-awareness, i.e. the experience of being the same organism in all times and places. 
It involves our self-centeredness and the unique perspective on the world it provokes, 
founded in our physical blueprint. On distinct moments in time we experience 
ourselves as the same center of perceiving and interacting with outer reality. From 
section four we recall the ecological self to be the psychophysical center of perception 
of an organism in dealing with the world, caused by its specific genetic make-up, 
whilst having a prereflective awareness of its own boundaries and a concern for its 
preservation and well-being.  
  A hermeneutic philosopher would probably raise objections to this argument, since 
according to her view, our way of looking at things is always somehow ‘coloured’ by 
our temper, moods or the worldview we inherited from our forebears. In other words, 
the experience of being a biological self would not be exclusively caused by our 
neurophysiological structure and consequently not be as fundamental as I am 
suggesting here. Even though I certainly do not want to undermine the importance of 
such factors on our way of looking at things, I still would classify them as being 
circumstantial in relation to our sense of self-identity. The reason why I believe so is 
that even if I experience tremendous revolutions in my life, appear to have altered 
personality completely, changed my circle of friends drastically, moved away, began to 
adhere to an obscure religion and may even have adopted a different name, it would 
still be me who underwent all those changes. A more fundamental sense of identity still 
reverberates within me, which turns these new qualities into my moods, my penchants 
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and my beliefs. No-one else but me owns this unique, first-person experience of all 
those happenings that occurred to me, before and after the far-reaching transformations 
that put my life’s course out of joint. As long as I can speak of myself as being 
changed, as having dealt with ruptures in my life, I have to suppose an underlying 
identity. This fundamental, inalienable sense of self-identity, is what the notion of 
ecological selfhood refers to. 
  Third, somewhere during the process of childly maturation springs self-consciousness 
from this ecological self-awareness. Having self-consciousness means having the 
ability to express ecological selfhood by referring to oneself using the personal 
pronoun 'I'. This is the historical moment, where mankind made a conceptual, self-
referential move and separated itself from the animal reign. Following Locke, I shall 
call such self-conscious beings persons, marked by the symbolically mediated, self-
referential observation of being the same thinking organism in different times and 
places. A person is an ecological self that became conscious of its own selfhood. The 
difference between being an ecological self and being a self-conscious ecological self 
lies in having a conceptual notion of one’s identity. In addition, as was demonstrated in 
the section on psychological identity, self-consciousness has to be accompanied by a 
properly working memory in order to establish and recognise temporal sameness.  
  As I noted in section 1 an animal, although having ecological self-awareness (i.e. it 
experiences its organism from within, knowing its boundaries and struggling to persist 
in its existence), cannot take a reflective stance towards itself. It is not conscious of 
itself qua self. This latter, reflective conception of selfhood is how we should grasp not 
only Locke’s notion of personhood, but also Descartes’ cogito, and even Kant's 
transcendental-subjectivistic concept of the ‘I’.32 Ultimately, despite the big differences 
in their philosophical systems, they all try to grab conceptual hold of this identity 
determining experience of selfhood, which I deciphered as self-reflective ecological 
self-awareness. Although concepts as ‘self’ or ‘I’ are reflexive concepts, and as such 
products of our thinking activity - there is no such thing as a ‘self’ out there in nature, it 
                                                
32 In postmodern literature, the subject has frequently been declared to have ‘deceased’. What is proven 
though, are the mobile and heterogeneous origins of subjectivity, not its non-existence. At the very most, 
it is a Cartesian type of subjectivity that is no longer tenable. "But even supposing that I am nothing 
more than some package of socially responsive roles, I am still something rather than nothing. So the 
argument hardly establishes the death of the subject; it simply makes the subject a social construction all 
the way down. But houses are completely constructed, and they exist. Being constructed hardly makes 
something into nothing. Usually it is the other way around" (Flanagan 1996: 7).   
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exists only in my imagination or utterance (I will address this point at the end of this 
section) – those concepts still refer to the undeniably real, self-referential experience of 
staying the same self-conscious being. In my opinion this is what ultimately accounts 
for our sense of identity.    
  Recapitulating, we can conclude that the experience of self-identity is caused by the 
combination of a relatively stable bodily shape, ecological selfhood, self-consciousness 
and having a properly working memory. Although these four constituents may be the 
necessary conditions for undergoing an experience of identity, we all know from our 
day-to-day lives that there is a whole lot more to it. We don not walk around indulging 
ourselves in being self-conscious ecological selves. The way identity usually comes to 
the fore is in the guise of personal identity.  
 
 
1.5.2  Personal identity 
 
Analogous to the distinction I made earlier between self-identity and personal identity, 
we can state that personal identity consists of all the self-descriptive attributes a person 
gathers in symbolically expressing her identity after reflecting on it. Personal identity is 
the versatile answer that is invoked when we are being asked for our identity. So the 
rather formal, inexpressible sense of always being oneself, now becomes tangible by 
adding to it a symbolically mediated composition of all the bodily features, opinions, 
desires, tempers, hobbies and so forth people are used to talk about when investigating 
into their identities. Returning to the initial, examplary meditation introducing this 
chapter that caused all this conceptual nitpicking, we can now add the insight that the 
continuous thoughts that are in my mind, and the desires I cherish, my memories, 
emotional response patterns and future plans, all account for a large part for my 
sensation of still being the same person when I wake up in the morning. On 
consecutive days I not only have the same ecological, but also a similar moral and 
psychological outlook on the world. It is highly likely that the food I liked yesterday is 
still the preferred one today, the beliefs I held yesterday are still part of my convictions 
today, and the slight panic I always used to suffer from when confronting a group of 
people, will probably be there too.  
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  So here the aformentioned hermeneutic philosopher would have a strong case in 
arguing that my moods and my life's history have a great impact on my way of being-
in-the-world. We have to keep in mind though that these traits remain contingent and 
constitute variable features with respect to our fundamental sense of self-identity. As 
shown on a couple of earlier occasions along the text, these circumstancial conditions 
may change. They form an integral part of my identity, exacerbate my experience of 
being the same person, but are not its essential prerequisitions. My character may 
change, yet I remain. I may experience severe disruptions in my biography, but it is still 
my life. The particular thoughts and desires that make up my mind on evenings before I 
go to sleep surely attribute to my sense of identity when waking up in the morning, but 
they could have been different thoughts and it would still be me waking up. On the 
other hand, I cannot shed off my unique, ecological outlook on the world. I cannot but 
wake up as myself. If not, there would be no identity any longer.  
  Even if I am deeply convinced of having become another person over the course of 
time, this personality change will occur on the level of my personal identity. As long as 
I talk of those changes as mine, my self-identity persists. Something deeper remains, 
garanteeing that all those different moments, beliefs and personality traits belong to the 
same human being. Of course, both self-identity and personal identity are necessary to 
having a complete experience of human identity. Without personality traits or free will 
a human would be reduced to an automaton, hardly worth being called human any 
longer.  
  A paradox frequently occurring in this kind of situations is that changes on the level 
of personal identity can be so radical, that a person declares herself to have become 
another person. Apparently, self-identity and personal identity can diverge. The 
primary and the secundary reflection on identity – as I called them in section 1 – can 
have different outcomes: whereas the primary reflection leads – ceteris paribus, that is, 
under conditions of physical health – to the ongoing experience of selfhood, the 
outcome of the secundary reflection can differ from day to day. My life's course or my 
beliefs sometimes change over night. We are all familiar with the surging culture of 
self-help therapies, where people try to change themselves for the better. Or just 
consider the situation we are all in, of playing multiple social roles, that all call for 
different modes of conduct. Yet no one gets thrown into a crisis of self-identity because 
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of the roles she plays. (A crisis on the level personal identity on the other hand is a 
frequently occurring nuisance!)  
  A concomitant paradox lies therein, that forgotten experiences at the same time do and 
do not belong to my identity. The things I have forgotten do not partake in my current 
personal identity, since that requires consciously expressable features, but have played 
a role in its formation. They have been erased from my active and conscious 
recollection, but they still partially caused me to become what and who I am today.  
  Generally, when asking for the idem of human identity, we can distinguish two main 
elements of sameness. The first one is the invariable experience of self-identity. The 
second one, personal identity, comprises the variable dimensions made up of physical 
aspects, personality, morality and biography. In this light, I shall now define personal 
identity in this research as the symbolic self-description by which a person strives for 
self-understanding, which expresses both her uniqueness and sameness over time, 
simultaneously providing her life with a moral framework.33 Therefore, whenever I 
designate someone as a person from now on, I take her for a human being who is 
conscious of her identity and is able to express this by means of a self-description. The 
next chapter will address the question of how we construct these self-descriptions. We 
will see that Paul Ricoeur’s theory of narrative identity provides an adequate answer to 
that question.  
 
 
1.5.3  The ‘self’ 
 
Before concluding this section I would like to make a few comments on the use of the 
word ‘self’. As a result of both the discovery of the subject as epistemological 
foundation of reality, and the Romantic ‘turn inward’ towards a conception of the self 
as a stable, psychological core of identity, "we naturally came to think that we have 
                                                
33 This definition implies that only known identity traits are part of our identity. I deliberately chose to 
leave unconscious traits such as habitual behaviour or psychological characteristics that remain 
concealed to their bearer aside, because this research project is mainly concerned with expressions of 
identity. So, features that are visible only to the outsider, become relevant as soon as they enter the stages 
of consciousness. Apart fom that, it goes without saying that a self-description is not being fomulated in 
isolation, but all the social interactions a person engages in affect the content of her personal identity. A 
description someone else gives of a person, for example, that differs from her own may cause her to 
change her self-image or her behaviour.  
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selves the way we have heads or arms, and inner depths the way we have hearts or 
livers, as a matter of hard, interpretation-free fact" (Taylor 1989: 112). This was a 
revolutionary step in the history of the philosophy of mind. Before that, the Greeks did 
certainly know a 'care for the self’, which implied looking after one's moral and 
physical health, "but this is not at all the same as making 'self' into a noun, preceded by 
a definite or indefinite article, speaking of 'the' self, or 'a' self. This reflects something 
important which is peculiar to our modern sense of agency" (Ibid: 113).  
  Although the Greeks did discern a capacity to reflect (logos, nous), they did not have 
a notion of a spiritual center of all thinking activity, located somewhere in the head. 
The self was not conceived as a spiritual deus in machina, reigning over bodily 
movements, like we saw in the Cartesian view. Body and soul together built an 
indivisible unity: "Snell remarked on the absence in Homer of words that could happily 
be translated by our 'mind', or even by 'soul' in its standard post-Platonic meaning, that 
is, a term designating the unique locus where all our different thoughts and feelings 
occur. Homeric psyche seems to designate something like the life force in us, what 
flees from the body at death, rather than the site of thinking and feeling” (Ibid: 118). 
The modern notion of a rational subject, tucked away somewhere in the head, did not 
exist in the Hellenistic-Christian universe, when human (small) reason was considered 
a faint reflection of the (big) Reason, the cosmos or God in its unfathomable tracks.  
  Descartes’ philosophy heralded the history of reifying this animistic concept of 
selfhood into the self as a fixed, autonomously existing entity. Rightly so, this view of 
the self as a substantivum has been criticised right from the start on. No other than 
David Hume called the self a fiction, a mere idea within the ongoing stream of 
impressions. Recently Daniel Dennett made the same sort of comment when asking: 
"Or is the very idea of a self nothing but a compelling fiction, a creed outworn, as some 
theorists insist, a myth we keep telling ourselves in spite of the advances of science that 
discredit it?” (Dennett, in: Kolak and Martin 1991: 355). In his article The self as a 
center of narrative gravity, he even compares it to an object’s (virtual) center of 
gravity.34 But how should we look upon the self then?  
  I propose considering the self as a construction of reflection, a concept that reflexively 
denotes the subject that reflects upon its identity. Selfhood does not refer to some 
                                                
34 This comparison suffers from the defect that a stone does not experience gravity, gravity is a humanly 
concept, whereas identity is a reality, strongly and uniquely experienced by its subject.  
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substantial core within me, but to the identity of the organism I am, as opposed to all 
the other things I am not. It always implies some sort of reflexive relation of a thinking 
being towards itself35 in its differences from other things. Notice that outside 
philosophy and psychology the word ‘self’ is never used in isolation, but always in 
compositions, such as myself, herself, self-knowledge, or self-consciousness. Adding 
the prefix ‘self’ lends a word reciprocity. In case of human beings, one could purport 
that selfhood arises the moment a person becomes conscious of her identity, that is, 
conscious of her own peculiar character, dissimilar to that of others. Therefore, 
whenever authors speak about the 'construction of self’, I would suggest speaking of 
the construction of ‘identity’ instead, as to avoid smuggling in an erroneous, 
hypostatizing conception of selfhood.     
 
 
1.5.4  Conclusion: identity 
 
The question ‘who am I?’ is a kind of question human beings (fortunately) do not ask 
themselves every day. Life would become utterly unlivable if we did. If it is risen at all, 
then typically at what Anthony Giddens poignantly called fateful moments: when 
planning your career after graduation, following the (far too early) death of a close 
friend, or maybe by gaining unexpected insights while reading a controversial novel 
(Cf. Giddens 1991: 112).    
  Although on this existential level the question after identity might seem a nuisance 
rather than a blessing, on a quotidian basis we cannot dispose of it: “Levels of concern 
about identity may wax and wane, but, whether individually or collectively, we can’t 
live routine lives as humans without identification, without knowing who we are and 
who others are. This is true no matter where we are, or what the local way of life or 
language. Without repertoires of identification we would not be able to relate to each 
other meaningfully consistently. We would not have the vital sense of who’s who and 
what’s what. Without identity there could be no human world” (Jenkins 2004: 7).    
  What, now, are the results of this first chapter as far as understanding this obviously 
vital phenomenon of identity is concerned? What is identity? The chapter yielded two 
                                                
35 One cannot but speak tautologically about the self, since we have no alternative concept to indicate 
what is meant. 
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important seeds, that we will witness becoming fruits in the next chapters. First of all, 
winding through the text like a pervading current, there is the insight that all identity is 
built out of elements of sameness and difference. The elements of sameness I discerned 
earlier in this section not only cause temporal continuity, but also provide criteria to 
distinguish between persons. A person’s opinion on politics, for example, gives both a 
sense of similarity over time, and distinguishes her from others’ political stances. 
Jenkins aptly summarizes this aspect of identity: “Identity is a matter of knowing who’s 
who. It is the systematic establishment and signification, between individuals, between 
collectivities, and between indviduals and collectivities, of relationships of similarity 
and difference” (Jenkins 2004: 5). The identity of things and persons always serves 
both ends: it unites and divides.  
  Secondly, from the text we can deduce as a bottom line fact that all identity is about 
(in)formation. As I boldly stated in section four: the I is pure form.36 Despite the fact 
that all matter is constantly in motion, on all levels of existence some sort of identity 
persists. Material particles are indiscriminative; it is their form that renders them 
recognisable and distinguishable. Information is nothing else than formed or coded 
matter. Like we saw as well, this formative principle can be caught in our DNA, the 
construction chart of a dinner table, or a written text. Somehow, all those material, 
elementary particles become infused with a certain form and end up as identifyable 
‘things’. On an intersubjective level it is the principle of information conveyance that 
safeguards meaningful relationships between people: ranging from collective 
memories, traditions and the handing down of knowledge to the existence of group 
identities. The subsequent two chapters address these last aspects of human identity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
36 See 1.4.2 
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Chapter 2 
Narrative identity 
 
 
 
 
Today, though, ‘identity’ is ‘the loudest talk in town’, 
The burning issue on everybody’s mind and tongue. 
Zygmunt Bauman 
 
Where first chapter was mainly concerned with the experience and foundations of self-
identity, I will now pick up the issue I ended with: how do we construct our self-
descriptions? What is the mechanism behind the formation of personal identities as I 
defined them? How do we know ourselves? One of the recent theories on identity 
particularly appropriate to answer this question, which – not surprisingly – enjoys 
popularity among scholars, is Paul Ricoeur’s theory of narrative identity. 
Methodologically, we could deem Ricoeur's theory of narrative identity a meta-theory: 
it provides with an insight into the methods of identity construction. The essence of it 
seems very straightforward: how do we achieve self-understanding? By telling stories, 
Ricoeur postulates. Of course, it is not that simple. Let us have a closer look.   
 
 
 
2.1  The ipse and the idem 
 
The philosophy of the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur can be seen as the long detour 
of the contemporaneous subject, which after its crisis endeavours to recover itself. His 
philosophy could be characterized as the laborious search for the complex identity of 
the ego, in a state of permanent change (Cf. Perone 1998: 16-7). In the end, though, 
Ricoeur’s cause is an ethical one. From the claws of its modern and postmodern critics, 
he tries to save a subject that withstands the trial of moralistic imputation and can 
consequently be held responsible for its actions.  
 68 
  For more than two centuries the subject had been subjected to fierce, debilitating 
assaults, ranging from Hume’s relegation of the subject to an ephemeral impression, via 
Nietzsche declaring the subject a grammatical fiction, to Foucault’s analyses of the 
subject as a product of disciplinatory practices. Outside philosophy the crisis of the 
subject had been exacerbated by attacks from various directions: whether by reductive 
explanations of psychic phenomena in natural sciences, by the disempowering of the 
conscious ego in psychoanalysis, or by the cultural constructivism in social sciences, to 
mention just a couple of them.  
  In response, Ricoeur aims at founding a novel concept of subjectivity that withstands 
all the sceptical challenges it faced and that regains enough solidity and self-constancy 
to bear responsibility for its actions. In order to do so Ricoeur does not revert to a 
unitary, oldfashioned, metaphysical concept of subjectivity, but he instead provides us 
with a theory of subjectivity which lends the subject a narrative unity, thereby 
underscoring its hermeneutical and mobile nature. The concept of narrative identity is 
not a devise of Ricoeur himself; it had been in vogue in, for example, psychology 
before he introduced it in philosophical discourse. Still, it represents an honest attempt 
by Ricoeur to retrieve some sort of ethical subject from its beleaguers.  
  In his major work on identity, Oneself as another, Ricoeur takes us on a dazzling, 
conceptual rollercoaster, in a grand synthetic sweep meticulously spelling out the 
antinomies, dichotomies and pitfalls that every thorough investigation into the nature of 
human identity is fraught with. Human identity typically encompasses both the 
reflective experience of selfhood – this is where human beings break away from the 
animalistic reign - and an element of sameness. There are traits within our lives that 
persist in a relatively unchanging (or better: slowly changing) fashion over time, and 
simultaneously we experience those traits on all occasions as being ours. The sixty-
four-thousand dollar question now is, not only in Ricoeurian philosophy but in all 
research on human identity, what ultimately accounts for this experience of selfhood? 
What causes the sameness in the experience of selfhood? Why is it that it will 
doubtlessly be me waking up tomorrow morning? The same question that guided us 
through the first chapter. 
  From phenomenology Ricoeur adopts the concept of ipseity to indicate this basic 
experience of selfhood. It is because of the element of sameness in our experience of 
selfhood, that Ricoeur is able to pin down the discourse on identity to the underlying 
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framework of the dialectic of idem and ipse. Idem-identity, or sameness, therefore is 
always two-folded: it refers for one to a person staying the same self (ipseity) over the 
course of time, but equally to the set of lasting dispositions and other characteristics 
that are being recognised in the process of self-understanding and the expression of 
identities. The idem-identity comprises the ‘linguistic, practical, narrative, and ethico-
moral objectivities of identity’ (Venema 2000: 128). Since the ipse and the idem are 
aspects of one and the same subject and on an ordinary level of self-perception will not 
even be told apart – after all there is just one me, I am my characteristics! -, the 
question is raised how both of them converge? That which stays the same in our 
complex experience of identity is the mystery-guest whose cover Ricoeur tries to blow. 
Does he succeed herein?   
  The concept of ipse not only represents the capacity of appropriation (Jemeinigkeit37) 
of experiences, but also reveals the locus of human freedom. Ricoeur’s analysis of 
identity and his ethical aspirations coalesce in the capacity of the subject to take a 
reflexive stance towards its thoughts and actions. Compare it to what Kant labelled the 
transcendental cogito: in everything I do there is always the accompanying knowledge 
of ‘me’ doing or thinking so. The ‘I’ becomes a kind of infinitely regressing, unifying 
mediator amidst the various contents of my impressions.  
 In Kant’s transcendental-philosophical system, we can distinguish two types of 
subjectivity. First, there is the subject in a sense of the whole cognitive apparatus, a 
priori given, preceding all perceptions of reality. Additionally there is the 
transcendental subject, which is an a posteriori product of the thinking activity of the 
subject. The transcendental subject – or transcendental unity of apperception – is a 
presumption introduced to guarantee the identity of consciousness. It may come as a 
surprise to the reader, but Kant too is primarily a philosopher in search of the basis of 
human identity. The question after the identity of the subject lies at the heart of his 
transcendental critique. This is the case for two main reasons. First, the I – apprehended 
as transcendental unity of apperception – is what unites all aspects of a thinking 
subject, i.e. all ideas, impressions, desires, sensations, into one consciousness. 
Everything popping up in my head can be accompanied by the reflexive thought of ‘I 
think’. They are always my impressions. So, the transcendental subject, the ego cogito, 
gives identity to the multiple contents of my consciousness. Second, in Kant’s point of 
                                                
37 For an explanation of the concept of ‘jemeinigkeit’ see Heidegger 1993: 42 
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view, the cognitive apparatus is universal and unchanging. A view that would be 
severely critized by Wilhelm Dilthey in the nineteenth century.38   
  Therefore, Descartes, Locke and Kant were very similar in their attempt to discover 
the idem of human identity. All three of them searched for the lasting principle – 
behind or within – our stream of conscious thoughts. According to Descartes this was a 
substantial, autonomous ego; to Locke it was a self-conscious consciousness, and to 
Kant it was a transcendental unity of apperception. In their own way, they all tried to 
grasp the first-person experience of staying the same human being.  
  By virtue of the mentioned ability to pull back, to reflectively acknowledge my 
experiences as mine, I am able to evaluate and, if wished for, to intervene in them. As 
an ipse, it is within my range of capabilities to either undertake actions freely or abstain 
from them. Ricoeur sees human beings through dichotomizing, Kantian glasses: on the 
one hand we belong to the phenomenal world, tied to a corps subjected to the laws of 
nature; on the other hand we take part in the noumenal world of autonomously acting, 
thinking beings, equipped to initiate a natural chain of events. That is the reason of an 
ingrained schizophrenia every human being has to deal with: when feeling the bodily 
sensation of hunger for example, like any other animal does, I may nonetheless decide 
not to obey the signal, watch my weight instead and defy my aching belly. It is exactly 
because of this freedom, and the fact that there is a large degree of sameness to this 
ipseity, that we can hold people responsible for their past and present actions. Ricoeur 
places the load of responsibility of the acting subject on this particular self-constancy.  
    
 
 
2.2  Updating Ricoeur’s theory 
 
But does Ricoeur offer a sufficient explanation of this self-constancy? What is it 
according to him that is constant over time? Here Ricoeur gets caught up in an 
                                                
38 Subjectivity implies doubling oneself virtually: whenever reflecting upon herself a person becomes 
conscious of herself qua … . Next to the two types of subjectivity mentioned above, other types of 
subjectivity can reach awareness in this act of self-reflection. I can become aware of myself qua 
epistemological subject (frankly what Kant was after), ontological subject (think of Hegels idealism), 
socio-political subject (as civilian, laborer or legal body) or psychological subject (as feeling and 
desiring person).   
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irreparable contradiction. Ricoeur defines this subjectivity exclusively in terms of 
narrative identity (See: Ricoeur, in Wood 1991: 32). We could formulate the paradox 
like this: the ipse designates the storyteller who is described by the very story he tells. 
Elsewhere he declares: “Precisely as second nature, my character is me, myself, ipse; 
but this ipse announces itself as idem” (Ricoeur 1994: 121). Ricoeur means by 
character the following: “Character, I would say today, designates the set of lasting 
dispositions by which a person is recognised” (Ibid: 121).  
  In other words, it is the narratively expressible idem of our identities that entirely 
makes up for the constancy of the subject, whereas we just learned that ipseity refers to 
the typically human feature of being able to always pull back reflectively from our 
dealings with the world in order to acknowledge them as ours. Venema reaches the 
same conclusion on Ricoeur’s substitution of ipse- by idem-identity by remarking: 
“Self-constancy without sameness is not an option within Ricoeur’s understanding of 
narrative identity” (Venema 2000: 142).  
  By identifying idem and ipse in this precise sense, Ricoeur shows a tendency to 
undermine his on its own very fruitful distinction of idem and ipse. The ipse, the 
experience of selfhood which perseveres in an unmistakable way and exposes the 
experiential core of human identity, escapes any symbolically mediated self-
description. For one Ricoeur acknowledges the ethical supremacy of ipseity over 
narrative sameness, but at the same time he tries to define the sameness within ipseity 
in terms of narrative identity.39 The essential point of introducing the idea of an ipse in 
the first place, was to show that no matter how much my character, my set of 
distinctive signs might change, it is still me, the same subject, underlying and bearing 
those characteristics.  
  In his work Subjectivity and selfhood, Dan Zahavi too criticizes Ricoeur on his failure 
of presupposing a distinct core self:  “… the experiential approach, primarily defended 
by Husserl and Henry, insists that an investigation of the self must necessarily involve 
the first-person perspective and ultimately conceives of the self as the invariant 
dimension of first-personal givenness within the multitude of changing experiences. 
[…] I argue that the experiential notion of a core or minimal self is both more 
                                                
39 One can find spots in Ricoeur’s text where he does stick to his distinction of idem and ipse, for 
example, when he explains ipseity by referring to performative (speech) acts, such as making a promise. 
In this case, keeping a promise is constitutive of a person’s sameness over time. Ricoeur sees it as 
‘another model of permanence in time besides that of character (Ricoeur 1994: 123).   
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fundamental than and a presupposition of the narrative self” (Zahavi 2005: 8). A 
subject therefore cannot use that which is the product of a self-reflective act, its 
narrative self-image, to fully explain the constancy of the agens of reflection, the ipse, 
that which always flees description and in its flight refers to something fundamental 
beneath. So, simultaneously, Ricoeur uses the concept of ipse as common ground and 
integrator of all the aspects that pertain to the narrative sameness of a person, but 
defines this subjectivity in terms of narrative identity. This seems logically inconsistent 
to me. We now see why Ricoeur called his work ‘oneself as another’: we cannot but 
identify ourselves using a symbolic self-image that because of its universalising, 
linguistic nature cuts out the idiosyncratic, experiential core of identity. We never fully 
coincide with our articulated identity, it always remains somewhat strange to who we 
are on a self-experiential basis.  
  Obviously, the kind of reasoning deployed by Ricoeur does not hold firm ground. 
Ironically, Ricoeur fails to grasp the concept of ipse properly, after proudly introducing 
it as the aspect of identity mostly overseen by its investigators. But how then should we 
grasp the ipse? It should have become clear by now that what Ricoeur calls the ipse 
refers to the experience of identity I termed ecological selfhood. Only on a few 
occasions does Ricoeur brush against such a corporeal conception of ipseity, 
mentioning our corporeal anchoring in the world, yet failing to move on to the just 
conclusions, for example when connecting identity to “.. an invariant, our corporeal 
condition experienced as the existential mediation between the self and the world” 
(Ricoeur 1994: 150).  
  Another highly questionable feature of the theory of narrative identity is whether its 
core-concept of narrativity is the proper one to describe identity in the first place. 
Although the theory of narrative identity pretends to encompass the whole range of 
aspects that adhere to the complex of human identities, one can argue whether a 
narrative is needed to fill the gap of a lacking self-understanding. Remember the 
example of Theresa, our 33 year old friend from Boston. The fictitious self-description 
I provided there, which I think is close to how people actually depict themselves, shows 
very little narrative elements. An enumeration of traits is not yet a story. It is very 
striking that in Oneself as Another we do not even come across one concrete example 
taken from non-fictitious, ordinary life, that supports how the principle of narrative 
identity formation works.  
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  In my opinion this is for good reasons: Ricoeur’s failure to provide examples might 
point at some deficiencies in his theorizing. People’s identities cannot be equated with 
narratives. Ask anyone on the street for his identity, and you will not get a lineair, 
classical narrative as an answer. The answer may contain some narrative elements – 
below I will have a closer look into these – but will first and foremost be a rather 
random list of personal characteristics. Narrativity in the Ricoeurian sense only enters 
the picture when people actively think of their biographies. By stressing the narrative 
dimension of identity formation there is an inherent preponderance of biographical 
experiences in Ricoeur’s theory at the expense of less ‘narrative’ identity traits, such as 
body features and our psychological make-up. In underscoring the necessity of 
‘mythical homogenisation’40 Ricoeur is in constant danger of neglecting crucial aspects 
of our identities and restricting them to our mere life stories. As shown in the previous 
chapter there is a whole lot more to it. Therefore I would suggest speaking of identity 
in terms of a self-description with narrative elements, instead of narrative identity.  
 
 
 
2.3  The power of narratives 
 
Of course, the theory of narrative identity not only provokes critique. I would do 
Ricoeur no justice in creating the appearance that there are but dark tones in his 
philosophical scores, whereas there is fortunately also a lot of bright music in the air. 
Let me therefore in this section enumerate a couple of fruit-bearing insights the theory 
produced. First of all, the segregation of the concept of identity into an ipse- and an 
idem-pole provides us with a very suitable toolkit to analyse the phenomenon of human 
identity from a first-person perspective. Although Ricoeur failed to grasp the concept 
of ipse properly, it does in itself constitute a very important contribution to the 
discussion on human identity.  
  Second, as far as our self-image contains biographical elements, they will very likely 
be of narrative nature. That is, they will bear the traits of spatiotemporal concordance 
and homogeneity as Ricoeur describes them in his book. We have to keep in mind, 
                                                
40 ‘Mythical’ refers to the Aristotelian conception of muthos as emplotment, that is, the ordering of a 
story’s timely scattered events into a temporally unified whole consisting of a clear cut beginning, 
middle and end.   
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though, that our identity does not coincide with our biography, even if we are using 
knowledge of our own past as a key to decipher our current identity, but that our life 
story is just one aspect of the entire picture. The same goes for Ricoeur’s assumption of 
there being a unified plot, in which several character traits and experiences are 
synthesized into a homogeneous and coherent life story. It is a conception of identity 
that is not necessarily in line with how identities are actually composed. Identities 
rather are mosaics of traits that often do not correlate with each other. One might 
consider a pictorial instead of a narrative metaphor to describe identity formation.  
  Nonetheless, we should grant Ricoeur that in most cases people will try to present 
their identities as monolithically as possible. In the self-image we create, the identity 
expressed will tend to forge as many discordances as possible into the drawn 
coherence, even the ruptures purposely elucidated, like the sudden career move one 
made, will play a meaningful part in the overarching ‘plot’. (For example by showing 
one’s proficiency in seizing opportunities in this case.)    
  Third, Ricoeur is right in claiming that we take our moral orientation from stories, 
which in one way or another have withstood the ravages of time, be it the bible or 
romantic ideas on love being hurled down at us in TV commercials. Although the 
majority of the world population does not partake in the literary tradition Ricoeur 
presupposes – it is estimated only 6 % of the population in the West reads literature – 
these stories, incarnated in novels, films, told tales, soaps, college books, ethical 
treatises and what more there is, are still the vehicles of our body of ideas. One does 
not have to read the corresponding novels to be familiar with Werther’s Weltschmerz, 
Hans Castorp’s boredom, or Raskolnikov’s remorse. As Ricoeur writes himself: ".. the 
work of imagination does not come out of nowhere. It is tied in one way or another to 
the models handed down by tradition" (Ricoeur, in Wood 1991: 25).  
  Borrowing a concept from Gadamer, we could circumscribe the development of moral 
stances as a 'fusion of horizons', in which stories handed down by tradition are 
appropriated in such a way as to yield an individual’s unique perspective on life. 
Persons always extract the content of their identities from already available and 
pervading 'symbolic resources'. “We may relate to the notion of disposition as the set of 
acquired identifications by which the other enters into the composition of the same. To 
a large extent, in fact, the identity of a person or a community is made up of these 
identifications with values, norms, ideals, models, and heroes, in which the person or 
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community recognises itself” (Ricoeur 1994: 121). Or, as Charles Taylor writes: “The 
full definition of someone’s identity usually involves not only his stand on moral and 
spiritual matters but also some reference to a defining community” (Taylor 1989: 36). 
Hitherto, I treated the subject matter rather isolated, as if we were all Robinson 
Crusoes. Of course we too have our Fridays. In fact, we have a whole week! It goes 
without saying that a substantial part of any personal identity is composed by elements 
a person shares with other members of the groups she engages in. As I stated in the first 
chapter: identity is sameness and difference at the same time. Having an identity means 
both distinction from and identification with groups of other people. Collective identity 
is the experience of sameness between individuals, to be part of a greater whole. As a 
group they distinguish themselves from other groups. In section 6 I elaborate on the 
social origins of personal identity. 
  The groups persons engage in are seldom a choice of their own. We write the stories 
of our lives only to a very limited degree ourselves. At birth already, every one of us is 
thrown into a non-chosen group: a nation, a village, a language community, a social 
milieu, a family: "Precisely because identities are constructed within, not outside, 
discourse, we need to understand them as produced in specific historic and institutional 
sites within specific discursive formations and practices, by specific enunciative 
strategies. Moreover, they emerge within the play of specific modalities of power, and 
thus are more the product of the marking of difference and exclusion, than they are the 
sign of an identical, naturally constituted unity – an 'identity' in its traditional meaning 
(that is, an all-inclusive sameness, seamless, without internal differentiation)" (Gay, 
Evans, Redman 2004: 17). In this sense, all personal identities are culturally biased: the 
cultural heritage handed down to me determines the nature and scope of the story I can 
tell: someone raised in a poor African region, or someone severely traumatized in her 
youth, will offer a completely different account of who she is compared to, for 
example, the spoiled Western teenager I was. The theory of narrative identity formation 
shows how within the dialectics of self and other, persons and groups, biology and 
culture, the homogeneous and the heterogeneous, those cultural forces are integrated 
into the story of one's personal identity.41 
                                                
41 It might be useful to add a comment on the use of the words cultural identity and group identity. Since 
it needs no arguing that all identities are cultural identities, the opposition of personal identity versus 
cultural identity becomes meaningless. I will therefore speak of personal identity as opposed to collective 
or group identity.   
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  A fourth and final advantage of the theory I would like to emphasise, lies in its stress 
on the mediated nature of human identity. The initial question of this chapter read: how 
do persons construct their self-descriptions? What is the procedure behind the 
formation and expression of personal identity? The theory of narrative identity aptly 
shows the manifold mediations that are inherent to every such construction. To quote 
Ricoeur himself: "...the self does not know itself immediately, but only indirectly by 
the detour of the cultural signs of all sorts which are articulated in the symbolic 
mediations which always already articulate action and, among them, the narratives of 
everyday life" (Ricoeur, in Wood 1991: 198). Narratives play a role in the process of 
self-reflection, we relate to others by their and our own stories, and by virtue of 
narratives we relate to the world and we embed ourselves in the grand narratives of 
cultures, politics, religions and other moral frames of reference.     
  The concept of identities as embedded in narrative structures, clearly indicates that 
even presumed 'facts' are always subjected to interpretation and sensitive to the context 
of formation. Because of his dissimilar life story to mine, for example, my friend whom 
I spent my summer holiday with may very well reflect on it in an entirely different way 
than I do, although we factually did exactly the same things during our two-week stay. 
Ricoeur demonstrates how we always forge our self-descriptions against the 
background of narrative prefigurations (Cf. De Mul 2010: 205-7). We are prone to 
explain the happenings in our lives according to the logic we encounter in stories. So 
we rather explain our actions by referring to rational motives, intentions and future 
plans, than by Pavlovian stimulus-respons models. That is what Ricoeur meant when 
he wrote that we live our 'lives in quest of narrative': we build our self-descriptions in 
the shape of meaningful, coherent stories and draw their content from narratively 
structured storages. Furthermore, narratives enable an author to link past, present and 
future actions, by giving past happenings a determined place in the courses of our lives 
and shed light on planned future actions from thereon. The stories we tell about 
ourselves – both to ourselves and to others – give a firm but mobile structure to our 
lives. Yet, they may be the cause of slight discomforts as well. Stories can have the 
somewhat embarrassing capacity to function as a mirror, eliciting traits that dwelled 
subconsciously up until the point of reading the story. They force their readers or 
listeners into taking a different stance towards things, to change perspectives, to look 
upon oneself with a foreign gaze. As we all know from experience, stories – whether 
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books, movies or the judgement of a close friend – bear the disturbing capacity of 
making the repressed, the unseen, the unconscious painfully conscious.  
 
 
 
2.4  Self-descriptions vs self-constructions 
 
"A man's character is discernible in the mental or moral attitude in which, when it came 
upon him, he felt himself most deeply and intensely active and alive. At such moments 
there is a voice inside which speaks and says: "This is the real me!""  
William James in a letter to his wife 
 
There is one last flaw in Ricoeur’s theory I would like to highlight. According to 
Ricoeur identities are being constructed in the stories told about them. He describes the 
procedure in the following way: “The narrative constructs the identity of the character, 
what can be called his or her narrative identity, in constructing that of the story told. It 
is the identity of the story that makes the identity of the character” (Ricoeur 1994: 147-
8). Suppose we confine human identity to its articulated side, and forget for a moment 
the above considerations on ipseity, is – in that case – talking of identity in terms of a 
construction an adequate description of how identities are being looked upon by their 
bearers? It goes without saying identities that are being constructed42, but let me take 
the first-person perspective and ask: do we autophenomenologically perceive identities 
as constructions or rather as self-descriptions? Do we actively construct identities 
during the descriptive process or do we regard this self-description as a revelation of an 
identity that was already there, waiting to be discovered and articulated? 
  We may be able to express our identity in multiple ways, but we are certainly not free 
in constructing just any identity arbitrarily. If I refer to myself as a muscular, well-
dressed, outgoing playboy, whereas in reality I am a boring, ill-tasted and shy scientist, 
then it is obvious – both for me and my interlocutors – that I am not offering a credible 
account of who I truly am. So the margin of variation, the amount of construction at 
                                                
42 To discern just a couple of constructive moments in the nascent stages of identity formation: one could 
think of parental genetic material, upbringing, education, social interactions and cultural forces. 
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mercy of the self-depicting subject, is actually fairly small. Even if it holds true that 
personal identities come into being and are being developed only by means of their 
expression, there being no identity apart from the one expressed, then the fact 
nonetheless remains that on the level of self-conception this will not be experienced as a 
construction, but as a self-description.  
  At any given moment in time I am not free in choosing who I want to be: I have an 
identity. If someone asks me who I am, I will try to offer him a true representation of 
my identity. If I do not and, for example, purposely distort my biography, I will be 
telling an obvious lie and give a false account of my identity. My identity will surely 
change, I influence it by making life decisions, I may choose to work on myself, but 
even in the latter case this presupposes an understanding of who I am – my idem-
identity – and who I want to become. It is hard to imagine a situation of a person sitting 
down on a chair thinking: ‘Let me now construct an identity.’ That person probably 
thinks: ‘who am I?’ and she consequently, in an act of self-analysis, tries to answer this 
question and make sense of herself. This will be seen, though, as a way of making the 
unconscious conscious: not as constructing an identity from scratch.43  
  Certain features are already present, such as body traits, a certain character, hard facts 
like age, nationality, address; features that may be subjected to interpretation, but as 
such are fixed. We are bound to several biological, psychological and biographical 
limitations when describing ourselves. An atheistic person, for example, will not 
change her religious preferences at random; her agnosticism is a pervading feature 
throughout all the social roles she engages in, although her stance may become 
evaluated differently depending on the situation at hand. Our nationality and all that 
goes with it, national symbols, language, ethnic origins, geography; they all play a part 
in our self-images. The corpus of ideas a person gets exposed to is highly dependent on 
coincidence: the teachers she finds at school, the books she happens to read, the friends 
she meets, or even the documentary on the Discovery Channel she accidentally zaps 
into. But also a feature as basic as our moods is largely outside our reach, yet it has a 
tremendously important effect on our worldview and self-esteem.   
                                                
43 I have to admit that probably only the most honest of all persons represents herself in a completely 
truthful manner. Socially it is perfectly common to present oneself in a positive and desirable fashion. As 
soon as a person starts thinking about her self-presentation, this will reciprocally influence her identity, 
via what others think of her, or by actually adopting this particular kind of behaviour. In this sense, the 
difference between self-description and the construction of identity is not as black and white as the text 
above might suggest. In every moment of description there is an element of construction involved.   
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  The constructive powers of persons themselves are rather indirect ones. By choosing a 
certain lifestyle, by choosing friends, a place to live, a job, people make decisions that 
thereafter will have an impact on their identities. I cannot simply decide any day to 
become someone else. But I may decide to behave differently and put question marks 
at the paradigms I used to live by, thus slowly transforming my identity as a result. 
Therefore, though in expressing an identity there is an act of construction involved, I 
would still prefer speaking of identity in terms of an experience and expression of 
identity instead of construction. Ricoeur himself admits this when writing: "We can 
become our own narrator ... without being able to become the author" (Ricoeur, in 
Wood 1991: 32).  
  It is true, of course, that persons construct their lives. But even in the extreme case of 
adopting a new lifestyle, a person will probably do this because she is convinced of 
having led the wrong, alienated life up until that point. I don not become a Hells-angel, 
I always was one! I just did not know it. Do we not all know this feeling of being at 
home in certain activities? Have we not all once experienced a groundbreaking episode 
in our lives that gave us the joyful sensation of truly being ourselves? Identity remains 
something persons find, not invent. People live their lives, but have identities. Identities 
are developed along the line. People do not construct an identity from scratch. Until 
some sort of critical consciousness springs during puberty, children and adolescents are 
completely constructed by language and the ideas that are being imposed on them by 
parents, teachers, friends and media. Even our personality is something that to a large 
degree has been infused to us genetically by our parents and since then stood under a 
constant bombardment of impinging social forces. As Ricoeur purports repeatedly: we 
are not the sole authors of our lives.  
  It has to be said, however, that every description involves interpretation and therefore 
contains an element of construction. Objective, value-free self-descriptions do not 
exist: we always see ourselves through a certain lens: we are constrained to use a 
particular language, are informed in a certain way, describe ourselves within a social 
setting, we may feel the need to give a socially desirable self-description, etcetera. 
Therefore, instead of opposing constructions and descriptions of identity diametrically, 
it would be more appropriate to see them as ends of a gradual scale.     
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2.5  Does identity matter? 
 
This may be the appropriate moment to raise some questions on the importance of the 
matter altogether. On a day-to-day basis we cannot do without the identification of 
persons and objects. Yet, this is something different from the self-reflexive search for 
identity philosophers are prone to speak of. One might doubt whether on this ethico-
existential level identity constitutes a major issue in the lives of people. For sure there 
are moments in people’s lives when their identity becomes problematic: during a 
juvenile phase of rebellion this might happen, during other ‘fateful moments’ (Giddens 
1991: 112) in life: when forced into exile, or maybe even on a foreign holiday whilst 
being confronted with different views and behavioural patterns. Yet such fateful 
moments – be it puberty, the choice of occupation, the death of our parents, or 
menopause – are the exception rather than the rule. Someone continuously digging into 
his identity will probably end up in a mental institution very soon. As Glover observes 
correctly: "It may seem that self-creation is something only a few people care about. 
[...] Most of us do not spend our lives on endless landscape-gardening of the self. Many 
of us lead rather undramatic lives. The identity we create is often shaped, not by some 
heroic struggle, but through our choice of partners and friends, by the job we choose, 
and by where we decide to live" (Glover 1988: 132). Seemingly, Glover too advocates 
the view I expressed above; stating that people rather construct their lives and not their 
identities, the latter coming along the line. Caring for ourselves, having a healthy 
interest in oneself, does not necessarily imply a conscious dealing with or even 
constructing of an identity.     
  Taking up the statement by Glover we might even call into question the relevance of 
people’s identities in life. Is it impossible to lead a satisfying life without having a 
well-articulated and carefully shaped identity? Again, we certainly do make decisions 
and appropriate ideas that co-shape our identity, but how many of us are doing that 
consciously? Who really carry with them an elaborated, long-term 'life plan'?44 Even 
the often heard diagnosis of our culture being in a ‘crisis’ of meaning, involving the 
                                                
44 It has to be said that on a micro-, day-to-day level people are making decisions all the time and they 
are planning their lives ahead. One could purport that daily activities such as buying clothes, reading a 
book or adorning one’s house are all moments that call for self-reflection. This may not be the highly 
existential type of questioning Giddens refers to, but it still concerns matters that require self-reflection 
and the conscious expression of identities. Identities do not only come to the fore at fateful moments, but 
are a constant, be it often implicit, part of the fabric of daily life.   
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loss of widespread patterns of identification and a supposed lack of morals, does 
obviously not prompt people to anxiously replace their lost identities by new ones.  
  Equally, a brief moment of anxiety or indecisiveness about where to go in life is by 
far not the same as a profound loss of identity. The referential patterns persons use in 
order to understand themselves and take a stance in life – in short: their moral 
orientation – turn out to be the mobile outcome of a rather slow process of shifting 
worldviews and preferences instead of the active formation of new identities on short 
notice. A youngster in the latter stages of high school, not knowing what university 
study to choose, may have a firm identity, but just hasn’t found the right education yet. 
To repeat it once more: the majority of human beings simply lead their lives, at best at 
certain existential crossroads reflecting upon themselves and discovering that over the 
course of their lives their identity has changed. It is certainly true that we 'late 
modernists' live in a culture that puts high value in 'being someone', in big career 
achievements and the development of a wide range of personal skills. The mountain of 
social virtues persons have to climb these days seems sheer unconquerable. But, 
although some of us may feel miserable now and then and wish for the looks and 
money of Brad Pitt, it seems to me that most of us have a pretty stable, down to earth 
understanding of who they are. Luckily, the big identity crises are limited to the 
unlucky few.  
 
 
 
2.6  ‘Oneself as another’  
 
The very way we walk, move, gesture, speak is shaped from the earliest moments by 
our awareness that we appear before others, that we stand in public space, and that this 
space is potentially one of respect or contempt, of pride or shame. 
Charles Taylor  
 
Of course, Ricoeur had another, compelling reason in mind to call his book ‘oneself as 
another’ than the one I gave earlier. The title expresses one of his core insights, namely 
that all human identity is infused with otherness. As mentioned in section 2.3, no single 
person stands in isolation: all identity is formed in interaction with others and is firmly 
 82 
set against a certain cultural background. In devising his theory of narrative identity 
formation, Ricoeur tried to open a door for this ‘other’ to enter the building site where 
personal identity is constructed. Others appear in stories; they tell stories about 
themselves, about us, about third parties; we share stories with others: with our friends, 
colleagues and our fellow countrymen. Basically, the difference between our self-
images and the images others have of us is a rather analytical one: it is hardly possible 
to tell the origins of the threads that make up for our self-image apart – whether they 
are internal or external. The slightest of words, signs or reflexes of others invite us to 
ponder our identity: ‘why did my friend pull a disgustful face for a second? Is there 
something the matter with how I behaved?’ As Richard Jenkins puts it: “Your external 
definition of me is an inexorable part of my internal definition of myself – even if I 
only reject or resist it – and vice versa” (Jenkins 2004: 25).   
  Recall from section 1.4 that even on the most elementary of levels selfhood already is 
mediated. An organism is negatively defined by its environment: it ends where 
otherness begins. Selfhood arises thanks to the interaction with other organisms. In 
their genesis, selfhood and otherness of living creatures are equi-created. That is why 
phenomenologists are justified in claiming that consciousness always is consciousness 
of something, i.e. tuned to the world – referring to some intentional content outside of 
itself. From the very first moment we open our eyes, from the instant we leave maternal 
darkness behind, our eyes are lit by the faces of others. Every word, every thought, 
every experience we have is put in there by and among others. Socio-evolutionary, the 
capacity of reading faces turned out important enough to have its own brain mechanism 
(Cf. Glover 1988: 70). A lot of fundamental, innate capacities do exist of course, such 
as schemes for bodily development, the acquisition of language, neural learning and 
intelligent adaptation to environments, but as George Herbert Mead contends: “It is 
impossible to conceive of a self arising outside of social experience” (Mead 1934: 140). 
  Identities – by that I mean self-conceptions – are thus constructed within this tension 
of self-perception qua introspection and what we believe others to think of us. “We use 
the way other people interpret our behaviour as evidence of who and what we are […] 
We cannot ignore what kind of persons others are telling us we are; the image of our 
‘self’ is seriously affected, if not created by, the image others have of us” (Livesey 
2004: 9). It is important to note that it is not so much what other people actually say or 
how they do react to us, but all the more how we interpret their actions that leads to 
 83 
conclusions about ourselves. “The manner in which a man evaluates himself 
corresponds most closely to what he believes people in general think of him and then to 
what he believes those in the temporary group in which he is participating think of 
him” (Shibutani 2006: 240). Somewhat later on Shibutani explains how relatively fixed 
identities are established via this process: “It is through the regularity in the responses 
of other people that man establishes his sense of identity, and this concertino of himself 
is buttressed and reinforced by the continuation of these expected reactions” (Ibid: 246-
7). Even the most stoical of persons cannot escape the influence of others on her self-
conception. The stickiness of others’ opinions, mimics and actions is just too strong. 
We all have to respond to our fellow humans’ conduct somehow. There are degrees of 
course in the impact different persons have on us. The opinion my partner holds about 
me outweighs the cynical comments made on my clothes by my colleagues. Because 
the one is better informed, more important to me or simply more qualified than the 
other – my physician in medical affairs for example – she will exert more influence on 
my self-conception.      
 
 
2.6.1  Roles and situations 
 
If other people obviously have such a massive impact on persons’ identities, what sense 
then does it make to speak of identity in the singular? Should we not revert to seeing 
identity as a continuously shifting collage of identities, as a kind of perpetuum mobile, 
depending on the persons and environments we interact with? Just look at it: at home 
we are someone different to who we are at work; with my beloved partner I would 
never speak at the tone I use to address my colleagues. Erving Goffman called this 
feature (ie. awareness of others and situations and adjusting one’s behaviour to them) 
‘role playing’ (See Goffman 1959: 13-82). Any situation calls for another kind of 
behaviour and invites a person to define her self-image accordingly. Here we see the 
mechanism I described in the previous paragraph at work: people look at themselves 
picturing how others would do, think of a performance they want to give and the 
impression they want to leave, and act according to the codes that apply to that 
particular situation.  
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  For example, whenever I enter a room, I will do that the way I believe to be 
appropriate and try to anticipate what people already present expect me to do. I present 
myself in such a way, as to leave the desired impression. Shall I shake their hands? Or 
just say ‘hi’? Do I want to come on strong and head for the buffet immediately or rather 
act modest and wait for the host to invite me to do so? The particular role one chooses 
is determined by a lot of factors: one’s age (children are supposed to behave differently 
than adults), one’s gender, one’s cultural background, the situation (at home or in a 
restaurant), social milieu, etcetera. At home I may belch whenever I feel an urge to do 
so, in a restaurant on the other hand, I suppress this urge because I know it to be 
inappropriate public conduct. The question now is whether this situationally 
determined behaviour determines our identity as well? Are we someone else every time 
we play a different social role? Or is it that behind, or ‘through’ all the roles we play 
every day, there is something lasting, a core that stays the same?  
  My thesis is that although self-images and the behaviour accompanying them differ 
per situation, identities do not. Identities consist of the underlying characteristics that 
are stable enough as to identify all those different instances of behaviour as 
performances of one and the same person. A person’s identity is what causes her to 
define a situation in a specific manner and gear her behaviour to this interpretation. 
That is why two people can have diametrically opposed conceptions of the same 
(physical) situation: one of them enters a church and laughs because of the spiritual 
cabaret that is being staged, whereas the other devoutly professes her faith. These 
different reactions are due to diverging identities. Someone with an aggressive and 
somewhat edgy temper will interpret a tense and potentially harmful situation in a 
completely different way than a very kind and peaceful soul will. No two people act 
entirely the same in a given situation. 
  Identity is that which endures throughout all the roles we play. There are some 
characteristics we carry with us in all the roles we play, be it that their significance may 
differ from role to role. For example, I remain a fairly tall, blond Dutchman in each of 
the roles I play, notwithstanding the fact that within my volleyball team this property 
gets valued higher than during office hours. In my self-conception though, this trait of 
mine perseveres: one of my chronic, distinguishing marks is my long, slender, well-
trained body. On a psychological level the same applies. I may express varying 
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emotions in different situations, but underneath a stable personality remains.45 My 
shyness, for example, is a quality I take with me wherever I go. Someone being rather 
introvert will feel the discrepancy between her behaviour and what she really is when 
she tries to conceal it by pretending to be extrovert. To give one more example: if a 
person did not believe in God, she might still consider saying she did in the presence of 
her mother-in-law in order to reassure her, being fully aware though of thwarting her 
true opinion on behalf of family politics. She could of course change her mind on the 
subject over time, but she will hold only one opinion on the subject at any moment. 
Therefore, atheism can be designated as part of her identity.46  
  So, both on an ecological and on a self-depictive level a person has some 
characteristics, be they of psychological, physical or moralistic nature, that are role-
proof, that partake in an underlying identity. This applies even if they have been 
internalized during one of the many roles a person plays. The fact that I became 
acquainted with philosophical worldviews during my studies – so in that particular 
academic setting – did not prevent me from adopting them as a distinctive feature of 
my identity throughout all the roles I played thereafter and still do. A person’s identity 
has to be distilled from the ensemble of roles she plays; her identity is the sum of the 
chronic features that pervade all the activities she engages in. Shibutani says: 
 
“Self-images vary from situation to situation, but each man has also a stable 
sense of personal identity. What he is willing or unwilling to do depends 
upon the kind of human being he thinks he is. […] Self-images are specific 
and differ from one context to another; one visualizes himself as playing a 
game, talking to his friends, reciting in a classroom, or whatever else he may 
be doing. In spite of the variety of things that one does he experiences all of 
these deeds as being performer by the same person. Even though self-images 
are constantly changing and never twice exactly the same, one has no 
                                                
45 I do not want to leave the impression of holding the view that personalities stay the same over the 
whole course of a life. Personalities change as well, although they will hardly ever change over night.  
46 Again, this is not to say that identities stay entirely the same over the whole course of life, in fact they 
are rather mobile: preferences change, people alter their looks, they work on their personalities. Yet there 
have to be relatively stable traits, the ones that enable identification and make us tell persons apart.  
In addition, I am aware of the fact that the view I put forward is a highly debated one. For a contrasting 
view on social identity, see Bibi van den Berg’s insightful work ‘The situated self’ (Van de Berg 2009), 
in which she proposes a Goffmanesk approach to the impact of technology on identies. (Chapter 3 in 
particular).  
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difficulty in recognizing himself. […] Each person then, has a relatively 
stable self-conception” (Shibutani 2006: 214-5).47 
   
It has to be remarked, though, that there is no such thing as a zero-identity. A backstage 
region – put in Goffman’s terms - where a person’s true identity is revealed. We always 
play some role, even when we are alone. Every situation has its own codes of conduct. 
Fact is that the presence of others does change reality and no one can withdraw from 
the gaze of the other. What we do see, is that people prioritize certain aspects of their 
identity in different situations. Within the walls of a university I am above all a 
philosopher, but in the gym this trait is completely irrelevant and I am prone to 
highlight being a passionate amateur cyclist rather. Or the fact that I am Dutch has 
much more meaning abroad, due to my exceptional status there and the expectations it 
raises, than when I am at home where it is no distinguishing trait at all. 
 
 
2.6.2  Cultural, social and group identity 
 
Personal identity constitutes one’s only tie with the rest of society; each person has 
status in a community only in so far as he can identify himself as a specific human 
being who belongs in a particular place. […] If men were not able to identify 
themselves and one another with consistency, our entire social and economic system 
would be in jeopardy. 
Shibutani 
 
Before moving towards  the conclusion of this section, I would like to put some things 
straight. During my investigations into this subject, I noticed that a couple of very 
important concepts in discourses on identity are regularly confused. How does personal 
identity relate to cultural, social and group identity? First of all, social identity and 
cultural identity are two different things. Social identity refers to what I explained in 
the preceding two sections: the fact that all human identity is established during 
                                                
47 As one reads, self-images do not equal self-conceptions. Self-images are temporary and situation-
bound, whereas a self-conception is the chronic understanding a person has of herself. Self-conceptions 
equate to what I defined as personal identity earlier.  
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interaction with others. Going into the social dimension of identity formation would 
mean disclosing the exact way how others contribute to individuals’ self-conceptions.    
  Cultural identity on the other hand means two things: first, one can speak of humans 
as Cultural beings – with capital C. Second, all humans live and grow up in a certain 
culture. Culturality refers to our (almost unique) capacity of handing information down 
in a non-biological way.48 In that sense, all human identity is Cultural identity. We are 
not animals that live by genetic programs alone. Now, because we are Cultural beings – 
thus dependent on the conveyance of knowledge and skills by others – we are always 
members of a group and grow old standing in a certain cultural genealogy. We are 
trained within a specific culture. This kind of group membership is what I call cultural 
identity. In the articulation and formation of cultural identities narrative identity 
construction plays an important role. Many cultures are founded upon stories, such as 
Vergil’s Aeneis did for the ancient Romans, or the history of the Dutch’ rebellion 
against their Spanish oppressors in the sixteenth century that creates a sense of national 
identity in the Netherlands. For collective stories the same holds as for individual 
histories: in this case too its writers will try to tell a story that is as consistent, heroic 
and dignifying as possible.   
  The next question, then, is when does a group become a culture? The group (or 
groups) an individual takes part in can be anything from a small circle of friends to a 
nation. I shall call cultures the large groups one cannot choose freely: national identity, 
or the ethnic community one belongs to for example. Smaller units that one can choose 
– although they are frequently being called cultures as well - shall be labeled as groups. 
Zygmunt Bauman calls them communities of fate and of ideas: “It is common to say 
that ‘communities’ (to which identities refer as to entities that define them) are of two 
kinds. There are communities of life and fate whose members ‘live together in an 
indissoluble attachment’, and communities that are ‘welded together solely by ideas or 
various principles’” (Bauman 2006: 11-12). For example, it was not my own choice to 
be born in the Netherlands and to be educated with all the elements that go with it: 
language, habits, morality, etcetera. Of course I could choose to emigrate and take on 
another nationality, but that would mean no more than switching to another culture. 
The friends I hang out with or the political party I am a member of on the other hand, 
                                                
48 Some higher animals, such as primates, are known to teach their offspring a small range of basic skills 
as well. One can think of using stones to crush nuts.  
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are groups open to my own choice of participation. During the nine months’ stay in my 
mother’s womb I was never asked in which country I would have liked to be born, but I 
can withdraw from a certain circle of persons if they no longer appeal to me.49   
  Summarizing, this means that culturally we are determined in a dual manner. In the 
first place, all identity is (in)formed by a process of Cultural inheritance and education: 
the (in)formation of the individual by other people with skills that she needs to survive 
in a world of growing complexity. Secondly, this formative process is always situated 
within a certain culture, i.e. a group of people having specific ways of living, moral 
frameworks and other shared customs. The fact, for example, that when growing up we 
are expected to develop a firm and individual sense of identity, is something very 
specific to our modern, Western culture. Someone living in the same spot on the Earth 
a couple of centuries earlier – say the Dark Ages – probably had a lot less to choose. 
On top of that, individuals might choose to adhere to smaller groups of various natures 
and identify with them.50  
  Therefore, because all identity is cultural identity, it is of no use opposing personal 
identity to cultural identity.51 Even the opposition of group identity and personal 
identity is a flawed one, since every personal self-conception is made out of building 
blocks derived from many larger, social entities. Even what we value to be our most 
intimate and personal emotions, emotions that seem to bubble up from the deepest 
corners our souls, are not innate but turn out to be culturally taught. The sincerity of 
mourning a deceased relative takes nothing of its constructed nature. Had we been 
                                                
49 I do not want to leave the impression as to conceive of cultures as static entities. Especially nowadays 
– in the face of globalization – the lines between cultures have become blurred. National identities, for 
example, are hybrid creations of multiple historic and ethnical influences. Cultures are part of (global) 
dynamic processes of sedimentation and alteration of customs and ideas. Anthropologically it would be 
better therefore to speak of people being born and raised in a dynamic cultural constellation, rather than 
a specific culture. Also, Bauman’s notion of groups of fate and ideas should not be seen as a static one: 
one can think of times, for example, in which religion clearly was someone’s fate, depending on the 
community one has been born into. Nowadays, on the other hand, religion for a lot of people is much 
more of a deliberate choice.      
50 The same obviously applies to my ‘transcendental’ analysis of human identity in chapter one. 
Although I may have presented it as some kind of eternal truth about the nature of human identity, I am 
fully aware of the relativity of my analysis, which would have been a different one if written in different 
times or with a different cultural rucksack.    
51 Chronologically, cultural identity predates personal identity, since all children are born into a specific 
culture and are raised by its standards before they develop a notion of who they are. Take the acquisition 
of language as an example, which is a prerequisite for having personal identity. It has to be said that, 
although all identity is by necessity cultural identity, one can personally oppose a certain culture; in the 
case of a resistance identity against some cultural malpractice, for example, it does make sense opposing 
cultural to personal identity. 
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raised in a culture which did not mourn its dead, but celebrate the new life that will rise 
from the ashes instead, our reaction would have been totally different.  
  The distinction between personal, cultural and group identity is not so much one of a 
strict division, but rather an analytical distinction of elements that mutually shape a 
person’s identity. For example, it is exactly identification with a specific group that 
often is singled out as the one characteristic that is most important to a person’s 
personal sense of identity. Just think of a football hooligan who even wears his 
underwear in club colours, or religious fundamentalists who are willing to give their 
lives for their faith. There is no such thing as anti-social identity. (Although people 
sometimes behave anti-socially!) The only thing that changes is the perspective, in the 
case of personal identity the perspective is the one of the individual; in the case of 
group identity we take the group as unit of reference. Groups play a constitutive role in 
the formation of any identity – either affirmative or negatively. An individual may 
identify with a group or several groups, yet she will still have her own distinguishing 
characteristics within this group and emphasise her individuality; but an individual may 
also oppose to certain groups and derive her identity from this resistance. A hot-
tempered environmental activist will find a common ground for identification with 
other activists when chaining themselves to the gates of a nuclear power plant, but will 
fight reduction to just being this activist equally strong, because of all the other things 
she is more. Again, the dialectics of sameness and difference – both belonging and 
resisting to group identities – appears typical of human identity, just like we saw on 
numerous other occasions in chapter 1.        
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Chapter 3 
The three paradoxes 
of (late) modern identity 
 
 
 
 
3.1  The quest for identity 
 
The second chapter dealt with the ‘method’ of identity construction: the theory of 
narrative identity describes the procedure by which self-conceptions are composed. It 
also emphasised the role of ‘the other’ in the construction of identities. In this chapter I 
will move on to what is probably the most important of all facets of identities: their 
content. What do these self-conceptions consist of? What happened in the past 
centuries to turn personal identity into a major sociological, psychological and 
philosophical issue? Why are the media these days littered by the talk of – national, 
cultural, or the ‘loss’ of – identity? The notion of personal identity did not enjoy 
scientific attention until 1690, when Locke introduced it in his Essay concerning 
human understanding. Although the talk of identity is almost as old as philosophy 
itself, specific interest in personal identity came into the picture only then. Apart from 
the documented biographical occasion of Locke being requested by a reviewer to write 
something on the principium individuationis, there has to be a deeper cause for the 
issue of personal identity to gain popularity in precisely those days, in that part of the 
world, not to be expunged from our agendas ever since. In the first chapter I performed 
a rather formal, phenomenological analysis of the concept of identity, therefore, it is 
time now to go into its contents. How have people thought of their identities in the past 
centuries? Can we discern some major developments? Why did identity become so 
problematic a phenomenon, as is proven by the vast array of books and articles on the 
subject that appeared in recent years?52  
                                                
52 In the introduction to a volume of studies published in 1996 Stuart Hall already observed: “There has 
been a veritable discursive explosion in recent years around the concept of ‘identity’” (Quoted in 
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3.1.1  Navigating the moral universe 
 
To know who you are is to be oriented in a moral space, a space in which questions 
arise about what good is or bad, what is worth doing and what not,  
what has meaning and importance for you and what is trivial and secondary. 
Charles Taylor 
 
Let me first briefly elaborate on what I mean by the ‘content’ of identities. Basically, I 
understand by it the meaningful answer one gets when a person responds to the 
question ‘who are you?’. The question ‘who are you?’ is of a totally different 
ontological order than the question ‘what is the I?’, such as it has been addressed in the 
first chapter. It is highly unlikely that a person starts talking of ecological selves and 
transcendental subjects when asked for her identity. In fact, when posed in an ordinary, 
non-philosophical setting, the question ‘who are you?’ concerns above all a matter of 
recognition. One is likely to get an answer in terms of name, whereabouts, occupation, 
age, etcetera. The self-reflexive question ‘who am I?’, on the other hand, contains an 
obvious existential dimension. It concerns matters of moral distinction and meaningful 
activities. Usually, if at least the talk is not explicitely about forensic identity in for 
example a legal context, a person’s identity involves her moral stance in life. That is, 
morality is understood in its broadest sense: identities are about the beliefs we cherish, 
about our perspectives on life, about what is valuable to us and what is not.  
  According to Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor, it is essential to any expression of 
human identity that it contains such a moral stance, some sort of orientation in moral 
space. In his opus magnum Sources of the self he writes: "... being a self is inseparable 
from existing in a space of moral issues, to do with identity and how one ought to be. It 
is being able to find one's standpoint in this space, being able to occupy, to be a 
perspective in it" (Taylor 1989: 112). In Taylor’s opinion it is impossible to lead a 
human life without some sort of moral guideline, without an idea of what is right and 
wrong. We would wander around in a moral vacuum, without knowing where to go, 
what to do and why to do so, to paraphrase Nietzsche. This is the reason why Taylor 
felt it necessary to write his book on modern identity: he witnessed that these moral 
                                                                                                                                         
Bauman 2001: 140.) Bauman then goes on to say: “A few years have passes since that observation was 
made, during which the explosion has triggered an avalanche” (Ibidem).   
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frameworks were retreating or losing authority. In his view, the threat of amorality is 
imminent. I will come back to this further on in this chapter, when I address the 
problem of nihilism.  
  Taylor asserts: "My identity is defined by the commitments and identifications which 
provide the frame or horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case 
what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or oppose. In 
other words, it is the horizon within which I am capable of taking a stand" (Ibid: 27). 
Having an identity means having a position in this space of moral questions; answering 
life’s big questions, knowing what is the good thing to do and gearing one’s actions 
and lifestyle to it.53 If we lose this orientation towards the good, we lose our identity 
and in the end our ability to act. In this sense, what we popularly call an identity crisis 
is caused by the loss of our orientation towards the good: we no longer know how to 
behave and what to think. We fail to judge what is valuable to us, what is worth doing, 
what has meaning and what has not.54    
  Between the lines of his text one can read Taylor’s ‘moral anthropology’ – which is 
very close to the one of Paul Ricoeur – which forms the philosophical foundation 
beneath his identity-theory. It contains a couple of important axioms about human 
nature. First of all, according to Taylor all human beings are historical beings: they are 
part of an ever changing history and more importantly, they are always temporally 
orientated. That is, they live their lives within a constantly shifting temporal horizon, 
both looking back and trying to make sense of the past and looking ahead by planning 
their future. Secondly, our notion of identity is always of linguistic nature. More 
precisely, it is built by means of narratives. Furthermore, being a true communitarian, 
Taylor emphasises the social nature of all human identity. Finally, Taylor stresses 
throughout his book that one of the outstanding marks of human identity lies in the 
first-person perspective its bearer always has. Identities are experienced from within, 
                                                
53 Obviously, these stances do not last a lifetime. People change their position on numerous occasions 
during the course of a life, especially during the formative, explorative years of young adulthood. They 
may even hold contradictory views at a given moment. 
54 One has to distinguish between an identity crisis and an identity conflict. An identity crisis means a 
lack of moral orientation, the loss of the moral compass. An identity conflict concerns a discrepancy 
between self-image and actual behaviour: performance and self-image collide. A person in conflict with 
herself feels like acting ‘out of herself’, not expressing her true identity. One can think of a situation 
where it turns out that the impression one leaves is by far not what one thought or hoped it to be. Or a 
situation that forces a person into behaviour that she deems morally reprehensible. By consequence, a 
severe identity crisis – such as a depression – does not necessarily imply a conflict of identity. One can 
be perfectly ‘at one’ with himself, and still be in search of a moral framework and a purpose to life.  
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via an inner world, which ensures every new experience to by placed against an already 
existing psychological and moral framework.  
  Taylor’s most important insight, though, remains that human beings by essence are 
moral creatures. By means of their identities they express their moral orientation. One’s 
moral stance also is the pre-eminent way to distinguish oneself from others, to have and 
develop a unique identity. It contains the characteristics that portray a person in her 
exclusive manner of conduct and perspectives on life. As a rule, one could say that 
identity is conceived of in this moral sense, unless it is deliberately put in a legal 
context, thus referring to forensic identity. In the remainder of this book I will take 
personal identity mainly in this moralistic fashion, since this is the sort of identity that 
is under discussion in the web applications this study focuses on.  
 
 
 
3.2  Making sense of life 
 
Thinking means to undermine, to undermine oneself.  
      Acting involves fewer risks, because acting bridges the gap between things and 
ourselves, whereas thinking dangerousy largens that distance.55  
Emil Cioran 
 
Emil Cioran once called the human being the ‘busy ape’, admiring the ability of our 
animal forebears to indulge in idleness happily. Somewhere along the lines of our 
evolution this desirable capacity of coping with monotony and sensorial deprivation got 
lost. Observing the behaviour of apes and other animals prompts modern Homo 
Sapiens to ask: ‘don’t they get bored?’ This question typically pops up in the head of a 
human being. In nature he is probably the only creature not capable of enduring 
monotony, the only one in constant need for action and novelty (Cf. Cioran 1984: 166). 
Ever since, humans have devised impressive means to combat the specter of boredom. 
A direct psychological line runs from our ancient forebears to today’s spoiled 
screenagers, who fill their days with soap operas and video games. Philosophy and the 
sciences are just another branch on the ever-growing tree of self-entertainment 
                                                
55 Author’s translation. 
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facilities. Meanwhile 50 percent of the GDP of industrialized countries is generated by 
the entertainment industries. If one looks at it commonsensibly, one cannot but observe 
that we owe a great deal of our cultural development and current economic prosperity 
to this fear of emptiness. Because of the anxious existential discomfort it causes, 
boredom provoked the goods of human culture we are so proud of.  
  Thus, this is the paradoxical plight we find ourselves caught up in: our cultural 
greatness is both endangered and spurred by the looming threat of emptiness within us. 
Unlike their animalistic counterparts, human beings have to go through the painful 
experience of birth on numerous occasions during their lives. The cerebral capacities 
that elevate them high above nature, simultaneously saddle them with the lifelong task 
of bridging the abyss between their consciousness and the world. This is precisely what 
the aformentioned Cioran called 'the trouble with being born'.56 Subjectivity implies 
distance; self-consciousness is both pinnacle and abyss of human existence. It made 
Beethoven compose his ninth symphony, but it also raises disquieting questions that 
threaten to undermine our peace of mind: Who am I? Why am I here? What am I here 
for? As German philosopher Rüdiger Safranski comments on the human condition: "I 
am free from the force of nature and free to determine myself. But this means a painful 
separation: by birth one is put on this world, but now one has to give birth to oneself 
over and over again, deliberately and resolutely" (Safranski 2001: 10).57  
  Human beings are sense seekers. They are driven by the frustrating habit of looking 
for the sense of their actions. Merely performing actions is not enough: human beings 
want to know what it means they are doing, why so, and to what purpose. Looking for 
sense amounts to a double search: it means looking for meaning and looking for 
purpose. People try to understand their own lives and all that goes with it – make sense 
of it –, but they also try to figure out the purpose of their lives and actions – give sense 
to it. As was just pointed out by Rüdiger Safranksi, human beings have the ability to 
take a reflexive stance, human beings never fully coincide with themselves and their 
present actions. They can always draw a reflexive loop that separates them from their 
dealings, creating a space for disquieting questions. Identities are forged within this 
tension. Creating an identity is an attempt to satisfactorily answer the existential 
questions that so often trouble our minds. 
                                                
56 The trouble with being born is the title of the book by Cioran I quoted. See Cioran 1984. 
57 Author’s translation. 
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3.2.1  How do we make sense of life? 
 
So, what then makes life worth living? This can be anything one would probably argue: 
raising children, enjoying a good meal, helping the needy, going into politics. In our 
liberal society we are apt at dodging this question by leaving it entirely up to the 
individual how to make sense of her life. Yet, I believe there is more to say about this 
issue. It is certainly not impossible to distinguish some general strategies that people 
use to tackle the problem of meaning. Two grand strategies can be observed in this 
regard: for one people rely on a larger context in order to embed their own lives in it – 
looking for community and coherence –; the other strategy seems the exact opposite: to 
highlight one’s exceptionality, one’s outstanding – and therefore valuable – qualities. 
People imbue their lives with meaning in this dialectical movement: oscillating 
between seeking distinction and seeking community. In the upcoming pages I will 
explain why this is only seemingly an opposition and will lay bare the complementarity 
of both methods. 
  We can trace the desire for distinction all the way back to the dialogues of Plato, who 
already described the desire for recognition – the thymos or human pride – as a part of 
the soul. Plato’s warrior ethics would nowadays probably go somewhat like: ‘My life 
wasn’t useless, because look at what I have achieved in business! I took my life in my 
hands and lifted it to a higher level.’ The message remains the same: we draw meaning 
from special deeds, from an outstanding personality or some other feat we deem 
exclusive. An individual’s life becomes intrinsically worthy, a kind of irreplaceable 
work of art. I am worthy of living because I am the only one like me! This way of 
looking for meaning fits perfectly with the dominant culture of personal growth, life-
long learning and self-centeredness. In our modern culture of self-invention, one of the 
greatest fears is uniformity. ‘You are so ordinary’ is without any doubt one of the worst 
insults to swallow. Not only our biological will to power, but more so our sociogenetic 
struggle for recognition propels our behaviour towards excellence. The irony is that 
precisely in regard to this culture of artistic-creative self-distinction we are all very 
much the same.  
  Whereas in the past Christian people believed to be exceptional because of their 
unique relation with God – touched by a divine spark –, they now have to gain self-
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esteem by drawing on their own, inner depth58. If we ask ourselves ‘who am I?’, we 
look for an answer that is socially viable but still sets us apart from all the others. There 
are numerous characteristics a person can revert to when thus expressing her personal 
identity and outlining what separates her from the rest. One can point at physical marks 
(how beautiful or how fit am I?), personality (patient or passionate), moral virtues, 
social status (richness, good neighbourhood), beliefs, preferences (expensive food, 
five-star holiday, classical music), or achievements (career, school, love). In short, it is 
about what one considers respectable opinions, feats and virtues. Together, these traits 
form the modern principium individuationis between individuals. Charles Taylor would 
subsume this palette of characteristics under the umbrella of moral stance. We strive 
for recognition on the grounds of what we have achieved, what we worked for, and not 
so much what nature bestowed upon us at birth.  
  Although the individual is the center this way of giving meaning to life revolves 
around, it still is a project that is social through and through. Because of the need for 
recognition, the ideal of self-realization always points at the other. There has to be at 
least one other human being to acknowledge my identity! In more than this one way 
this existential strategy is less individualistic than it might initially seem. In the next 
subsection I explain why.    
 
 
3.2.2  The value of communities 
 
"But our normal understanding of self-realization presupposes that some things are 
important beyond the self, that there are some goods or purposes the furthering of 
which has significance for us and which hence can provide the significance a 
fulfilling life needs. A total and fully consistent subjectivism would tend towards 
emptiness: nothing would count as a fulfilment in a world in which literally 
nothing was important but self-fulfilment" (Taylor 1989: 507).  
 
Is it possible for a single shipwrecked person to lead a fulfilling life on a deserted 
island in the Pacific Ocean? Charles Taylor would obviously argue no. And for good 
                                                
58 In the Romantic era this inner depth or ‘inner voice’ was heard in nature or in the form of (non-
rational) feelings (Cf. Taylor 1989: 355-67; Gergen 1991: 20-27). Today, this rhetoric of self-finding is 
accompanied by a rhetoric of self-invention.    
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reasons. As I mentioned in the former section, even a self-indulged, egocentered person 
needs other people to tickle her vanity. Somehow, meaning and importance of our 
actions have to come from a bigger unit. Making sense of an action means putting it in 
a context, putting it in a larger coherence, a meaningful framework in which the actions 
play their role. Creating meaning, above all, means the creation of temporal and social 
cohesion. Then human conduct becomes purposive conduct, contributing to the 
working of a supra-individual structure. I will briefly go into what I regard the three 
main types of such structures. 
  The classical way of putting oneself in a bigger whole is by reverting to some kind of 
metaphysical order. There is a vast and diverse spectrum of grand narratives that have 
been devised during the past millennia in order to resuscitate people, ranging form 
animistic religions to Plato’s world of Ideas, the Christian God and Marx’s account of 
historical necessity.59 It involves the belief in the existence of some form of original 
entity, which in itself stands outside the realm of questioning from where meaning 
radiates back to the individual. Sense, then, is drawn from this necessary order of 
things, which may come in the guise of honouring a divine creator, being promised 
heavenly salvation or preparing the red revolution.  
  The second type of creating coherence is a little bit more down to earth. People still 
look for structures that transcend individual life, but on this occasion they set inner 
world goals: "If meaning and worth come with relations of certain sorts, perhaps in the 
first instance to other selves, but possibly also to nature, to work, to oneself, then 
perhaps we are wisest to look for grounds of meaning and worth in this life – in 
relations we can have during this life" (Flanagan 1996: 8). This is likely to be the most 
common and familiar way of embedding one’s life in a larger structure. Various forms 
of social organisation can be thought of here: families, companies, nations, tennis clubs 
or political parties. It is the group membership that gives us not just a sense of identity, 
but also a sense of purpose to life. Parents feel they are responsible for their children, 
and an employee feels that she is responsible for part of the operating process of the 
firm she works for. Here we come across the interplay of striving after excellence and 
devoting oneself to a collective cause. What gives the individual a purpose is that she 
gets the idea of being a small but indispensable cog in the social machine. Because of 
                                                
59 For an explanation of the concept of grand narratives and their delegitimization see Lyotard 2001: 
108-114.   
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her own, special talents she is vital to this particular organisation. She tells herself and 
is told by others that she plays a crucial role in the organisation’s functioning and she is 
recognised for it by the other members.  
  The third type of coherence guides us into the realm of abstract goals. Instead of 
finding coherence in short-ranged family matters or entrepreneurial interests, this type 
of coherence widens the horizon to include transhistorical purposes like the well-being 
of mankind or scientific progress. Artists, scientists, philosophers; do they not consider 
their works important because of their alleged contribution to the power and glory of 
mankind? But one need not go that far: the same gratifying experience holds for the 
banal act of procreation, thereby fulfilling our genetic ‘duty’ and preserving the miracle 
of life. Has any human being ever asked for the purpose of an orgasm? It gives the 
feeling of doing a (the!) deed that is intrinsically valuable. There are lots of ‘good 
deeds’ – tenets that Taylor would call the moral good –, causes that people find worthy 
dedicating there lives to: volunteering for medical aid in Africa to reduce suffering, 
sailing a Greenpeace vessel in an attempt to save the environment, marching the streets 
in favour of social justice, or doing scientific research in the hope of claiming a spot in 
the history of ideas. Again, here too the complementarity of private vice and public 
virtue is evident. The egoistic battle for recognition and fame coincides with collective 
purposes. The vanity of many talented persons and their determination to accomplish 
something that can withstand the ravages of time makes our civilization prosper.  
  Human beings thrive by projecting a (better) future. The thought of other, future 
conscious selves, the thought of their children is enough to give human beings a goal to 
live for. No matter how sophisticated and self-centered we have become; even in 
modern human beings the interests of the species still prevail. Immagine that because 
of genetic mutations caused by solar radiation human fertility would decline rapidly 
and the human race would be sure to disappear within three generations from now. 
What would happen if this doomsday message became true? Would we make it to the 
end of this three-generation period? Who would still go to her office or to school 
knowing that all is ending soon anyway? Does everyone go on with what they were 
doing anyway, making the best of it, or would the world be swept by a global wave of 
chaos, anarchy and despair? Ironically, this predicament applies to each single 
individual even without this global, genetic catastrophe happening. Everyone’s death 
means the end of things. As Wittgenstein wrote: the world is always mine 
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(Wittgenstein 1999: 67). On a phenomenological level there has never been, and will 
never be anything else than ‘my world’, the world as I perceived and experienced it.  
  In philosophical anthropology human beings’ orientation towards the future is seen as 
one of the outstanding marks that distinguishes them from the animal kingdom. 
According to German phenomenologist Martin Heidegger, for example, the essence of 
human beings is their existence: instead of being characterized by some fixed ‘core’, 
some essential substance or quality, what is peculiar to human beings is their 
historicity: human beings know their past, envision their future and project their lives 
onto this temporal map (Cf. Heidegger 1993: 325-331). Human beings are not capable 
of merely ‘being in the moment’ like an animal does – remember the quotation about 
the ‘busy ape’ I used to open this section. Although by intuition animals plan ahead 
also, by building stock for the winter for example, they can hardly be attributed an 
existential, self-conscious concern for themselves. In chapter 1 I already explained that 
a sophisticated language system is a minimal condition in order for self-consciousness 
to rise. For human beings it proves almost impossible to stay alive without some future 
goal to aim for.  
  Purpose is something that comes to us from the future. Doing a job provides us with a 
satisfying experience as long as the job has not been finished yet. Once it has been 
done, it loses its capacity of providing meaning and we look for a new challenge. We 
always tend to look ahead: what am I doing tomorrow? What will be my next 
assignment? What would be a suitable job after completing this one? The remembrance 
of past achievements may give us a smile on the face, a moment of pride or shame, but 
they cannot help us in making it to the next day. What gave my life a direction 
yesterday, for example the book I wanted to read; today has lost its purpose because I 
did so. Writers think up their next book before finishing the one under construction, 
politicians are barely elected when they start their next campaign, travellers who only 
just disembarked the airplane rush to a PC to book their next trip. Idleness is difficult to 
bear. After I complete this dissertation it will probably rest untouched upon my 
bookshelf while I write my next book. I live here and now, but my head always is 
‘ahead’ of me: my agenda for tomorrow, the concert I am going to attend later this 
week, the dinner with my partner tomorrow and all the pleasant things that happen 
from there on. These kinds of desires and plans are utterly necessary to lead a 
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meaningful life: a life without some sort of future hopes and aspirations would swiftly 
degenerate into unbearable apathy. 
  Identities are self-descriptions used by persons to give their lives a direction, to 
express the frameworks their lives are part of. Meaning is derived from them: 
backward, as a point of reference, and forward, as a horizon of possibilities, aims and 
wishes. Charles Taylor too admits that the expression of personal identity is not so 
much of a goal, as it is a method of creating life-supporting contexts (Cf. Taylor 1989: 
376-77). On a larger scale this is exactly what cultures do: apart from their function of 
conveying knowledge and skills, culture also means creating a livable domain in an 
inhospitable, natural world deprived of meaning. Human beings feel at ease and safe 
when absorbed in a community based on the principle of mutual love, care and respect. 
Friendships, for example, are ways of ‘anchoring’ onself, of using the construction of a 
social identity to get a hold in life. An identity gives a person her existential 
coordinates, so to speak. It helps to navigate through moral space, through the stormy 
sea that hopefully leads us to the heavenly shores of a good life.  
 
 
 
3.3  Living in late modernity 
 
“Life is work in progress, with no goal in sight, only the tireless endeavour to explore 
new possibilities, to respond to the chance event – the singular point – that takes us off 
in a new direction.” 
Francis Bacon 
 
3.3.1  Modern subjectivity: inventing oneself 
 
Apart form projecting a future life, answering the question 'who am I?' also points 
toward the desire to be in harmony with oneself. We want to bridge the gap between 
who we are and who we want to be, for example, to match our self-conception with our 
physical appearance. Equally, one could claim that we are driven by the desire to see 
our lives within a larger social structure and understand ourselves as (a vital) part of it. 
Or to put it differently: to bridge the gap between our own consciousness and that of 
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others. In either case we attempt to create a comforting isle of selfness in the vast, 
hostile see of otherness that surrounds us. Anthony Giddens adresses this topic in his 
book Modernity and self-identity by contending that human beings seek a ‘protective 
cocoon’: we cannot live without some minimal basis of trust (Cf. Giddens 1991: 40). 
What this trust is ranges from tomorrow’s rising of the sun (although I cannot be one-
hundred percent sure of that!) to the support one gets from family members. According 
to Giddens we need a minimum amount of ‘ontological security’ for not to drown in 
the chaos of existence, even if this means deceiving oneself such as in the case of the 
sun rising. The same goes for the presupposition of identities – for example, if I make 
an appointment with somebody I expect to meet the same person next week – which 
physically is untrue, since all matter is in constant motion: one cannot set foot in the 
same river twice. Yet we cannot do away with such basic experiences of trust. Giddens 
especially refers to emotional trust such as the reliance of a child upon its parents and 
the feeling of ‘things being alright’ they provide their child with. “The protective 
cocoon is the mantle of trust that makes possible the sustaining of a viable Umwelt” 
(Ibid: 129).  
  Identities are forged to meet this need. Personal identity functions as the spider, whose 
arms knit the varying aspects of life together to create a life-sustaining web. Answering 
the reflexive question ‘who am I’ always takes place against this background of 
potential insecurity, of worriness, of daunting possibilities, maybe even fear. What 
basically gets acknowledged is: “Shit, I’m here, I’m living and have to make the best of 
it!” This beam of insight that hits the individual during so-called fateful moments (Cf. 
Giddens 1991: 112) causes an existential, primeval pain that is typical of human beings 
and transforms their natural surplus – that is, their capacity of self-conscious thinking – 
into a nagging lack: they are saddled with the herculian task to give birth to themselves. 
Human beings are existential nomads forced to permanently rebuild their homes. 
  That is where we touch upon the problem of freedom. The never-healing wound of 
subjectivity compels us to define ourselves over and over again. We came across this 
insight earlier when I explained Ricoeur’s notion of ipseity and Kant’s notion of 
noumenal subjectivity. In his book Eurotaoismus, German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk 
reads human existence against the backdrop of the drama of birth, that is, the moment 
we all get ‘thrown’ out of the safe, maternal womb and into the hostile, outer world. 
Subjectivity is the ongoing process of erecting oneself which starts from there on and 
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which lasts a whole life. Resembling Gidden’s analyses Sloterdijk brings up the 
necessity of creating a ‘sphere’ (cf. Gidden’s cocoon) of security. He calls human 
beings ‘deficiently born’ animals, creatures that do not coincide with the world and 
therefore find themselves confronted with the task of building a world to feel at home 
in. Sloterdijk writes: " .. constantly the subject tries to find hold in a certain attitude by 
making this effort of bearing itself" (Sloterdijk 1991: 151)60. "Subjectivity is the kinetic 
effort-who-I-am” (Ibid: 160).  
  Just as we saw in the previous section, every human being needs some sort of 
‘project’, a goal to live for: a career, the promise of loyalty to a partner, nourishing a 
child or personal growth. According to Sloterdijk this existential anxiety is so powerful 
that it has become one of the ‘authors of history’ (‘geschichtemachend’), which 
explains why in the introductory remarks of this section boredom was called the motor 
of history. We keep pushing the primeval pain of subjectivity – the question of life’s 
purpose – away by staying busy and constantly inventing new projects to pursue. In 
this sense identity has become a project in modern times: it reflects the never ceasing 
challenge of inventing oneself. As Bauman puts it: “No more was it (human nature, jt) 
seen, no more could it be seen, as ‘given’. Instead, it turned into a task, and a task 
which every man and woman had no choice but to face up to and perform to the best of 
their ability. ‘Predestination’ was replaced with ‘life project’, fate with vocation – and a 
‘human nature’ into which one was born was replaced with ‘identity’ which one needs 
to saw up and make fit” (Bauman 2001: 142).  
 
 
3.3.2  Late modern scepticism: institutionalizing doubt  
 
I put forward the question why personal identity has become a troublesome issue in 
modernity. One of the reasons why this is the case can be found in the way we have 
become used to look at knowledge and (scientific) truth. Since the scientific revolution 
all knowledge is under constant scrutiny. The new scientific paradigm that took hold 
relegated all knowledge to hypothetical knowledge and all answers to temporary 
answers. The same applies to traditional institutions of truth-telling: we no longer take 
the docter, priest or professor for their word. Doubt, in the guise of the introduction of 
                                                
60 Author’s translation. 
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hypotheses in the sciences, entered the heart of scientific method: “But the reflexivity 
of modernity actually undermines the certainty of knowledge, even in the core domains 
of natural science. Science depends, not on the inductive accumulation of proofs, but 
on the methodological principle of doubt” (Giddens 1991: 21). Giddens contends that 
in modernity doubt became the dominating method of knowledge-seeking.  
  One of the founding fathers of this new scientific paradigm was Descartes. In 
Descartes’ case, though, doubt played a strictly methodical role – it did not lead to 
existential doubt. Descartes applied his scepticism against the background of a divine 
order, a divine creator, aiming to establish His existence with even more certainty. But 
he never doubted to find proof of this divine order (Cf. Perone 1998: 8-9). As he writes 
himself: "... my whole plan had for its aim assurance and the rejection of shifting 
ground and sand in order to find rock or clay" (Descartes 1968: 50). Still, by giving 
scepsis such a crucial place in the process of finding truth, Descartes stood at the 
beginning of the history of the institutionalization of doubt. Giddens observes: “Doubt, 
a pervasive feature of modern critical reason, permeates into everyday life as well as 
philosophical consciousness, and forms a general existential dimension of the 
contemporary social world. Modernity institutionalises the principle of radical doubt 
and insists that all knowledge takes the form of hypotheses: claims which may very 
well be true, but which are in principle always open to revision and may have at some 
point to be abandoned” (Giddens 1991: 3). 
  A good example of the debunking of human supremacy and greatness was provided 
by Freud when he outlined the three big ‘humiliations’ human beings had to deal with 
in the past centuries.61 The first one was Copernicus’ discovery that the earth was not 
the center of the universe as was believed before. To make things worse, his theories 
were then confirmed by Keppler, Galilei en Newton. It pushed human beings away 
from the middle of creation onto a trivial planet orbiting its star, floating somewehere 
in the infinite vastness of space. The second assault on human dignity came from 
Darwin when his theory of natural selection threw the human being off her divine, pre-
destined throne and turned her into the human animal, descended from the apes. 
Psycho-analysis, finally, showed that we are not the ‘masters in our own homes’. It 
undermined human autonomy by laying bare the subconscious processes that steer our 
moods and conduct beyond our conscious control. We could summarize these 
                                                
61 In: Een moeilijkheid in de psychoanalyse, 140-42. 
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happenings by saying that they all point towards a relativizing of human powers and 
her role as the Chosen. We have reached a point in history where we can call into 
question even ourselves. 
  This modern version of scepticism has far-reaching consequences for any individual 
now living. “Being ‘at ease’ in the world is certainly problematic in the era of high 
modernity”, Giddens aptly puts it (Giddens 1991: 126). If we went yet one step further, 
and "if we tried to rely entirely on reason, and pressed it hard, our lives and believes 
would collapse..." (Nagel 1979: 20). The danger we then face is slipping into a stage of 
hyperrationality: we are running the risk of becoming so rational that rationality starts 
to undermine itself. Nihilism lurks around the corner. This likely predicament is what 
the next subsection is about. 
 
 
3.3.3  Nihilism 
 
The name that comes up almost automatically when hearing the word nihilism is 
Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche diagnosed European history as the history of nihilism. 
To Nietzsche the word nihilism meant both the worthlessness of life itself and the 
worthlessness of human attempts to give worth to life. In its earliest stages nihilism 
came in the form of a belief in a transcendent reality – an illusion – such as Plato’s 
ideas or the Christian God. Little by little this way of giving meaning to our existence 
began to erode. Due to the process of hyperrationality I mentioned earlier, Nietzsche 
saw nihilism transforming into its next stage: people started to doubt their own fictions. 
Rationality reached its own limits. Our will to truth became cannibalistic and began to 
cut its own grounds. Analyzed rationally our supposed highest truths turned out to be 
nothing (nihil). Nietzsche’s era, the nineteenth century, which was an age of positivism, 
spiritual jolt and capitalistic mobilization, left only little room to high-flown ideals (Cf 
Timmermans 2003: 11-15).  
  Charles Taylor sees the same development and relates it to the problem of identity: 
“The big thing that happened since is the opening of other possible sources. […] 
Secularisation doesn’t just arise because people get a lot more educated, and science 
progresses. This has some effect, but isn’t decisive. What matters is that masses of 
people can sense moral sources of a quite different kind, ones that don’t necessary 
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suppose a God” (Taylor 1989: 313). Of what kind are these supposed changes and what 
are non-Christian ways of giving meaning?  
  Let us look at family life for example. What is striking about how we treat children 
these days in comparison to a couple of centuries ago, is that now children have 
become a sort of life-project. For a lot of people building a happy family or failing to 
do so has become the decider in terms of happiness and fulfillment. In the seventeenth 
century on the other hand, children where often seen a necessary element of life and 
parents could not wait to see them grow up and enter the labor process. That is not to 
say pre-modern persons knew no love, affection or care for their children: “What 
changes is not that people begin loving their children or feeling affection for their 
spouses, but that these dispositions come to be seen as a crucial part of what makes life 
worthy and significant. Whereas previously these dispositions were taken as banal…” 
(Taylor 1989: 292).62  
  To put this one example in perspective: what happened on a more structural, socio-
economic level is that due to the transition from the medieval, feudal class society, in 
which almost every human being was destined by birth to a certain social status and 
occupation, to the modern, industrialized state, social mobility increased dramatically 
and to some degree people became free to choose their own lives. Gradually, a society 
was born with ever more equality and economic perspective. It was no longer evident 
that if your father was a shoesalesman you had to become one as well. But this freedom 
held a burden. The other side of this coin is that identity is no longer as obvious as it 
had hitherto been, when on the socio-economic plane people lived predictable, often 
even predestined lives. “The idea that each person has a unique character and special 
potentialities that may or may not be fulfilled is alien to pre-modern culture. In 
medieval Europe, lineage, gender, social status and other attributes relevant to identity 
were all relatively fixed. […] the ‘individual’, in a certain sense, did not exist in 
traditional cultures, and individuality was not prized. […] We are, not what we are, but 
what we make of ourselves” (Giddens 1991: 74-75).63  
                                                
62 See also: Elisabeth Badinter, De mythe van de moederliefde, 1983. Badinter discovered that the 
concept of instinctive love for the child is not as universal as we currently think in the West, but a 
sentiment that waxes and wanes throughout history. 
63 I have to make a short comment on this interpretation. The historical development I sketch may exist, 
but for individuals now living it is impossible to experience these gradual transformations: experientially 
there is no other world to us than the current one. The ‘community life’ in a medieval village, for 
example, is completely alien to us and therefore something we cannot possibly miss.   
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  A lot of commentators see this very same transition taking place, Kenneth Gergen for 
example writes: “… John Lyons proposes that the centrality of the self was largely a 
product of late-eighteenth-century thought. Before then, people tended to view 
themselves as exemplars of more general categories – members of a religion, class, 
profession, or the like” (Gergen 1991: 11). In Zygmunt Bauman’s Identity one comes 
across the same shift: “Social affiliations – more or less inherited – that are traditionally 
ascribed to individuals as a definition of identity: race … gender, country or place of 
birth, family and social class, are now … becoming less important, diluted and altered, 
in the most technologically and economicly advanced countries. At the same time, 
there is a longing for, and attempts to find or establish new groups to which one 
experiences belonging and which can facilitate identity-making. An increasing feeling 
of insecurity follows …” (Lars Dencik, in: Bauman 2006: 24). 
  Giddens in particular takes this last point up and zooms in on the downsides of this 
hard-won personal freedom. He sees existential insecurity and social discomforts 
rising. We may live in ever-expanding societies, but are we still members of real 
communities? He gives the impression that we have become social atoms, knit together 
only by macro-structures like national borders and megacities, but bereft of intimate 
bonding. “Modernity, it might be said, breaks down the protective framework of the 
small community and of tradition, replacing these with much larger, impersonal 
organisations. The individual feels bereft and alone in a world in which she or he lacks 
the psychological supports and the sense of security provided by more traditional 
settings” (Giddens 1991: 34). A bit further down the page, though, he acknowledges 
that this supposed loss entails new possibilities as well and that it creates a tension 
between chances and threats: “ … yet this is not a situation of loss, and it does not 
imply either that anxiety levels necessarily increase.” Others call this the risk-society 
(Cf. Beck 2007), a world in which security gave way to probability, and a world in 
which dangers and uncertainty pervaded. Jenkins enumerates some of the most 
important changes that shaped our modern world: reorientations of work and family, 
class and status mobility, migration, medical and technological innovation, the 
redrawing of political borders (Cf. Jenkins 2004: 11).  
  These cultural developments have implications in the field of identity construction. As 
it appears, life, and as a consequence identities, have become a problem under 
                                                                                                                                         
 
 108 
conditions of late modernity. “What to do? How to act? Who to be? These are focal 
questions for everyone living in circumstances of late modernity – and ones which, on 
some level or another, all of us answer, either discursively or through day-to-day social 
behaviour” (Giddens 1991: 70). Kenneth Gergen too, sees the communal sources for an 
identifiable self diminishing, rendering it increasingly difficult to answer the question 
of ‘who am I?’ He feels we move into “a cultural condition in which our identities are 
increasingly more situated, conditional, and optional” (Gergen, Cell phone technology 
and the challenge of absent presence). Bauman adds an economic argument to the issue 
and links identity to changes in the realm of labor: “The question of identity is 
associated too with the breakdown of the welfare state and the subsequent growth in a 
sense of insecurity, with the ‘corrosion of’ character that insecurity and flexibility in 
the workplace have produced in society” (Baumann 2006: 5).   
  So, why is finding meaning so difficult these days? Why did identity become such a 
big issue? Summing up, we can point out at least three major changes that occurred in 
the past centuries, which are aspects of our predicament of what one might call 
‘identity-nihilism’. First, there is nihilism in the Nietzschean sense: the partial 
breakdown of traditional frameworks of identification, the demise of the ‘grand 
narratives’ as Lyotard termed them. Second, we now live in an age of ‘institutionalized 
doubt’ as we learnt from Giddens, an era in which definitive answers are taboo and all 
stances and persons are open to critisicm. Nobody or anything is beyond questioning 
and we deem identities mobile. The third change is the emergence of a pluralism of 
lifeworlds: the number of contexts people lead their lives in has increased dramatically. 
People spend their time scaterred over a number of geographical, social, recreational, 
economic and political spaces. Each sector consumes our attention, in each of them we 
play a different role and we are asked to express ourselves accordingly. Kenneth 
Gergen called this facette of modern life ‘multiphrenia’. This ‘cacophony of voices’ 
within our heads makes it difficult to maintain unity of character (Cf. Gergen 1991: 
73).  
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3.4  Media – identity – globalization  
 
The change last mentioned leads us to another historical development that very much 
influenced the process of finding meaning: media-related globalization. Instead of 
leading entire lives in one village (affluent) people have become (virtual) globetrotters, 
both physically and culturally. The rise of the network society meant that the range of 
lifestyles, opinions, religions and products at our disposal nowadays is overwhelming. 
We come across a vast number of foreign cultures, which all suggest different beliefs, 
different habits, different ways of looking at things. After all, one has the option of 
becoming a Buddhist only after meeting one or reading about it. Presently, we live in a 
world of sheer endless possibilities, refusing to prioritize one lifestyle over the other.  
  We cannot understand the modern identity properly without taking the impact of 
media on identities into account. What did the introduction and proliferation of media 
do to our identities in the past and how is this nowadays? How did they contribute to 
the development of our self-understanding? Aware as I am of the vast scope of these 
issues, I shall not try to cover the whole history of media, but limit myself to a couple 
of examples – that are representative of the main theme of this thesis – about how 
media played their part in (in)forming human identity, more in particular some of the 
social, mental or cultural changes media were involved in, and their role in the 
development of a new way of looking at the world.  
 
 
3.4.1  Homo technologicus: media – movers – messengers  
 
New media are often met by resistance and hesitation. Human beings may be novelty 
seekers, they are also creatures of habit. Call it evolutionary caution if you wish. Every 
new medium needs considerable time for its (old) users to get used to, and to weave it 
into their own practices. The story of the nascent railway system in the first half of the 
nineteenth century is a particularly famous and important one in this respect. It is often 
recalled how the first train passengers were dazzled by the speed of the vehicle and the 
rushing by of the landscape. A lot of passengers even are said to have become sick, 
which is quite difficult to imagine for us now if we keep in mind that those first trains 
traveled at a mere 20 to 30 miles per hour! (Cf. Müller 2009: 196-99)  
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  Its success, though, was not long in coming. As a result of its astounding qualities in 
terms of transport, speed, comfort and connectivity the railway came to be seen as a 
symbol of progress, promising economic and social betterment, democracy, energy, 
freedom from old restrictions, all the benefits and opportunities of the constantly 
circulating liberty of modern, mechanized civilization (Harrington, quoted in Cresswell 
2006: 20). Not only did the train herald the industrial revolution – the steam engine 
marked the substitution of natural by mechanical power – but all the more it helped 
forging a culture of speed and mobility accelerating till the present day. In the United 
States the train became the symbol of an era. The train embodied a nineteenth century 
society ‘on the move’, as it steamed ahead under its proud (but dark) clouds of progress 
in order to spread the message of freedom, trade and democracy. Mobility became a 
national characteristic. “To be an American is to go somewhere, especially to go West” 
(Urry 2007: 103). In his book Mobilities, John Urry points at the mechanization of 
movement through the railways which initiated the valuation of speed and especially 
the value that faster trains are better than slower ones (Ibidem: 99). High speed came to 
equal high status. 
  One of the consequences of the railway system Urry points at, is that it lead to a 
fundamental rethinking of space: distances were significantly shrunk. People could 
now travel farther in shorter time. Cities started to expand into new suburbs and work 
and home became separate spaces. Already in 1839 an English commentator suggested 
that the railways had the effect of ‘compressing’ time and space (Ibidem: 96). People 
were suddenly a whole lot nearer to each other. The identities of people able to afford 
frequent train travel came to be constituted through their increased connections with 
other places and other people. In this sense, the train was the first high-speed ICT: 
news and information of other parts of the country spread around more quickly and 
physical nearness became a lot easier as compared to travel by horse and foot. But not 
only did the train bring places at closer range and did it improve their accessibility, it 
also caused the transformation of places, of the countryside, into commodities (Ibidem: 
101). After Thomas Cook had discovered railway tourism in the nineteenth century, by 
the twentieth century the world had become one large department store according to 
Urry, a store of countrysides and cities, places to consume and laid out for the 
delectation of potential visitors (Ibidem: 102). From a place to live in, the world had 
become a composite of places to visit, exploit, enjoy or simply pass by.  
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  The proliferation of the railway system across the continents obviously had a lot more 
consequences than just the couple of them described above; yet they may serve as a 
fitting example of how media can have a bearing on peoples’ lives and henceforth their 
identities. Media – or to put it in a somewhat broader perspective: technologies – have 
always caused a tremendous impact on societies and lifestyles. More than that, they 
also served as metaphors for understanding human nature. In early Enlightenment, for 
example, self-conceptions were phrased in terms of newly discovered mechanics, take 
the famous l’homme machine of De la Mettrie. In the Romantic era the novel spurred a 
highly individualistic and emotional concept of human nature (Cf. Gergen 1991: 22). In 
the late twentieth century we were able to witness a tendency to portray the human 
being in computer-like metaphors, as a piece of hardware equipped with software or as 
a network-like, information processing system. And who knows, under the influence of 
advancements in the field of biotechnology our present century might become known 
as the century of biology in which human beings slowly progress toward cyborgs. In 
this light, I want to dedicate some words to the nature and scope of technology in 
general and its importance for the human animal.  
 
 
3.4.1.1  Media and Technology 
 
To speak of a ‘homo technologicus’ really is a pleonasm. To be human is to use 
technology. Since the first stone was carved out and used as a tool technology helped 
shaping our lives, the way we interact, the way we think, and the way we conduct our 
businesses. Stones meant more power, better food and effective weaponry. In twentieth 
century philosophical anthropology in Germany a tradition of thinkers put emphasis on 
the technical roots of what it is to be human, with Helmut Plessner and Arnold Gehlen 
being the most well-known of them. In this line of reasoning philosopher Peter 
Sloterdijk pushes the argument even further. In his insightful essay Domestikation des 
Seins (domestication of being) he sees in the throwing of the first stone the birth of 
modern human beings. Using stones enabled prehistoric people to free themselves from 
their determination by natural forces and to discover the world as a field open to 
deliberate human modification and exploitation. Our world-consciousness as we know 
it today – being self-aware creatures that ‘have’ a world at their disposition – originated 
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when proto-human first started using tools. Using proto-techniques on surrounding 
nature meant the world to light up as a horizon of possible human intervention and 
made us aware of the difference between ourselves as manipulating subjects and the 
world. Therefore, Sloterdijk concludes, our particular way of being, that which makes 
us stand out from the rest of nature, is of technical origin (Cf. Sloterdijk 2001: 142-
234).  
  If one continues this line of reasoning, then we have to admit that human beings have 
always been mediated and have always depended on media for their existence. This is 
not merely a trait of our industrial age. Our success as a species, which led us to occupy 
such an exceptional evolutionary spot on the face of this planet, has never been a matter 
of superior human anatomy or physical strength, but is inevitably entangled with our 
capacity to use technical means. Thanks to pre-conceived tools we managed to subdue 
nature and create the comfortable isle of spiritual life amidst the cosmic ocean of 
thoughtlessness we are part of. Homo sapiens was in the first place always Homo 
Faber.64 Technology threw us into existence – made us into the self-conscious and 
ecstatic creatures we are today. In other words, our generic identity, that which singles 
us out as species, is technological through and through. 
  Therefore, human beings have been cyborgs right from the start (Cf. De Mul 2002: 
228). Having culture means – as I explained earlier – passing on information down the 
tracks of history in a non-biological manner. Raising children and educating them 
comes down to cultivating the mental techniques that are necessary for any human 
being to stay alive in a complex, technology-driven society populated by large groups 
of people. Because of the astonishing, exponential growth of information available to 
us and the manifold skills we need to master, human beings have become more 
dependent on media by the year. Would you still dare stepping in a car if it were not for 
glasses, contact lenses and laser technology? Without technology our society would be 
doomed. Even worse so, it would never have existed in the way we know it today. 
Culture is the technical surplus that elevates humankind over nature. Within this 
                                                
64 Meanwhile the genus Homo is attributed with no less than three adjectives ‘sapiens’. Homo sapiens is 
the word for the first human beings who used language and thought symbolically. Homo sapiens sapiens 
is meant to indicate the externalisation of our capacity to think by means of writing or computers 
nowadays, thereby expanding it greatly. Homo sapiens sapiens sapiens finally designates the human 
being in times of advanced information- and biotechnology, a being that is able to toy with its own 
biological make-up and transform its nature, in the end maybe even rendering itself redundant!  
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predicament technology is what makes it possible for us to live far above our mere 
biological standards.  
   
 
3.4.1.2  Media 
 
The media I investigate in this chapter could be classified as a means to transport either 
information or matter through time and space.65 That is why we can rate both a book – 
as a time-bridging carrier of information – and a car – as a means for physical 
displacement – among media. Take reading a book as an example. Information is 
stored in the book in a code – language – and whoever knows that language is able to 
retrieve this information from the book. In the very moment of reading, thoughts are 
being created in the mind of the reader, meaning that some movement – however tiny – 
takes place in the reader’s head. The reader is infused with a certain form, both on a 
molecular and electrical level, and on the level of having meaningful thoughts that were 
not in her head before reading the book. Passing on information comes down to the 
infusion of form, and media convey this form.  
  Or take the example of listening to a piano recital on a compact disc at home. From its 
composition to finding entry in your head the music went through numerous 
transformations, every one of them involved in transferring form from one carrier to 
another. The form (in this case a particular arrangement of air-trembling frequencies) 
travelled from the composer to the pianist via the score. The pianist transferred it to the 
instrument. The instrument set in motion air, which was caught by microphones. The 
vibrations were digitally encrypted onto a compact disc. A CD player decrypts the 
information and via an amplifier and a set of speakers changes it back into vibrating air 
molecules. Those vibrations finally cause the listener to hear music, thanks to another, 
advanced hearing-system that decodes the vibrations (Cf. Von Baeyer 2003: 25-6). In 
the age of digital media this process of conveying information can in principle be 
                                                
65 It needs no arguing that many other usages of the word media exist. In physics any substance that 
serves as a container to others, such as air or another gas, is called medium; or persons who claim to 
possess paranormal powers are called medium. A general trait which we could deduce from all the 
usages of the word media that exist, is that media in one form or another are always things in-between 
other things: they connect or fulfill a bridging role.  
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duplicated endlessly, and ‘transposed’ (to keep the musical metaphor running) between 
information carriers of various nature.     
  In their twofold quality of means of transportation and information media are the 
pulsating heart of every modern society: as a collective we are dependent on the 
movement of people and goods and the passing on of information. Put somewhat more 
bluntly: without trucks our supermarkets remain empty and without proper education 
no one learns a profession decently. Next to being a necessity in terms of physical 
survival, media have grown ever more important in a cultural sense as well. Like we 
saw above, culture does not only mean the transfer of knowledge and skills, but also 
the creation of a livable and meaningful domain in a harsh, inhospitable world, 
naturally devoid of any meaning. Human beings look for security, shelter and meaning 
in an intersubjective nexus, founded on the principle of mutual care and 
acknowledgement. Since the campfires have been replaced by television sets and the 
movies have replaced the telling of stories, media have become the social cement that 
binds people together.  
  In the age of digital media in particular a great deal of the social interactions we 
engage in are buttressed by media: websites bridge the generations and hand down 
knowledge; telephone technology and electronic data traffic made the world shrink into 
a single present by enabling people to communicate globally at almost light speed, and 
planes can take us to almost any place on earth within a matter of days. In terms of 
identity this meant that both our social horizon and our cultural frame of reference have 
expanded greatly: thanks to radio, television, the world wide web, postal services, 
telephone, transportation media and satellites, people with access to those media have 
become populated by the others, lifestyles, ideas and customs they now encounter (Cf. 
Gergen 1991: 69). For one media made people conscious of their common fate, of the 
absence of a sphere completely ‘outside’, but media also opened up a window for 
encountering other people and other customs, for discovering ‘new worlds’, so to 
speak. Physically, global media made it possible for human beings to truly become 
inhabitants of one planet for the first time in history. By linking various parts of the 
globe into a single ‘now’, and by putting even the most remote places on earth within 
reach, media completed the project of ‘globalization’ for two billion inhabitants of the 
developed world. By enabling large-scale mobility of goods and people around the 
globe, by providing education and dispersing information, and by creating social 
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cohesion, media brought to us the unbelievable wellbeing we experience today in the 
Western world.     
  But media not only facilitate life, they also transform it. As Marshall McLuhan boldly 
stated in the Sixties: the medium is the message (McLuhan 1964: 7). This famous 
mantra of his expresses the crucial insight that the particular type of medium one uses 
also shapes its content. Form and content cannot be separated: such a thing as the 
‘neutral’ conveyance of information does a message carried across by text message and 
the same message – which obviously is no longer ‘the same’ – by a hand-written letter. 
Electronic messages tend to be shorter, composed in less time, more informal, bullet-
like, more direct than written letters; they often call for an immediate reply and are sent 
with near light-speed. The choice of medium has a huge impact on the tone and style of 
the message, the speed of communication, the emotional involvement, the way 
communication between people works, power relations, etcetera. The same applies to 
media of transport: air traffic belongs to a different world than wooden sailing ships 
did: a world with different modes of work, cohabitation, politics and economy. 
Conceiving of oneself as a ‘global citizen’ and acting accordingly would not be 
possible without modern media of transport and communication. Just have a look at the 
introduction of writing some 6,000 years ago for example. Although there were no 
media scholars around to analyze the changes at the time, we are now able to tell that it 
did coincide with and partly caused some of the most fundamental transformations in 
human history in the realm of the modes of human cohabitation and social 
organisation. It introduced new power relationships – the literate versus the illiterate –, 
new forms of social stratification, it accelerated urbanization, and it spurred the 
creation and division of work.   
  It was not surprising therefore that scholars like McLuhan revealed media as an 
important part of the message conveyed. Obviously, this influence of media on human 
conduct and consciousness had existed long before – as long as media existed as a 
matter of fact – but it had not become recognised as such and for a long time people 
saw media as kind of neutral serving-hatches of information instead. Since then famous 
examples of the power of media have been widely commented. In retrospect we 
became painfully aware how in Nazi-Germany Adolf Hitler cleverly used the airplane 
in combination with radio broadcasting technology to enchant the German audience 
and win them over. Never had a leader been so omni-present and so close to his 
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subjects as Hitler was in the early years of his dictatorship. Another well-known 
example of media’s influence is the televised Kennedy-Nixon debate in the US election 
of 1960, a debate that clearly showed the supremacy of the image over the word. 
Whereas radio listeners at the time gave the advantage to Nixon, television viewers 
clearly proclaimed Kennedy as the winner of the series of debates, eventually going on 
to the White House. These are only two examples of the mediated nature of all human 
communication, and the effect any particular type of mediation has on the 
communicators.  
 
 
3.4.1.3  Technology 
 
Spurred by these remarks the moment has arrived to make some clarify the concept of 
‘technology’. Despite the composition of the word ‘technology’, it would be a gross 
oversimplification to see technology jus as the ‘science’ (logos) of technique. Both 
words – technique and technology - are a derivative of the Greek noun technè, meaning 
‘craft’ or ‘skill’. I would like to propose two different readings of the concept of 
technology, in order to clarify my use of it. The first usage could be called an 
anthropological conception of what technology means. Here the suffix ‘logos’ is 
conceived of in its meaning of reason: technology in this case comprises all goal-
oriented human action that makes use of some sort of tool. This means we do not only 
use tools along a process of trial and error, but that we are also capable of deliberately 
manufacturing tools on the grounds of abstract reasoning to solve problems. Human 
beings are able to envision an absent reality, conceive of solutions for problems 
mentally and try to find a way of arriving there as efficiently as possible. Technology 
encompasses this realm of purposive behaviour.  
   The second usage refers to the social implications of techniques and sees them 
primarily as social phenomena. In this reading ‘logos’ has to be understood in its 
original sense of ‘legein’, which means to ‘collect’ (Cf. Heidegger 2004: 13). Literally: 
techniques collect people in a certain way, that is, techniques contribute to the 
organisation of social processes and the structuring of lives. So, instead of seeing them 
as mere tools, transparant in their use, techniques are considered constituent of social 
practices, enticing particular kinds of behaviour, involving rules of conduct, tied in 
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with institutions, and so on. Think for example of how several transportation media 
helped forming a culture of speed and mobility that locked us in ever deeper and 
informed numerous practices without which contemporary life would be impossible to 
imagine. In the following subsections I shall go into one of them – auto-mobility – in 
more detail and show its origins and working as a technological system. Another telling 
example of how a rather simple technology was involved in a transformation which 
yielded far-reaching social consequences, is provided by the assembly belt – in 
combination with the electrification of industrial processes – that enabled a whole new 
regime of industrial production centered around standardized output, regular working 
hours, mass production, speed and a culture of high-capitalism which is organised 
around profit and efficiency.  
  I have to insert a caveat here, because I do not want to leave the impression of being a 
sturdy technological determinist. In order to understand the impact of technology on 
identity, a very helpful theory in my opinion is offered by Hughes’ theory of 
technological momentum. According to Hughes both technological determinism and 
social constructivism are one-sided, because they overemphasise either the 
technological artifacts in their impact on society (determinism), or because they 
overemphasise the socially driven processes of design and interpretation and their 
impact on technologies (constructivism).66 Hughes’ interactionist approach focuses on 
the level on which both users and artifacts are actors in a complex process, in which 
socio-economic, cultural and technological factors are constituted by, and constitutive 
of other factors. In Hughes’ own succinct words: “… technological momentum infers 
that social development shapes and is shaped by technology” (Hughes in: Smith and 
Marx 1994: 102). Since both the social and the technical interact within technological 
systems, for Hughes there remains only one factor outside of the system: the 
environment. An environment of which one can obviously pose the question to what 
degree an environment unaffected by technology still exists in this era of grand-scale 
technical mobilization? The term momentum is not chosen by accident: technology is 
made up of techniques which, because of their widespread social ramifications, their 
complexity (they require vast amounts of knowledge, investments and infrastructure) 
                                                
66 An endless debate wields in science and technologie studies about the origins of the sociotechnical 
complex: does technology drive society, or does society drive technology? See for an overview of 
arguments: Smith and Marx, 1994. 
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and their sedimentation into several layers of daily life, gained momentum of their own. 
To give a better insight into what technological momentum exactly is, and how (social) 
freedom and (technological) force interplay, I shall give a brief account of what is 
probably the most iconic of all technological systems: the car system.   
 
 
3.4.2   Automobility: ultimate freedom or compulsive behaviour?  
 
To remain stationary in these times of change, 
When all the world is on the move, would be a crime. 
Thomas Cook  
 
Indispensable as it is now, the car may seem a purposive, deliberately planned 
revolution in transport, carefully timed and grown out of a strong social and economic 
need, (such as it turned out to be for the past two or three generations). But was it 
really? Actually, it was far from it. At the time of the ‘Big bang of auto-mobility’, 
when in 1886 Benz and Daimler invented the internal combustion engine, the first 
automobiles were rather conservatively seen as a kind of efficient bicycle or coach. The 
car suffered under what came to be later known as the horseless carriage syndrome 
(McLuhan): far off from consciously triggering a revolution, its inventors tried to 
‘optimize the existing’, creating a cycle with mechanical propulsion. As was the fate of 
many new technologies, the German public was difficult to convince of its use. They 
even saw it as a redundant invention (!) and concerns grew whether the car would be 
commercially viable.67  
  It was not until some years later in Paris that the idea really took off. The reason is as 
clear to us as it was clouded to the car’s first manufacturers: instead of aiming their 
attention to the greasy, noisy and complex underlying technology, manufacturers put 
users in the center of the experience and promotion of cars. Not yet seen, though, as a 
functional means of transport, the car became popular as a machine for leisure time, for 
relaxation, enjoyment, for visiting the countryside. It served as a means for 
demonstrating social superiority and to experience the thrill of speed. Cars entered the 
                                                
67 In the first paragraphs of this section I draw heavily upon Wolfgang Sachs’ For love of the automobile. 
See: Sachs 1992: 91-124; 188-195. 
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scene as expressions of identity as they became ‘lifestyle symbols’ for the rich and 
tokens of courage for daredevils. Flourishing on a culture of speed which rose at the 
end of the nineteenth century the car was turned into an esthetic object and bought to 
parade the boulevards. It was only from 1908 onward, when Ford started to mass-
produce cars in the US, that the car was dispersed widely and became a common 
machine in the gamma of transportation means.  
  There were more and various reasons why the car suddenly did take off in those days, 
some of which completely mysterious to the contemporary mind. For example, driving 
was considered healthy! Clean air was breathed, the organism was thought to be in an 
active state, even the vibrations of the car were said to possess healing powers. A better 
example of the changing perception of media can hardly be found, since nowadays cars 
are considered extremely unhealthy (because driving requires no bodily exercise) and 
highly polluting. What also played a role in the nascent popularity of the car was the art 
of mastering it and the distinction that followed from it. Driving a car was not easy at 
all in those early days: there were very few roads, cars broke down regularly and hardly 
any supply was available. Fuel had to be sent in advance by train. Avoiding other 
traffic members was an art in itself: streets were littered with people, coaches, bicycles 
and animals, neither of them familiar with cars. Driving a car was supposed to lead to 
all sorts of virtues: health, patience, courage, inventiveness, mechanical aptitude; a 
triumph over the natural elements.   
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3.4.2.1  The freedom to move 
 
Keep moving! Steam, or Gas, or Stage, 
 Hold, cabin, steerage, hencoop’s cage – 
 Tour, Journey, Voyage, Lounge, Ride, Walk, 
 Skim, Sketch, Excursion, Travel-talk – 
 For move you must! ‘Tis now the rage. 
 The law and fashion of the age. 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1826) 
 
One distinguishing and novel feature of cars, however, stands high above all the others: 
cars provide the ultimate sense of freedom to their drivers. In cars the freedom to move 
is epitomized. Especially in a time when people were condemned to mass-
transportation in trains for the undertaking of longer journeys, the car was a true 
solution for those in disgust of full and filthy trains and fixed timetables. As a 
commentator in those early days wrote: “We will decide ourselves whether we drive 
fast or slow, where we stop, where we want to pass through without delay. We will be 
in the brisk, fresh air for days on end. We will not drive in dark, terrible caves through 
mountains, but over mountains. In short, gentlemen, we will truly travel, rather than 
have ourselves transported” (Bierbaum, quoted in Sachs 1992: 95). Sachs, too, agrees 
that partly the feeling of independence was born out of its contrast to the railway 
(Sachs 1992: 97).  
  The feeling of freedom it created was the most important reason for the car to push 
through and to take a decisive advantage over other mobility systems. Its plusses 
outweighed its downsides: driving meant freedom from public timetables, freedom of 
place, the experience of speed, the kick of driving fast. Along with freedom to move 
came a considerable amount of convenience: the convenience of having a private 
means of transport, and not depend on others. The car became the symbol of cultural 
and economic progress, the expression of a culture in which (self)movement, similar to 
the railroad in mid-nineteenth century, played an increasingly important role.  
  As I explained in section 1.2.2, in the Enlightenment human freedom came to be 
explained in terms of the capacity of unrestricted movement. This notion of freedom, 
which was and still is deemed one of the principle human rights, coincided perfectly 
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with the new-born services the car offered and was in turn endorsed by it, of which the 
American car culture forms a striking example. In general one can easily see how 
media feed this notion of freedom as self-movement: both media of transport and of 
communication provide us with a sense of mastering nature, of overcoming natural 
barriers of speed and location. As it comes to executing this supposed right of freedom 
– freedom to move as well as freedom of speech – it has always been tightly attached to 
media, ranging from primitive stone tools in slaughtering animals to the web enabling 
instant world wide communication. Media enable us to put our will into effect.  
  In conclusion, since the first T-Ford left the assembly belt, cars have not stopped 
evolving on this path of comfort, convenience and speed. Cars still enjoy unabated 
popularity, although economic crises and environmental concern may give the old-
fashioned car industry a hard time these days. It is not difficult to see why the car has 
become so central an artifact in our present lives. The list of predicates it merits is 
almost endless: cars are machines of dreams; objects of desire; symbol of status and 
objects of prestige; objects of art, lifestyle and the expression of identity; the ultimate 
embodiment of freedom and individuality; machines of adventure, thrill and enjoyment 
and machines of sports and competition; handy extensions of our bodies, a kind of 
natural, second skin in traffic; comfort machines by serving as climatized living room, 
cinema and music hall; but also objects of habit, frustration, big spending and envy, 
pollution and political debate (Cf. Sachs 1992; Urry 2007). The car has become deeply 
ingrained in all aspects of our modern, highly mobile society and woven into the fabric 
of our daily lives. In 100 years of driving, the car has gained an almost unstoppable 
momentum.  
   
 
3.4.2.2   Stuck in traffic again! 
 
The difficulties governments experience with greening the transport sector and the very 
slow introduction of alternatives beyond fossil fuel based vehicles tell a lot about how 
powerful and dominant the current car system in our society is. As Hughes explained 
about technological systems, they gain socio-technological momentum as they grow 
bigger and bigger. Every mobility system – as Urry calls it – presupposes both an 
extended underlying infrastructure facilitating this particular type of transport and a 
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culture of usage around it. So, the car system entails the car industry, roads, traffic 
rules, gasoline, mining of resources to build cars, education of drivers, licenses, 
etcetera. It is one of the biggest industries on the planet, maybe even the industry of the 
twentieth century. Companies such as Ford, Mercedes and Toyota have become some 
of the iconic firms of capitalist society and probably no single item has had so many 
hours of research and manufacturing put into it as thet cars they manufacture. One 
could even say the car industry is capitalism. More than one billion cars were 
manufactured during the past century, it consumes one fifth of all fossil fuels and still 
car travel is expected to triple between 1990 and 2050 (Urry 2007: 115).   
  The tentacles of the car system reach into every corner of our lives: it is tied to the 
fossil fuel industry (mining, refinery, gas stations); it employs millions of people 
directly or indirectly, tax-revenues generated by it are tremendous; it calls for extended 
infrastructural facilities; it is at the heart of commuting; we move our goods around by 
truck and by car; a whole leisure industry has been built around it; and on the list goes. 
It is a truly all-pervading system, interwoven with almost any aspect of contemporary 
life, without which modern life as we know it would come to a halt. The car system has 
grown to a point where it has become almost impossible to tell the car industry and all 
its technological aspects apart from the social processes it involves: they are completely 
mixed up. Did we move to suburbs because cars and roads enabled it or did we build 
cars and roads because we wanted to live in suburbs and needed them to do so?68   
  As we learned from Hughes in the former section, the deeper a system gets anchored 
in society, the more momentum of its own it gains. Its tentacles grow deeper into all 
layers of society, it becomes less prone to overturning and its impact on our lives 
mounts. Systems force their users into their own rhythm so to speak: “Systems 
increasingly develop in which there is an obligation to be circulating, and this is true of 
water, sewage, people, money, ideas” (Virilio, cited in Urry 2007: 13). We cannot 
afford our machines to falter. Urry observes this growing dependence too: “It is the 
steam engine that begins a long process of human life becoming a life that is 
irreversibly interconnected with and dependent upon machines. This is what I mean by 
‘modernity’, that moment when enormously powerful machines are imbricated within 
                                                
68 To the US this last remark applies. In the UK, on the other hand, suburbs already existed when the car 
was introduced, due to its early and extended railway system.  
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human experience. From then on, machines are not something on the side but they 
serve to constitute a ‘human’ life that cannot be lived without them” (Urry 2007: 93).   
  The gridlock does not just occur on our highways: our entire lives are held in a 
stranglehold of compulsory movement and technologized behaviour. An individual 
might still refuse car-ownership and revert to public transport, but as a society we 
cannot do away with cars, however high the oil-price is and however steep CO2 
emission curves. We live in a culture of mobility and constant acceleration: an 
entrepreneur refusing to partake is out! The logic of mobility that rules the globe – the 
constant flow of goods, information and persons - turned auto-mobility into a sheer 
necessity for survival. The system has ‘locked in’: the car system is so vast, dominant 
and there are that much interests at stake, that it is impossible to turn it over quickly. 
Despite all the contras in terms of environmental damage, it will be the dominant 
system for many years to come. As observed by Urry, “Billions of agents and 
thousands of organisations have co-evolved and adapted to that remaking of the system 
of auto-mobility as it spread like a virus around the globe” (Urry 2007: 117). What 
started as the freedom to move has turned into compulsive behaviour. Traffic jams are 
a frustrating symptom of the paradoxical plight we find ourselves in: we move around 
so much that this movement becomes self-inhibitive. The force that is exerted on us by 
the car system comes in many guises. With the car system come a lot of aspects that 
limit our freedom in numerous ways. John Urry therefore calls the car “simultaneously 
immensely flexible and wholly coercive” (Urry 2007: 119). 
  One could allege that this paradox is already foreclosed in the word ‘auto-mobile’ 
itself. ‘Auto’ comes in a twofold meaning of auto-mobility as ‘self-movement’: a 
vehicle that moves itself and needs no exterior help to do so. As such it can be viewed 
as a McLuhanesk extension of the human self. But the ‘auto’ of auto-mobility can also 
be interpreted as an automaton: the car as something autonomous beyond our control. 
This might not yet apply to the individual car – although experiments with Knight 
Rideresk cars and busses are being held – but it does apply to the car system in its 
cultural, economic and social dynamics. As Urry puts it aptly: “Auto-mobility involves 
the fusion of the humanist, inner directed self as in the notion of autobiography, and of 
objects or machines that possess the capacity for movement as in something being 
automatic or an automaton. […] The car driver is as a hybrid assemblage of human 
competences and will, and machines, roads, buildings, and signs” (Urry 2007: 118). 
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Wolfgang Sachs speaks of a dependent independence in this same context (Sachs 1992: 
101). 
  I shall list some other areas in which the car system has a large bearing on our way of 
behaviour and freedom of movement. In the first place, the car system goes hand in 
hand with many technical affordances69. A car not only requires driving skills and 
knowledge of traffic rules: modern cars take over an increasing number of actions from 
their drivers. Think of brake-assistance, automatic gearboxes, automatic lights, etcetera. 
In general a driver has to drive in a certain, pre-conditioned way in order to avoid 
accidents and keep the engine running and traffic flowing. One cannot pull the wheel or 
hit the gas pedal whenever one wants. A driver needs to make the car her ‘second skin’ 
in which machine and driver become one. Such ‘cyborgs’ are disciplined to move in 
certain pre-arranged ways. Just try braking with your left foot and you will know about 
the conditioning! Road dependence limits our freedom to move: a driver is restricted to 
roads and needs gas stations.  
  Handing over actions to cars has the consequence of turning them into moral agents. 
This applies not only to cars; we increasingly tend to delegate the morally good or the 
socially desirable to technologies: cars have limited top-speeds, roads are littered with 
speed ramps, airbags pop up and alarm lights flash if safety belts are not fastened. For 
reasons of safety and in avoidance of the interruption of traffic flows human behaviour 
is standardized, made predictable and repetitive. On top of that we are faced with what 
Urry calls authority constraints: legal restrictions on mobility such as forbidden areas, 
age discrimination and limited opening hours of public services. Also, freedom for car 
drivers often coincides with impediments for cyclists and pedestrians in terms of space, 
air quality and safety to move through traffic. Generally, we can observe increasing 
congestion of our cities and highways turning the freedom into frustration of our desire 
of unrestricted movement.   
  Although the car was heralded as liberator of public timetables, it too is bound by 
social conventions. We are still expected at work at a certain hour; carriers have to 
deliver their package before 3 o’clock; and if you want to avoid traffic jams, you best 
drive between 10 am and 3 pm. The railway, to draw a historical analogy, did already 
                                                
69 I took the concept ‘affordance’ from John Urry, who uses it to describe the intrinsic quality of objects 
to invite people to act upon them with a certain kind of behaviour. For example, a pavement invites us to 
walk on it. See also: Urry 2007: 50-51. 
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provide a good example of how a medium induces social pressure on a population by 
introducing universal time and fixed time zones in 1896. Before the first railway tracks 
were laid, almost every town had its own time. With the introduction of scheduled train 
travel, this chronological diversity was no longer tenable. For those travelling between 
towns by trains, an urgent need for punctuality, precision and calculability rose. Urry 
quotes Sachs, when he writes: “the station clock meant that ‘the cult of punctuality 
overtook the whole of society’” (Urry 2007: 97). The car meets a manifold of social 
demands. A lot of people depend on the car for work, social contacts, holidays, 
shopping, leisure activities, etcetera. Especially the sprawling of our cities  – the 
separation of home space on the one and work and services on the other hand – 
contributed much to the necessity of having cars at our disposal. For many people the 
possible loss of their driver’s license – because of a violation of traffic rules – is a truly 
horrendous and devastating prospect.  
  We may conclude that the car forms a perfect example of a technology that is at the 
same time liberating and restraining. Its personalized character, speed and convenience 
of use are paralleled by an increasing number of social pressures, rules and conventions 
around it. Compare it to what has happened to the mobile phone at the turn of the 
century: at its introduction it was praised as the ultimate device in terms of mobile 
communication, the freedom to move and staying ‘logged in’ at the same time, but it 
also forced us into a culture of constant reachability, reciprocity in terms of answering 
phone calls and text messages, and into an ‘always on’ mentality. The boundaries 
between private life and professional life become blurred: the ‘crackberry’ is already 
allowed in many bedrooms. The car experienced the same kind of fate, be it over a 
much longer period of time. The car simultaneously is pinnacle of individual mobility, 
of the democratization of movement, of the freedom of place and time, and part of a 
mobility-system that created a world wide momentum that will not be stopped for 
decades to come, and which places its burden on every individual living on his planet. 
As such, the car is one of many media in a larger process, a process that gained 
momentum of its own, and that is characterized by a similar paradox of advancing 
freedom and introducing new forces that impinge on the individual: globalization.   
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3.4.3  Globalized identities 
 
Your Christ is a Jew. Your car is Japanese. 
Your pizza is Italian. Your democracy – Greek. 
Your coffee – Brazilian. Your holiday – Turkish. 
Your numbers – Arabic. Your letters – Latin. 
Only your neighbour is a foreigner. 
Poster on the streets of Berlin, 1994 
 
Anthony Giddens pointly observes in relation to globalization: “When the image of 
Nelson Mandela may be more familiar to us than the face of our next-door neighbour, 
something has changed in the nature of our everyday experience” (Giddens 2003: 12). 
Essential feature of the process we are used to call globalization, according to Giddens, 
is the separation of time and space, or time-space-distanciation. Whereas in the past 
people lived in the here-and-now, that is, the coincidence of time and space in one 
single reality, a number of media appliances have made it possible for us to disconnect 
time and space, so, being in the now physically, but being elsewhere virtually: 
communicating, causing an effect, or suffering the consequences from things 
happening in another location. It has to be said, though, that in the pre-media era, 
people were able to be somewhere else in fantasy or by memory. Media thrive on our 
ability to displace ourselves virtually by means of thinking. In the end it is the very 
same capacity of self-reflexivity, which enables the existence of self-identity as as well 
the use of media.   
  As I stated earlier in section 3.4.1.2, media of communication and media of transport 
have brought the whole of the globe within reach. Although distance still matters - 
flying to Australia easily takes a European citizen a day - we owe it to media such as 
telephones, internet, airplanes and satellites that the constraints of time and space have 
been taken away to a considerable extent.70 If, for instance, natural disaster was to 
strike in Indonesia in the year 1500 AD, then the knowledge of the event appeared 
maybe two months later in Europe, when the first vessels arrived and spread the 
                                                
70 Apart from geographical distance, also economic distance is still an important barrier between people: 
many digital divides prevail on the basis of the lack of access and purchasing power. Especially in the 
developing countries a lot of people are not online yet. The access to media is very unevenly spread 
around the world.  
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message. In present times, on the other hand, we learn immediately about what is going 
on all over the globe and we may even see the images in real time on news sites. That is 
what globalization does to us. A process that did not start recently according to 
Giddens, but evolved gradually over many media starting with the prime medium of 
human language: “language is the prime and original means of time-space 
distanciation, elevating human activity beyond the immediacy of the experience of 
animals” (Giddens 1991: 23). After all, we can speak of things that are not immediately 
present but have taken place in the past or in our fantasy. 
  When did globalization start then? Is it a recent phenomenon and should we link it to 
modern technologies of communication and mobility or can we trace it all the way back 
to the origins of human language as in the explanation above? The word globalization 
itself is in vogue since the 1960s, when it first appeared in economic contexts (Cf. 
Shirato & Webb 2003:2; Waters 1995: 2). Apart from its actual use as a word though, 
several theories circulate on the beginnings of globalization. Peter Sloterdijk, for 
example, distinguishes three different historical stages of globalization. The first one is 
what he calls morphological globalization; a form of globalization he traces in classical 
philosophy and theology, as intellectuals tried to grasp the whole of the cosmos in 
round, sphere-like concepts. The second stage Sloterdijk discerns is made up of the 
history of terrestrial globalization; beginning with Columbus’ discovery of the 
Americas in 1492, this periods extends to 1945 and marks the physical discovery, 
mapping and knitting together of the various parts of the world, particularly as a 
consequence of European expansion. Finally, since the Second World war, we entered 
the era of electronic globalization (Sloterdijk 2005: 20-29). 
  In a similar vein, Malcolm Waters specifies three possible ways to date the beginning 
of globalization. One way is to see it in process since the dawn of history, with a 
sudden and recent acceleration. Another theory sees globalization cotemporal with 
modernization and the development of capitalism, and again, with a recent acceleration. 
The third way to look at globalization is to understand it as a recent phenomenon 
associated with other social processes called postindustrialization, postmodernization 
or the disorganisation of capitalism (Waters 1995: 6-7).   
  Pushing these theories on the nature and origins of globalization further from the 
viewpoint of media technologies, another triade can be added. I think Grosso modo 
three big waves of globalization can be discerned, all directly linked to milestone 
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discoveries in the field of media. In the first place there was the invention of writing, 
which made 'absent presence' possible: detailed communication, actio in distans, 
wielding influence over large areas such as the Roman Empire or the empire of 
Alexander the Great were some of the first examples of it. The concomitant spread of 
the wheel and advanced shipbuilding lead to the first stage of ‘world trade’ in the 
Mediterranean area. The second wave of globalization started around the fifteenth 
century with the invention of the art of printing, which eased the dissemination of 
knowledge, coinciding with the grand era of voyages of discovery, when European 
sailors roamed the globe and explored it physically. Magellan’s circumnavigation of 
the earth can be seen as the first true proof of the ‘global’ nature of our planet. It 
marked the beginning of an era of European expansion, military dominance and 
colonial exploitation.  
  The third wave struck at the end of the nineteenth century and triggered the tsunami of 
globalization that was to follow in the twentieth century. The invention of a gamut of 
communication and transportation media such as the telegraph, electricity, the internal 
combustion engine, and later aviation and modern telecommunications and computing 
systems accelerated the process of globalization to the point we know it today. After 
1990 especially, as we entered the post-cold war era, the process of globalization was 
accellerated even more. The hunger for ever more connections between people, 
countries and continents, more profit and more fancy gadgets continues to push 
technological innovations further ahead. Globalization and modern media technologies 
co-evolved in an ongoing history of relentless economic expansion, demographic 
growth and migration, connectivity and interdependency. With the rise of the world 
wide web, the explosion of global trade, rapidly expanding, cheap air traffic, further 
integration of financial markets and the bringing online of hitherto closed markets, we 
truly entered the network society. 
 In the light of my research, I align myself authors like Waters, Sloterdijk and Giddens 
in their emphasis on the reflexive dimension of globalization, which ties it historically 
to the modern period. As a reflexive process globalization could not arrive before the 
Copernican Revolution and other important discoveries in the early modern age; all of 
them learning humanity that it inhabited one globe. It was also in this particular period 
that the linear extension of globalization – tightly attached to the technologies I 
discussed above - experienced till the present day began (Cf. Waters 1995: 7). To quote 
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Waters by means of a summary: “We can therefore define globalization as: a social 
process in which the constraints of geography on economic, political, social and 
cultural arrangements recede, in which people become increasingly aware that they are 
receding and in which people act accordingly” (Waters 1995: 5). The key terms in this 
comprehensive definition by Waters are ‘aware’ and ‘act accordingly’. Both point 
toward a stage where globalization has become reflexive: people are conscious of the 
profound changes the world experiences and gear their behaviour to this new situation. 
Companies perform global marketing, groups of dissatisfied citizens construct 
resistance identities, and on the political and legal level a human rights discourse has 
been adopted.  
  One thing can certainly be said: globalization made the world shrink. Places that 
belonged to the vast and unknown terra incognita only a couple of centuries ago are 
now scrutinized by geologists to give away their hidden treasures of oil and gold and 
tourists swarm over their beaches. Globalization is the ongoing process that closely ties 
the world’s regions together and makes them interdependent in terms of economy 
(finance, labor, trade, resources), culture (the exchange of ideas, customs and 
lifestyles), politics (the formation of transnational institutions and the global dialogue 
between nations) and even biology (the migration of species, gene technology). Put less 
academically: globalization means driving an Asian car, which runs on oil from the 
Middle East, to a French restaurant, to eat an Argentinean stake and have an Ethiopian 
coffee afterwards, while in Africa millions of children are starving. Now, how does all 
of this impact our identity?  
 
 
3.4.3.1  Identity between the local and the global 
 
In Modernity and self-identity Anthony Giddens (1991) puts forward the question how 
people maintain their sense of personal identity in a globalizing world. He sees multiple 
dilemmas of identity arising that are directly linked to the process of globalization (Cf. 
Giddens 1991: chapter 6). First, there is the dilemma of unification versus 
fragmentation. On the one side the regions of the world are becoming increasingly 
homogenized in terms of culture and consumerism; on the other side we can witness 
growing individualism and the fragmentation of experiences, scattered over a wide 
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range of possible lifestyles, geographical places and social environments. The second 
dilemma Giddens mentions is the one of powerlessness versus appropriation. The 
domestication of sophisticated technology and communication media gives us the 
feeling of increased mastery over nature and of grip on our own lives. On the contrary 
we know ourselves to be part of global processes that transcend the powers of the 
individual; economic, social and ecological events that seem to unfold in line with their 
own, autonomous logic, beyond our control. As an individual I am confronted, for 
instance, with a scale of investment options for my savings that is unheard of in history, 
but simultaneously I depend on an opaque global financial system for its revenues and 
stability, a system beyond my realm of influence.  
  Thirdly, Giddens points at a discrepancy between personalised and commodified 
experience. On the one hand we could, with Lieven de Cauter, call capitalism the 
‘transcendental’ of contemporary society: the capitalistic logic of making profit, 
individualism, growth and efficiency pervades almost any aspect of modern life and 
has become the pre-condition for its thriving (Cf. De Cauter 2004: 41-49). On the other 
hand this logic forces individuals to develop their own lifestyles, to write their own 
biography, to make their own choices in life, choices though that are already 
conditioned by a capitalistic economy. Giddens speaks of ‘the pursuit of artificially 
framed styles of life’ (Giddens 1991: 198). One could call this dilemma the 
homogeneous obligation for heterogeneity in an economically homogenized world. 
Globalization not only causes global cultural homogeneity but even so more diversity. 
The global supermarket of identity resources we can shop in has widened enormously 
due to the use of global media. Before the age of high-speed transportation and instant, 
broadband communication devices, cultures were much more homogeneous in 
themselves due to a lack of exterior input. In these days media offer a platform for 
almost any cultural expression, however minor the land or group of origin may be. In 
this sense the use of modern media is telling for a person’s identity: am I a couch-
potato who discovers the planet through the Discovery Channel or am I a hypermobile 
businessman who travels the continents armed with laptop and blackberry? In The 
Saturated Self Kenneth Gergen warns us for a possible downside of this wealth of 
identity resources, pointing at the risk of saturation, where an individual is typically in 
internal conflict: for each belief there exists a strong countertendency (Cf Gergen 1991: 
72). We can add globalization to the list of factors that caused what he called 
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multiphrenia – the splitting of the individual into a multitude of self-investments – by 
so greatly expanding the amount of information we have to deal with, the networks we 
participate in, the lifestyle options and all localities we live and work in.  
  Finally, modern human beings find themselves in tension between living locally and 
being part of global networks and a global information system at the same time. On this 
last point and its implications for our identity I shall elaborate a bit more and go 
beyond Giddens’ text. As I declared earlier, globalization involves the decrease of 
distances, both physically and in terms of communication. The ‘outer world’ (the 
global) now intrudes the inner circles of our quotidian lives (the local). It does so on 
many levels: news about events happening in the rest of the world reaches us with 
light-speed and high accuracy; products from all corners of the world are displayed for 
our delectation in the supermarkets we visit; people from countries all over the world 
inhabit our cities and bring their customs along; diseases travel the globe by ship and 
plane and wreak havoc in regions they were naturally never designed to exist.  
  As Marshal McLuhan showed in Understanding Media (1994), pre-electric media 
such as ships and writing caused the world to explode at first – the world grew bigger 
and bigger during the past centuries as we learned more about it – but to implode under 
the influence of electric media from the end of the nineteenth century onward. Whereas 
writing could be portrayed as a unilateral medium – one was able to wield influence 
over distance without suffering immediate consequences, if at all – electric media on 
the other hand brought bilaterality with them (Cf. McLuhan 1994: 3-4; 35; 81-88; 247-
257). In a world that is becoming ever more globalized, these feedback loops become 
ever tighter, hence the impact of globalization on our identities mounts. On our 
television screens we watch starving African children with big, round bellies; we watch 
an earthquake destroy thousands of lives in China; we watch the felling of the Brasilian 
rainforest in order to meet our demand for bio-fuels.  
  In the old days the locality of an event determined whether it was to make it to the 
newspapers: only what occurred in the known vicinity and had a direct, local bearing 
on their lives was of interest to people. For ages people lived locally, at best regionally, 
as well in terms of subsistence as in their social lives. Nowadays newspapers round up 
24 hours of global news footage, hardly drawing a line between what happens in town 
or at the opposite end of the world. A lot of people know more about the private lives 
of their prime minister these days than of their neighbour’s. The traditional ‘sphere’ – 
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to use a metaphor by Peter Sloterdijk – surrounding us, a sphere locally based and 
offering existential security and social stability, has become porous. Thanks to a broad 
spectrum of media that flush our societies, from cars to satellites, mobile phones, 
money and the web, modern Europeans depend on the Tokyo stock exchange for their 
pensions and a tsunami in Indonesia puts our solidarity to the test. A moral appeal 
speaks from such images and saddles us with new problems. How should I treat 
disasters happening elsewhere, far beyond my immediate doorstep? Should I feel 
guilty? Should I ignore them? Should I donate money? A global phenomenon such as 
climate change, faces us with the responsibility we bear towards future generations and 
the need for sustainable development. In an age of global media people are forced to 
find the right balance between letting the world enter or shutting it out, between 
jumping into action or continuing business as usual.     
  We do not live in closed units any longer, units at worst are threatened or challenged 
by a deity or natural disruptions. The protective cocoon (Giddens) that villages, tribes 
or families once constituted, has turned into a mobile, volatile and temporary capsule at 
best. The world as a whole has become the new unit of reference. Globalization by its 
nature affects everybody on this planet and puts tremendous strain on modern 
individuals. The changing experience of space and time, the global economy and labour 
market, the proliferation of (Western) human rights, cultural Westernization, 
worldwide access to information, the evaporation of economic and physical borders 
between countries and the entwinement and interdependence of cultures, economies 
and political institutions; all these aspects of globalization have far-reaching effects on 
the daily lives of billions of people around the world. In the past people lived on the 
same planet; now we live in one world. In his prologue to a compendium on 
globalization, German social scientist and ecologist Wolfgang Sachs describes how this 
new world consciousness conquers our identities (conceived of as self-consciousness) 
by feeding our awareness of global interdependencies and the need to act accordingly. 
The image, fed by media, of planet earth as one big, interlinked system of which we are 
all part, makes our cognitive and moral coordinates of self-conception drift towards a 
new self-definition as responsible agents. That explains how all of a sudden driving a 
car can be linked to global warming and deemed morally abject. Sachs holds the 
opinion that the birth of a global community (Weltgesellschaft) may very well count as 
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the pre-eminent mark of our time (Sachs 2005: 18). It can safely be stated that 
globalization is the dominant cultural and socio-economic force of the moment. 
  In his book on modern identity, Anthony Giddens explains modern identity as a 
reflexive project against the background of this dialectic between the local and the 
global, between individuality and (new) social institutions, and between chances and 
fewer existential certainties (Cf. Giddens 1991: 33). The paradox of identities in times 
of globalization is that both elements play their part in peoples’ self-conceptions: they 
tend to see themselves as global citizens but still experience a strong tendency to 
‘encapsulate’ and affirm their local identity. Zygmunt Bauman, too, is aware of this 
paradox, one that is often overlooked in the heralding of globalization and its blessings, 
namely the one that people tend to erect new boundaries to compensate for the 
dwindling of other boundaries incurred by globalization. “As Jonathan Friedman put it, 
in our globalizing world ‘one thing that is not happening is that boundaries are 
disappearing. Rather, they seem to be erected on every new street corner of every 
declining neighbourhood of our World’” (Bauman 2001: 152).  
  In this same vein there have been writings on the emergence of so-called diasporic 
identities. The Indian anthropologist Arjun Appadurai, for example, writes in his 
famous book Modernity at large:  “As Turkish guest workers in Germany watch 
Turkish films in their German flats, as Koreans in Philadelphia watch the 1988 
Olympics in Seoul through satellite feeds from Korea, and as Pakistani cabdrivers in 
Chicago listen to cassettes of sermons recorded in mosques in Pakistan or Iran, we see 
moving images meeting deterritorialized viewers. These create diasporic public 
spheres, phenomena that confound theories that depend on the continued salience of the 
nation-state as the key arbiter of important social change” (Appadurai 2005: 4). 
  It speaks for itself that without modern media of transport and communication those 
diasporic identities would be inconceivable: without air traffic, radio, television and th 
world wide web keeping communities all over the globe upright, the connection to the 
home country would inevitably faint. Modern communication technologies facilitate 
diasporic communities to keep in close touch to their cultures of origine (Cf. Winter, 
Thomas & Hepp 2003: 103). Media mediate identity resources ‘translocally’ (Winter, 
Thomas & Hepp 2003: 12). Identities are reflexively formed in a kind of ‘in between’ 
space, in which persons transgress the boundaries of nations or regions thanks to the 
input offered to them by media. As far as the role of media is concerned, national 
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identity is an early form of a translocal identity, because of its constituency as an 
‘imagined community’ (Anderson 2006), going beyond face to face contact, and 
dependent on mediatic representations. National identity has always been informed by 
media, which started out in the nineteenth century with the use of newspapers, trains 
and telegraphs. Nowadays television obviously is the most important broadcasting 
medium in forging national communities (Cf. Winter, Thomas & Hepp 2003: 98). Yet, 
as opposed to this traditional, territorial form of identity (although it is already 
mediatic!) global, digital media delivered the means for deterritorialized, neo-tribal and 
diasporic identities. According to Hepp the globalization of media-communication 
leads to deterritorial identities in the fields of ethnicity (diasporic), commerce (neo-
tribalism) and politics (new social movements) (Hepp in: Winter, Thomas & Hepp 
2003: 12). 
  In analogy to what has been explained in chapter three about the human need for 
familiarity, intimacy and the creation of ‘cocoons’ of comfort and trust, it appears that 
the need for local anchorage of lives prevails even in a time when we enjoy the benefits 
of progressing globalization. Manuel Castells points at this paradox of people who 
withdraw into their familiar, local environments to stand up against the storm of 
globalization: in the end “most human experience, and meaning, are still locally based” 
(Castells II 2004: 182).  As traditional identities, such as national identities or religious 
identities, may experience a decline in authority, new group identities are built and new 
borders are drawn. The search for identity becomes thus a natural companion of 
globalization.  
  On the other hand, is it not the case that people develop cosmopolitan identities as 
well, rather than retreat into local sources of meaning, as Castells suggested? An 
example of such ‘global identities’ will be offered in chapter 5 in the case study about 
green blogs, where the web clearly contributes to a growing global consciousness of 
our ecological predicament. Media obviously work both ways: they can serve to 
reinforce our sense of the local, media might transform the ‘local’ by extending it, or 
they further processes of globalization. Therefore we conclude that the supposed 
opposition of the local and the global in fact is more of a paradox: they really are part 
of the same phenomenon of the pervasiveness of media in our societies. Given the 
analysis of identity so far in these opening chapters, what are the main paradoxes 
pertaining to contemporary identity?   
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3.5  The three paradoxes of (late)modern identity 
 
In a liquid modern setting of life, identities are perhaps the most common, most acute, 
most deeply felt and troubleshooter incarnations of ambivalence. This is, I would 
argue, why they are firmly placed at the very heart of liquid modern indviduals’ 
attention and perched at the top of their life agendas. 
Zygmunt Bauman   
 
If one takes a close look at modern (Western) identity, one sees that it is wrought with 
contradictions. We want to develop a highly original personal identity, yet we want to 
belong to a larger group as well. We want to detach ourselves form fixed, sometimes 
oppressive categories, yet we want to feel attached to a larger whole too. We want to 
choose and develop ourselves in freedom, yet keep phrasing identities as a higher order 
imposition: by birth (genes), by blood (national culture), by vocation, by social status. 
We deny having a stable, unchanging identity, but cannot dispose of the need for 
familiarity and continuity. We have become highly self-reflective, casting doubt on 
every supposed truth, yet know a constant landscape-gardening of the self to be utterly 
unbearable. On the one hand we have suspended belief in all-encompassing, universal 
doctrines about life, but on the other there is still a strong need for explanation and 
consolation. To a large degree we look upon identity as genetically given, but 
simultaneously we acknowledge identities to be social constructs hence pliable and 
alterable during the course of lives.71 If we now overview the contradictions the first 
three chapters yielded, we may categorize them into three major paradoxes, which lie at 
the heart of the modern, Western narrative on personal identity.   
 
First of all, we can view human identity in the light of the clash between autonomous 
and heteronomous behaviour. There is the apprehension, mainly stemming from the 
Enlightenment, of human beings as self-conscious, rational and autonomous creatures, 
contested by the Romantic view of human beings as being driven by (often 
unconscious) moods, feelings and incentives, resisting conscious control. On top of 
                                                
71 I owe some of these insights to my colleague Michiel de Lange.  
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that, theories which emphasise the role cultural factors play with regard to identity 
construction have gained weight in particular in the second half of the twentieth 
century. There is growing awareness of the deep impact environments, socially scripted 
situations, upbringing, education, media and peers have on human conduct and self-
perception. Both in psychological and sociological studies the evidence for how little 
we are in control of our own actions mounts up (Cf. Wilson 2002: 43-66). Identities 
then become (flexible) products of biological causes, the social activities we engage in 
and the cultural biases that are imprinted upon us, and their influence on how we feel, 
act and judge. This view is contested by the classical one of seeing human beings as 
deciding freely on who they want to be and how they want to behave. On another level, 
we encountered this very same paradox of autonomy and heteronomy in the former 
section on technology and globalization. Just think back of all the ways the car turned 
out to be liberating but also constraining our behaviour. In terms of personal identities, 
this paradoxical process of a growing (global) space for autonomous behaviour, and the 
simultaneous spread of heteronomic forces in regard to the construction and experience 
of identities equally prevails.  
  Autonomy literally means living by one’s own laws. We can distinguish three types of 
autonomy: moral autonomy, that is, putting oneself under self-conceived moral laws. 
Political autonomy, that is, govern oneself (e.g. democratic governance). And personal 
autonomy, that is, shaping one’s life in freedom. As we already saw in chapter 1, in the 
age of humanism and Enlightenment the subject climbed center stage: the ‘inner world’ 
had been discovered as moral and epistemological source. It was particularly Descartes 
who, like we saw in section 1.2, planted the seed of human freedom, which from 
thereon started an astounding uprising into becoming the moral sunflower of human 
dignity.  
  Yet, in the very same context we can distinguish three types of heteronomy (literally: 
living by another’s laws). The first type disputes human autonomy by pointing at 
elusive inner forces, forces of biological or psychological nature. The other type 
negates autonomy by pointing at outer forces, forces of social or cultural nature. The 
third one is heteronomy caused by technologization and the (implicit) maxims of 
conduct technologies entail. Especially in the Romantic era the view of an inner voice, 
the voice of nature, and the power of feelings gained a lot of popularity. If one takes a 
close look at popular culture, such as it is performed on television or in magazins, one 
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gets the impression ‘feeling’ has become the ultimate moral touchstone. It has become 
the final, unexplicable ground for making decisions: something is good if it feels good. 
Kenneth Gergen sees in this the beginning of a culture in search of depth and emotional 
richness.  
 
“To summarize, much of our contemporary vocabulary of the person, along 
with associated ways of life finds its origins in the romantic period. It is a 
vocabulary of passion, purpose, depth, and personal significance [...] It places 
love in the forefront of human endeavours, praising those who abandon the 
‘useful’ and the ‘functional’ for the sake of others. It fosters a belief in deep 
dynamics of personality – marriage as a “communion of souls,” family as 
bonded in love, and friendship as a lifetime committent” (Gergen 1991: 27).  
 
Romanticism meant a longing for community, but also for self-expression and 
emotional expenditure; a longing for community with nature, but also an attempt to 
transcend it (the sublime, the cult of the genius); Romanticism meant celebrating 
feelings as a moral compass. The ages of Enlightenment and Romanticism saddled us 
with this hybrid anthropological and ethical discourse of viewing human beings as 
rational, self-responsible and autonomous actors, and at the same time as driven by 
uncontrolable forces (think of Schopenhauer’s Wille or Freud’s subconscious), who 
grant a lot of weight to their feelings and impulses. Some hundred pages later Gergen 
eloquently lists some of the paradoxes of the modern identity: “We seem to be 
machinelike, but with a spiritual side; biologically determined, but in possession of 
conscious control; fundamentally motivated toward self-gain, but even more 
fundamentally motivated by high ideals; sheeplike creatures who are slavishly 
dependent on the mass media, but drawn deeply toward goals of uniqueness and 
independence” (Gergen 1991: 119).  
  A lot of Westerners nowadays live with the Romantic idea that somewhere deep 
concealed in them there is a metal box containing their true identity, turning their lives 
into the quest of the proper key to open this magic box and discover who they really 
are. Although this view is disputed widely within the scientific community, it still lies 
at the heart of a powerful discourse with tremendous societal implications. Take the 
examples of two (future) lovers. After the first stage of physical attraction the stage 
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arrives of ‘getting to know’ one another. The stage of discovering what kind of person 
the other ‘really is’: which type of personality, ideas about life, what kind of habits, and 
so on. Saying the words ‘I love you’ is preceded by a lot of laborious conversation. In 
modern relationships every detail of someone’s personality is made transparent and 
scrutinized: one lives in front of a constant mirror while performing reciprocal 
assessment-sessions. The partner’s true identity is supposed to lie somewhere deep 
within and has to be carved out first before embarking the love boat.        
  Simultaneously, a strong urge prevails in our culture to explain our personality traits 
and behaviour scientifically and move the burden of accountability away from the 
subject. Naturalistic approaches to mental matters are very much in vogue lately. In 
case of psychological deviances – say, for example, a case of paedophilia – it has 
become hard not to explain them in terms of mental illnesses, deficient genes or youth 
traumas. The fact that someone simply was ‘wrong’, for no particular reason, is 
accepted less and less. Identities are increasingly used to justify behaviour or made 
choices: ‘I couldn’t have behaved differently, since this is what I am!’  
   
The second paradox consists therein that we seem to be split, more than ever nowadays, 
between the (selfish) wish for self-expression and personal growth on the one, and the 
need for communication and community-building on the other hand. I shall call this 
contradiction individuality versus collectivity. As Jones states: “It is as if a fault line 
exists and two sides grate against each other; on one side is social convention, the 
community, the force that binds us together as social beings, and on the other is 
individualism, the dictum that we should just be our ‘selves’ (provided we can discover 
what that is) irrespective of outside forces” (Jones 1997: 27).  
  In his book The individualized society72 Zygmunt Bauman addresses the same 
paradox. He explains in what sense we should grasp modern individuality: “What the 
idea of ‘individualization’ carries is the emancipation from the ascribed, inherited and 
inborn determination of his or her social character: a departure rightly seen as a most 
conspicuous and seminal feature of the modern condition. To put it in a nutshell, 
‘individualization’ consists in transforming human ‘identity’ from a ‘given’ into a 
‘task’” (Bauman 2001: 144). Ironically it is because of their ‘dis-embedding’, the loss 
of traditional social and moral contexts, that individuals are prompted to a frantic 
                                                
72 Bauman, The individualized society, Cambridge, 2001. 
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search for ‘re-embeddeness’. Identity then “owes the attention it attracts and the 
passions it begets to being a surrogate of community […] Identity sprouts on the 
graveyard of communities, but flourishes thanks to its promise to resurrect the dead” 
(Bauman 2001: 151).  
  Peter Sloterdijk strikingly described our predicament with the concept of ‘co-
isolation’ (Sloterdijk 2004: 56). Modern apartment buildings are exemplary of a life in 
which (in the big cities at least) we are divided by no more than a few inches of wall 
yet socially live miles apart. It is a common phenomenon for people living in modern 
cities to know their neighbours’ favourite tv-shows, listen unsollicited to their music 
and scent their cooking without having so much of a clue of their names. Sloterdijk 
compares modern societies to the material of foam, existing of countless connected, but 
at the same time isolated bubbles, – remember Giddens’ cocoons – as a metaphore for 
the social state of modern citizens. In his recent book on the city Jan-Hendrik Bakker 
sees the modern city as the site where the opposition of the individual and the 
collective materialised in the form of appartement blocks (Bakker 2008: 37). Life in the 
cities became more anonymous, more free, but also more indivdual and more lonely. 
The bigger the city, the more people live together, the bigger the isolation so it seems.  
  In the next chapters we will see that modern communication technologies push this 
opposition even further. The world wide web in particular – with its tendency of 
encapsulating and uniting people at the same time – is a paradigmatic playground for 
this tension in the modern moral. On the web we are more than ever caught between 
these two tendencies of individualisation and capsulation on the one, and 
communication and community-building on the other hand. The web is both a source 
of reflexive uncertainty and computer-mediated isolation, and serves as a new, high-
tech layer of social cement.   
 
Finally, ever since the phenomenon of identity is under scrutiny, the debate is held 
whether identities are fixed or mobile. For one we still believe in the idea of a fixed, 
stable personality, hidden somewhere in the depth of our soul. Neurological research, 
for example, has shown clearly that people in fact do have certain genetic dispositions 
as far as their personalities and behavioural dispositions are concerned. On a daily basis 
it is even unimaginable not to suppose some sort of core personality that pervades all 
the social roles we play. Human interaction would become impossible altogether if we 
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were to lose the ability to predict the behaviour of others to a certain degree. Yet, 
simultaneously, we are well aware of the instable nature of our identities, both 
chronologically as well as spatially. As Ricoeur tried to indicate by using the concept 
of narrative, we all know from experience that identities are in motion during the 
course of a life and that every social situation requires different behaviour and makes 
us pick up different roles. 
 
 
3.5.1  Conclusion: identity 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to give an impression of the history and content of 
Western identities and sketch the contours of the current identity discourse.73 Above 
all, all the various examples and theories of identity lead to the conclusion that in late 
modernity identity has become a highly reflexive project (Cf. Giddens 1991: 21; 32). 
People are compelled to ask (self-reflexive) questions as to who they are and how they 
want to lead their lives. Yet, although reflexion has become the transcendental of the 
late modern identity, it seems that we lead our lives still guided by ideas stemming 
form the ages of Humanism, Enlightenment, Romanticism and Positivism. From 
Charles Taylors´ Sources of the self we can extract the main sources of modern 
morality, hence of our identity. According to Taylor these are: the classical turn inward 
- the human being as a reasonable, autonomous subject; sentiments as moral source; the 
utilitarian pursuit of happiness; and the affirmation of ordinary life. The list of modern 
values – which are canonical and institutionalised ideas on the good life – springing 
from these moral sources is dazzling. To mention a few of them: freedom, safety, 
responsibility, mobility, entertainment, transparancy, health, fitness, credibility, 
honesty, equality, authenticity, justice, happiness, love, pleasure, community, altruism, 
benevolence, respect, well-being, comfort, loyalty, personal growth, self-expression, 
creativity, self-esteem. Summarizing, these values could be grouped into two 
categories: societal values, values securing the quality of community life, the rules of 
                                                
73 I would like to emphasise that the picture I drew in this chapter is first and foremost a Western picture, 
conscious of the fact that even supposing the existence of so called ‘Western’ countries is a bit 
anachronistic, since all of these countries are suffused with influences of non-Western cultures and have 
mixed populations.   
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social conduct; individual values, values concerning the well-being and thriving of the 
individual. This list, which is far from complete, shows the ambivalence of modern 
views on good life, hence the versatility of modern identity. 
  In the quote below Taylor lays bare the fundamental schizophrenia of the modern 
worldview: 
 
"The result for us has been a split-screen vision of nature. On one side is the 
vast universe which scientific discovery continually reveals, huge and in some 
ways baffling, stretching far beyond our imaginative powers in both the 
gigantic and the miniscule; indifferent to us and strangely other, though full of 
unexpected beauty and inspiring awe. On the other side is the nature whose 
pulse we feel within, with which we can feel ourselves out of alignment and 
with which we can aspire to be in attunement. How these two are to be related 
is deeply problematical" (Taylor 1989: 416). 
 
The quote exemplifies the clash of romanticist and positivist conceptions of nature. The 
gist of Taylor’s analyses is precisely this convergence of multiple historical sources in 
(in)forming the modern identity. Not only Taylor, but also commentators like Giddens 
and Gergen share this opinion. As a result of which we are saddled with "… a sense of 
self defined by the powers of disengaged reason as well as of the creative imagination, 
in the characteristically modern understandings of freedom and dignity and rights, in 
the ideals of self-fulfilment and expression, and in the demands of universal 
benevolence and justice" (Taylor 1989: 503).  
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Chapter 4 
Playing and gaming 
 
 
 
 
4.1  Wanna play a game?  
 
Alle heiligen Spiele der Kunst sind nur ferne Nachbildungen von dem unendlichen 
Spiele der Welt, dem ewig sich selbst bildenden Kunstwerk   
 Friedrich Schlegel 
 
We usually have little difficulty determining whether someone is playing. Apart from 
the apparent joy that goes with it, it is easy to read the signs of playful conduct: 
submersion into another reality, one where different rules apply, that has goals of its 
own, that maybe has an element of competition in it; but also the perseverence and 
determination of playing the game as well as possible. But human beings are not the 
only creatures who are said to engage in play. When we witness puppies or kittens 
fooling around, tossing and tumbling on top of each other, biting, scratching and 
pulling each others’ leg, we do not hesitate to shout out ‘Oh look how adorable they’re 
playing with each other!’. Even non-living phenomena are sometimes called play, as 
there is the playing of light or waves. If we add to that the vast amount of expressions 
and sayings involving the concept of play, then the vast range of applications of this 
concept becomes apparent. This makes the question all the more pressing, why it is that 
we call so diverse a spectrum of behaviours all play? If there is such a wide range of 
phenomena and activities described as play, then what is their common denominator? 
What minimal characteristics do they all have in common as to merit the label ‘play’?  
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4.1.1  The concept of play 
 
How hard it is to pin down the phenomenon of play unequivocally, is evident from the 
literature on play. Sutton-Smith aptly describes the problem in his book The ambiguity 
of play: “Although most people throughout history have taken for granted their own 
play, and in some places have not even had a word for it, since about 1800 in Western 
society, intellectuals of various kinds have talked more or less systematically and more 
or less scientifically about play, and have discovered that they have immense problems 
in conceptualizing it. Presumably this is in part because there are multiple kinds of play 
and multiple kinds of players” (Sutton-Smith 2001: 6). 
  The ambiguity surrounding the concept of play originates right at its source. It is well 
documented that what we now indicate as playful has a double source in ancient Greek 
society (Cf. Huizinga 1950, Frasca 1999, Caillois 2001). On the one hand it can be 
traced back to the phenomenon called paidea, referring to a kind of 'prodigality of 
physical or mental activity which has no immediate useful objective, nor defined 
objective, and whose only reason to be is based in the pleasure experienced by the 
player' (Frasca 1999: 5). The other connotation is the one of ludus (which would be 
called a game now), which is a particular kind of paidea, defined as an 'activity 
organised under a system of rules that defines a victory or a defeat, a gain or a loss' 
(Ibidem). Or as Frasca also puts it in the same article: games have a result, play does 
not.    
  ‘Ludus’ is obviously no Greek word; neither is it an original Latin one. Nevertheless, 
it has become common place among scholars to use the concept of ludus in order to 
describe this particular kind of playing. The Greeks probably called these types of 
activities agon. Also, ludus and paidea are certainly not in opposition to each other: by 
definition, every game contains playful elements, that is, there is an element of free, 
transformative play involved. I introduce this distinction for being able to describe 
actions as play (paidea), which are not commonly seen as games, but which are still 
accompanied by free, playful elements. In the case of actual games, one can think of 
open-ended games such as Grand Theft Auto.  
  The classic definition of play, offered by Johan Huizinga, is as follows:  
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“Summing up the formal characteristics of play we might call it a free activity 
standing quite consciously outside ‘ordinary’ life as being ‘not serious’, but at 
the same time absorbing the player intensely and utterly. It is an activiy 
connected with no material interest, and no profit can be gained by it. It 
proceeds within its own proper boundaries of time and space according to 
fixed rules and in an orderly manner. It promotes the formation of social 
groupings which tend to surround themselves with secrecy and to stress their 
difference from the common world by disguise or other means” (Huizinga 
1950: 13).  
 
From this definition Roger Caillois deducts the following traits of play (Caillois 2001: 
9-10)74:  
1) It is a free activity. Freedom here means that it concerns a voluntary, non-obligatory 
action.  
2) It is conducted separate from ordinary life: within its own limits of space and time. 
When looking at the execution of a playful activity itself it strikes that it often involves 
both an element of repeatability and an element of oscillation. The temporal linearity 
that normal reality is ruled by seems less pervasive and has given way to a more 
circular experience of time. More so, although all playing comes to an end at a certain 
moment, there is always the possibility of playing again. If play were a unique, 
unrepeatable activity, it would no longer be distinct from ‘normal reality’ in all its 
transitoriness. The genre of games has the peculiar feature of inviting players to play 
over and over again. In Ingeborg Heidemann’s words: “… the goal of a game is not the 
arrival, but being on the way” (Heidemann 1968: 72)75. Therefore, play is frequently 
associated with the figure of a circle. It forms a self-contained unity, and as such is a 
symbol of fullness an perfection. When we look at play itself, as an activity severed 
from ordinary life, then it forms a meaningful totality in which every player plays a 
specified role. 
                                                
74 In Man, play and games Roger Caillois distincts four types of play (Caillois 2001):  
1) Agon: competition. 2) Alea: chance and fate. 3) Mimicry: creating an illusional, imaginary universe. 
Drama, film, carnival, parades. 4) Ilinx: vertigo. Sensation seeking, ecstacy, experience. Dance, rituals, 
danger, amusement parks.   
75 Author’s translation.  
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  3) Play has a high degree of uncertainty (about the outcome) attached to it: its course 
cannot be pre-determined. 4) Play is unproductive: it creates no goods or (direct) 
wealth and serves its own end. Play is said to be no technical, that is to say, no 
functional activity: it stands outside the realm of functional relationships, it functions 
not as means to some other end.76 The goals of playing lie beyond the sphere of direct 
material interest of its players. The goals of playing can be as diverse as winning the 
game, experiencing the thrill that accompanies the playing or the beauty of mastering a 
certain skill. The activity of playing contains a – what we could call –  ‘immanent 
teleology’: the elements of play are organised in a way as to enable the play to unfold 
and realize the goals that accompany it. Because it stands outside the teleological order 
of normal life and defines its own goals, play is sometimes said to create a world of its 
own. A world which offers its players a way to transgress the boundaries, to escape the 
dealings of ordinary life, and delightfully submerge in a world of selflessness, a world 
the pleasure of which increases by the degree to which one enters the play-world.  
  5) Play of the type of games is governed by rules. Games typically involve some kind 
of competition. Consequently, it is a way of displaying superiority over others, be it in 
terms of physical strength, intelligence, aptitude or play-tactics. To do so, it needs 
rules. Rules determine the playing field, they determine what tools belong to a game, 
they determine who is a player and they determine who the best player is. In order to 
understand a game one needs to be initiated into its rules. Within the manifold of play-
forms the rules tell all these different types apart. We could deem the set of rules 
belonging to a game its apriori: they are a game’s pre-condition and are beyond 
contestation. To the player rules are absolute. If the rules are violated, then either 
someone loses, or the play-world collapses entirely. As Heidemann writes about this 
feature of games: “Playing-rules cannot be cancelled out without annihilating the game. 
They cannot be converted or modified without transforming the whole playing-domain. 
They don not permit negation and resist turning them into an object of play. They are 
beyond doubt and absolute, one cannot play with them, but only according to them, 
under their law” (Heidemann 1968: 60).77 The rules not only delineate a game, they 
also provide it a goal. This goal obviously has to be realizable within the limits of the 
game. A computer game, for example, that is technically unplayable will not sell many 
                                                
76 Although we all know the spin-off from disciplines like sports to be gigantic nowadays.  
77 Author’s translation. 
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copies. 6) Play always contains an element of make-believe: it is accompanied by an 
awareness of a second reality against real life. By playing we engage in our ‘second 
lives’; a world in which we transgressed the boundary between being and appearance, 
between the serious and the playful.  
   
 
 
4.2   Playing and gaming 
 
Writing about play is always in danger of falling prey to a confusion of terms. What 
exactly is play and when do we call something a game? What is the difference between 
them? What is playful behaviour? In the following sections I shall try to establish some 
clarity in this matter by considering some existing notions which one often encounters 
in the literature on play. 
  In Truth and Method Hans-Georg Gadamer analyses art works by viewing them as 
games, as an interpretative frame to show the autonomy of works of art. Gadamer states 
that playing always means being played. The game (the art work) becomes master over 
the players and absorbs them completely. The real subject of a game is not its player 
but the game itself (Gadamer 1990: 112). In this sense he speaks of the autonomy of a 
game (Gadamer 1990: 116). Now, autonomy of a game means heteronomy for its 
players. It is not hard to see why: if someone plays a game she is supposed to play 
along the rules of the game, she is, as it were, sucked in by the playful reality unfolding 
itself and her actions are limited to what the rules of the game allow. For that reason 
Marshall McLuhan saw an important role for games in education: “A game is a 
machine that can get into action only if the players consent to become puppets for a 
time. For individualist Western man, much of his ‘adjustment’ to society has the 
character of a personal surrender to the collective demands. Our games help both to 
teach us this kind of adjustment and also to provide a release from it” (McLuhan 1994: 
238).  
  The ‘release’ McLuhan talks about is an important reason why modern life cannot 
only be compared to a game, but should also be seen play. As I mentioned earlier, the 
phenomenon of playing can be approached from the game perspective, but can also be 
seen as a kind of free behaviour that purposely transgresses boundaries. Carse speaks 
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in this context of a game as finite play (ludus) and play as infinite or free play (paidea) 
(Carse 1997). Modern identity is formed and performed within this dialectics of play 
and game, just as we saw in the first three chapters where identity was regarded under 
the banner of autonomy and self-creation on the one, and heteronomy – identity 
determining social, cultural and biological forces – on the other hand. A variety of 
technological tools enable people to construct their lives with an increasing degree of 
freedom of time and choice, but simultaneously we get entangled ever more deeply in 
this web of technology dependence. Just as in a game the horizon of options to choose 
from is limited: I have to abide the law, there are certain minimal rules of proper 
conduct, my financial funds are not endless, I am dependent on many technologies for 
my survival, and so on. But there is still plenty of room for me to play with (and 
within) those constraints, to make my own choices and to lead my life as I wish. We 
live, by necessity, in a technotopos in which technology both liberates and constrains.   
  This paradox of freedom – the tension between autonomy and heteronomy – may 
even have become the characteristic, if not curse, of present-day society. It occurs on 
many levels. For example, there is a presumed freedom of choice in terms of lifestyles 
that in reality is based on a grinding absence of true autonomy. We may face endless 
options for life fulfillment, but simultaneously tremendous pressure is put upon us to be 
ourselves, to enjoy, to make the most of life. Modern human beings continuously feel 
the social whip striking their back, condemning every less successful life as a blatant 
failure. Be someone, or be a loser! As Anthony Giddens puts it somewhat less 
polemically: “In conditions of high modernity, we all not only follow lifestyles, but in 
an important sense are forced to do so – we have no choice but to choose. A lifestyle 
can be defined as a more or less integrated set of practices which an individual 
embraces, not only because such practices fulfill utilitarian needs, but because they 
give material form to a particular narrative of self-identity” (Giddens 1991: 81). 
Another example is provided by the relief progressing technology has given us over the 
ages, relief from burdensome work, allowing easy communication over great distance, 
the speeding up of activities, etcetera. Yet, the paradox revealing itself nowadays 
counters more speed with more congestion and more spare time with ever busier 
agendas. We created a world system that banks on the illusion of freedom; a system 
that only works as long as everyone plays the (e.g. financial) game along.  
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  These ambivalences are part of play’s nature. If we look a little bit deeper into the role 
of rules in a game and the way they function, we see them functioning in a twofolded 
manner. Games are spaces where organised play takes place. The rules of a game 
ensure that the game has an unpredictable and partly free course. Rules permit a certain 
playroom to exist, within which the trajectory of the game evolves freely. Rules foretell 
their own transgression by enabling something new, something unique every time the 
game is played. So, one of the moments of play is the moment where the player uses 
this ‘playroom’, where the player uses her creative freedom within the system so to 
speak. When playing, players play with the freedom offered by the game itself. The 
other moment of playing goes a step further and takes the player beyond the game. 
There playing is understood as playing with the rules, as flirting with the games’ 
tolerated limits. Then play is the moment within a game where the player starts 
questioning its conditions. In doing so, a player places herself in a position where she 
virtually is extra ludus, a position from which she is able to break the rules. Then, a 
game becomes what I would call playful: it is the moment when reflexivity gets 
introduced within a certain setting, reflexivity that permits to look beyond the obvious. 
Identities form a perfect example of this mechanism: a person can play along the game 
of whom she ought to be for years, and live by a pre-given identity as one is supposed 
to, but only the moment she becomes self-conscious of her biases will she be able to 
move beyond them and play freely with her identity. In this case playful conduct can 
even turn into subversive behaviour, in which the existing circumstances are no longer 
taken for granted and an attempt to alter the rules of the game is conducted. In section 
5.3 I shall say more about this type of playfulness by showing that weblogs are a 
powerful tool for this kind of civic ‘disobedience’.   
 
 
 
4.3  The ambivalences of playing  
 
As the description in section 4.1.1 indicates, when we are playing we always hover 
along the edge: sometimes we are in and sometimes we are out of play; we can be 
posessed by it and fully immersed, yet simultaneously we have an awareness of its 
limited relevance somewhere in the back of our minds; we play by the rules but do not 
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forget about the ‘normal’ rules of proper conduct. Whenever we enter a play-world we 
engage in a world of ambivalences: a world where meanings shift and people alter 
behaviour and appearance. On the one hand, play is a phenomenon like all others: it is a 
fact that the activity of playing exists, it needs tactile parts and bodies in order to be 
performed, it is out there, as a reality. But on the other hand, it also represents a sort of 
hole in normal reality. We may even call it an ‘ontological gap’, because of the deviant 
perception of space and time by its players and its self-created universe of meaning. 
Play forms a world apart, a world different from ordinary reality in many respects. To 
play requires a change of perspective, a different take on reality by everybody 
involved.    
  In this sense play is at the same time real and virtual. It exists beyond any doubt, it is 
made out of pieces of hardware just as any other reality is (including ourselves – the 
players), but simultaneously it creates another reality: it causes effects to emerge from 
that hardware that were not there outside the play-world. For example, the tools we use 
when playing bear a completely different meaning than they would under normal 
circumstances. Seen from the perspective of the outsider play leaves the impression of 
being a world of appearances, a world that is not for real and which has only temporary 
relevance. But turn the perspective around and take the player’s point of view, then the 
outside-world, the ‘normal world’, temporarily loses its importance. What is more, 
although it may be ‘just’ a world of appearance, playing causes very real effects on 
players, as anyone who has ever vigorously played a game knows.   
  This very peculiar quality of play, of simultaneously being a part of reality and of 
standing outside it, is called ‘ontological ambivalence’ by Ingeborg Heidemann in her 
monumental work Der Begriff des Spieles (The concept of play). This ontological 
ambivalence is not only a consequence of play’s nature, but also refers to the varying 
ways in which play manifests itself phenomenologically in the minds of players, 
engaged spectators and third parties like scientists. Each of them ‘sees’ play differently, 
might even see or experience another reality. To give an example: the way a game of 
tennis appears to the players – take the speed of time passing when they are in the zone 
– is by no means comparable to how a pampered VIP in a skybox witnesses the game. 
Phenomenologically, they are not in the same world. Play seems to oscillate 
continuously between the realms of being and appearance, seriousness and playfulness, 
inside and outside reality. Heidemann mentions in this context the betweenness of play 
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(Heidemann 1968: 10). In the remainder of this section I will expose the ambivalent 
nature of play in more detail on the basis of two of its most important constituents.78 
 
 
4.3.1  Two ambivalences: space and time 
 
The first constituent of play is its spatiality. Every play evolves in three-dimensional 
space and follows the physical laws governing this space. In this sense ‘normal’ space 
is constitutive of every type of play. The difference between normal space and play 
space – and thus its ambivalence – comes to the fore as soon as we take the player’s 
experience into consideration. The act of playing is performed not only in normal 
physical space, but it also creates is own abstract, symbolical space. Space not only 
constitutes play, but play also constitutes its own space. Let us take the art of playing 
the piano as an example of how play creates its own space. A piano is played by a 
pianist, whose body is seated on a bench in front of the piano, say a Steinway concert 
grand of about 2,4 meters long and 1,4 meters wide. All of them neatly within their 
supposed measurements and obeying the laws of physics. Even the transferring of 
sounds to the listener, sharing those same spatial dimensions, can be perfectly 
explained scientifically. But precisely what these people sitting in the auditorium are 
hearing – music – can by no means be explained according to the principles of 
‘normal’, Euclidian space. Music creates a spatial dimension that knows its own 
parameters: its variables being not length, width and volume, but harmony, structure, 
melody and meaning. The music played raises a reality in the consciousness of 
performer and audience, which is irreducible to its quantifyable, external, physical 
properties. Every play has its own, immanent logic, in this case a logic of musical 
mystery. Here we clearly witness an example of play’s ambivalence, by means of a 
reality that, although it is made up of limited, ‘normal’ space, in itself creates and 
contains an unlimited, musical space.   
                                                
78 Maybe a quick reminder could be useful here: I purposely speak of the ambivalences of play and not 
of the ambiguities of play. Although play can easily be surrounded by ambiguities, for instance, in case 
of lacking rules or vagaries concerning what elements belong to a game – “is this part of the game or 
not?” –, here, the concept of ambivalence has been chosen in order to indicate the fact that all play is 
two-sided, that one can always look at it from two sides, as it is the case with paradoxes.     
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   A second ambivalent feature of play is its temporality. Again, when a game takes 
place, it can be perfectly described in terms of clock time, having a beginning in time 
and lasting for so and so many hours, minutes and seconds. But for the player this is 
not the only way time passes. During playtime time accelerates and slows down, 
freezes or rushes by, can become highly concentrated or stretched out to almost 
infinity. As any player of games would know, it can cause the experience of completely 
forgetting about time, of being involved in a game to such a degree as to forget about 
all outer events. Some of us experience this when reading an exciting novel; others 
when engrossed in a game of soccer. One could describe this phenomenon with the 
concept of branched time: next to normal clock-time – which obviously still runs along 
– there is a parallel temporal universe, run by some intra-ludic logic. This playing-time 
does not necessarily coincide with the time played.   
  In a certain way one could speak of the annihilation of time within time during play, 
of a certain timelesness of play. The time represented within a game does not equal the 
game’s clock time. Take a stageplay or a movie as an example. Although it begins at, 
say, eight o’clock in the evening and finishes at eleven, what is represented within the 
play can be anything from three hours to three years or even more. The trick is that 
both players and audience are deliberately letting themselves to be fooled, so to speak, 
in order to fully experience play’s contents. This goes for play activities ranging from 
novels and films to computer games. Yet, playtime in itself has the same characteristics 
as normal time does. Every moment has its past and future and, although time gets 
distorted and flashbacks may occur, playtime basically too has a linear order. Let us 
return to the example of the pianist. Every moment of the performance her attention 
can be seen as kind of two-edged sword, forcing the pianist to listen back to the sounds 
she just produced and tuning them to the notes yet to be played. The piece is played in 
a continuously shifting present, from which the pianist extends herself consciously into 
the past and future of play. In an interview the great Austrian maestro Alfred Brendel 
once declared that because of this necessity of simultaneously listening to past notes 
and thinking ahead every musician is characterized by a split personality.  
 Of course these two ambivalences are by far not the only ones inherent to playing. 
Many other examples of play’s ambivalent nature can be given. For instance, when we 
play it is all about the act of playing: we derive our satisfaction from it, but this is 
coupled with the contradictory effort to win a game as quickly as possible. Or, in the 
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case of reading a book, one reads because of the pleasure of reading but the better the 
book the quicker one wants to finish it. The same goes for the rules of a game: for one 
they restrict the player in her possiblities, but at the same time they enable the game to 
exist in the first place and to have an unforseeable outcome.  
  I perform these analyses on the ambivalence of play because I would argue that this is 
precisely the reason why the concept of play is so apt for explaining modern identity, as 
I laid bare its very paradoxical nature in the previous chapter. Play is the embodiment 
of ambivalences. Michiel de Lange writes: “I believe the most valuable contribution of 
a theory of playful identities could be in capturing this view of identities as mobile, 
open-ended and wrought with paradoxes”.79 What in my opinion is the main 
ambivalence of play in terms of media use and identity construction – its playfulness – 
will be discussed in the subsequent section.  
  
 
4.3.2  The playfulness of playing: it is just play 
 
No matter how often you tell a sports player it is only a game she is performing, the 
tears flowing after defeat will not be any less. Chances are, however, that half an hour 
later the same player, after she took a shower and had something to eat, when she has 
her obligatory meeting with world press, says something like ‘yes, its hard to lose, but 
after all it’s only a game, there are more important things in life’. How strange is that? 
And this radical turn-around of mentality happens millions of times a day, be it among 
sports players, computer gamers or children playing in the street. How strange a reality 
we enter when playing, a reality that one moment means the world to us, and the next 
loses all its significance. Here we encounter what is probably the most striking and 
most familiar ambivalence of playing: the ambivalence towards it own value. Play is 
easily opposed to normal life as not being serious, as a means for briefly opting out (or 
in!), entering a state of mind where we are relieved from the strain and obligations that 
life puts us under. Yet, hardly any human undertaking is done with so much vigor and 
dedication, with so big a desire to succeed as playing. As Johan Huizinga observed in 
Homo Ludens, it is seriousness that stands behind every game. “But let it be 
emphasised again that genuine and spontaneous play can also be profoundly serious. 
                                                
79 Michiel de Lange, Moving Circles, 2010. Unpublished PhD thesis. 
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The player can abandon himself body and soul to the game, and the consciousness of 
its being ‘merely’ a game can be thrust into the background” (Huizinga 1950: 20-21). 
This state of mind resembles what Gadamer had in mind when he talked about the 
work of art. Gadamer even claims that only seriousness (while playing) turns play 
really into play (Gadamer 1990: 108). 
  The paradox is that when a person engages in play, she does not necessarily have to 
show playful behaviour; just look at the world of professional sports for an example. 
Although players know it is only a game they are playing, this knowledge does not 
dilute their dedication in any way. Either one plays, or one does not. There is no middle 
ground between play world and the world outside. A person will always be oscillating 
between the two of them: she is in, or she is out. It is impossible to win a game a little 
bit. The thrill and joy that accompany playing are largely due to complete immersion in 
the game and the temporary forgetting of outer reality. Maybe it is because of the 
pureness of play, the fact that there is nothing ‘really’ at stake, that is, nothing but the 
honour and aptitude of the player – the art of play so to speak – why playing seems to 
involve this element of sacred seriousness. But even if we are fully immersed in what 
we do, it is still only play.80 
  Yet, this is just one way of looking at the ambivalence of playfulness and seriousness 
in play. In addition, the millennia-old art form of the tragedy demonstrates how play 
also has been a way of dealing with hardship. The delicate mixture of seriousness and 
weighty matters, humour and cheerful performance, transforms hard nuts into 
psychologically and morally edible ones. A playful mentality enables us to treat things 
as it were from a distance: to dive into them without being swallowed. Science is such 
a kind of serious play: we engage in it vigorously, aggrevating matters to the most, yet 
we are fully aware of its limited reach and we see our papers flushed down the gully of 
mass interest time after time again without leaving any noticable trace. It may well be 
that in the age of continuous news feeds all of us need to have a playful stance towards 
things in order to keep afloat: if we were to take seriously every bit of information that 
reaches us about the condition of the planet and human suffering, life would become 
                                                
80 What I write here about flow and immersion holds true for the player’s consciousmess during play. If 
we look at the practice of play altogether, then a picture emerges, which is a lot more colourful instead of 
the black and white picture of simply being in or being out of the game. For example, in the case of 
professional sports huge commercial interests are at stake, which can lead to the kind of strategic 
behaviour that is not related to the act of playing in itself. A football match is played not only for sport’s 
sake, but also to ensure the club’s income.     
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unbearable. Cool eyes are sometimes needed to keep the motor of civilization hot and 
running. Section 2 of chapter 5 will see this type of playful behaviour as an important 
instrument in the battle against a hotter climate.  
  Apparently the relation between playfulness and seriousness can take on two forms: in 
the case of games we witness seriousness within play, their seriousness is an important 
means for the execution of the game. In not game-like settings on the other hand 
playfulness is performed as a way of dealing with the seriousness behind play. This is 
what is commonly understood by playfulness and it is this type of playfulness and 
play’s ambivalence towards seriousness that is especially important to my thesis. If one 
looks up the adverb ‘playful’ in a dictionary, one reads of meanings along the line of 
‘full of fun’, ‘wanting to play’, ‘not serious’, and ‘light-hearted’. This interpretation of 
playfulness offers us a criterion to tell apart play from ‘normal’ reality. At the 
beginning of this chapter we set out on this journey by posing the question after play. 
What turns play into play and what sets it apart from other reality? We are now in a 
position to state that play’s distinctive mark – its identity – resides in its playfulness. 
Playfulness is what both games and all other conduct we call play have in common. 
Playfulness is the criterion of play. Playfulness means there is always a high degree of 
ambivalence involved in such action we call play, since it means looking at things with 
double glasses on: for one it is only play and people recognise it as such, but somehow 
there is always an element of seriousness involved, either within or standing behind 
playful conduct. Playfulness is the expression of the ambivalence between seriousness 
and non-seriousness that is constitutive of all playing.  
  This also explains why the label of ‘play’ is being used as widely as it is, covering so 
many types of actions, even animal behaviour. We can doubt whether we can attribute 
the type of highly sophisticated behaviour that is required when playing a game – 
involving a concept of what is real, of rules, of planning ahead, of roles, of 
performance-levels – to a creature that even lacks language. Yet, even an animal seems 
to have some sort of intuitive ‘knowledge’ of merely being at play, which is why 
playing puppies do not really bite their brothers and sisters, and why kittens pull back 
their raiser sharp claws just in time to avoid injury. They somehow ‘know’ the situation 
is not serious, although they lack a well-articulated concept of play. Here as well, 
playfulness is the dividing line between play and normal, serious reality. As soon as we 
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stop pretending, stop doing ‘as if’, and we do not find ourselves any longer in a reality 
that is ‘only play’, then we clearly feel that normal reality has kicked in again. 
  Playful behaviour can be associated with a lot of qualities: it involves some minimal 
distance towards one’s own actions in order to view them as mere play; one has to take 
a reflexive stance towards oneself, a kind of doubling of the ego – as I already 
elaborated on in chapter 1 in relation to self-identity – for being able to classify own’s 
own behaviour as the kind of activity that has no consequences outside play, that is not 
for real. Playfulness means non-seriousness, it contains a touch of humour, of parody, 
of satire and it enables us to get away with saying ‘it was only play’. Playfulness also 
means freedom, the freedom to toy around, to transform, to experiment, to open up new 
possibilities, to express critique in a harmless manner and resist the prevailing forces 
without immediately suffering severe consequences. Playfulness means frivolity, fun, 
and enjoyment of what one is doing.  
 
  
 
4.4 Playful media  
 
As will be shown in the upcoming chapters, the playfulness of modern, online identity 
resides in three ambivalences characteristic of play. The websites I describe and 
analyse throughout the last three chapters will all deal with these ambivalences. The 
ambivalences will be coupled with the aforementioned identity paradoxes. Let me now 
briefly introduce each of them by repeating what I already wrote about them in the 
Prelude, for the reader to keep a clear picture of the overall structure of this thesis.  
  The first ambivalence is the tension caused by the freedom of play(ers) on the one 
hand, and the heteronomy and rule-bound character of game-like situations on the 
other. In chapters 5 and 6 I show, through an analysis of political sites and green blogs, 
how the playful presentation of statements, jokes, humour and satire serve as a medium 
for expressing critical and subversive messages and facilitate resistance against (social, 
economic and political) systems. I shall describe so-called green blogs at length, which 
provide an apt example of how all the mentioned aspects of playfulness merge in an 
online environment. As well the aspects of play as freedom, as those of frivolity, 
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open(minded)ness and counter-culture are prominent features of these kind of websites. 
In this particular case we will witness a playing with rules.81  
  The second ambivalence concerns how we play with others, which I encounter in the 
playfulness of social network sites, consisting of a peculiar mix of individuality and 
collectivity. Therefore, in section 6.2 I pay attention to how playful, light, frivolous 
self-presentation of persons in online network environments is accompanied by the 
utter seriousness of social bonding and the pressure to develop distinguishing 
personalities. 
  The third ambivalence directly refers to the one I discussed along Heidemann’s text: 
the ambivalence of play as creating a world of appearance, a kind of second, 
experimental reality as opposed to ‘normal’ reality. In other words: playing with 
reality. In this case there is a direct connection between online behaviour and personal 
identity. In online environments we witness playful probing of identities and the 
discovery of alternative stances and new ideas, but all this has very grave, real 
consequences. A playful environment encourages us to do ‘as if’, to take on roles 
beyond the ordinary. This role-playing can become so strong an experience as to forget 
what the ‘real’ world is or as to import characteristics into it. The gap between reality 
and appearance closes. In section 3 of chapter 6 I consider the implications for human 
identity of online identity experiments and the possibility for people to ‘play with 
themselves’. As opposed to narrative identities, playfulness emphasises the openness 
and multilineair character of identity, just as a game virtually has an endless amount of 
possible variants and outcomes. Just as the way games are played over and over again, 
human identities remain under construction during the course of a life. And just like 
life, games have a high degree of uncertainty (about the outcome) attached to it: their 
course cannot be pre-determined. As I wrote in the first section of this chapter, play 
always contains an element of make-believe: it is accompanied by an awareness of a 
second reality against real life. By playing we engage in our ‘second lives’: we shift 
between the worlds of being and appearance. 
  
 
                                                
81 Players may sometimes be able to play with rules; generally they play by the rules. I use the concept of 
‘playfulness’ on purpose because it expresses this ambivalence between game features and performative 
play features.  
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Chapter 5 
Setting the playing field –  
Green Blogs 
 
 
 
 
We come to ourselves differently as we catch sight of our images in the mirror of the 
machine 
Sherry Turkle 
 
If one ponders on how using the web might affect personal identity – by which I mean 
people’s self-understanding – then it is not difficult to come up with a range of possible 
influences. The web is often said to offer people a platform to experiment with their 
identities, to explore who they are, or even pretend being someone else for a while to 
acquire better self-understanding. Applications such as virtual worlds, social network 
sites or homepages provide some of the tools to do so. Next to positive identifications – 
I am this or I am that – the web offers endless contrasting views: users encounter 
examples of identities they clearly disagree with. As explained earlier, negative 
identification contributes to the shaping of an identity as much as positive identification 
does. This chapter opens with an overview of the ways the web is thought to influence 
both the process of identity formation and its content. After those introductory remarks, 
I will move on to presenting my central case, an analysis of green blogs, from which I 
extract elements of playfulness in the sections thereafter.  
 
 
 
5.1  Identity & the web 
 
A big change that came with using the web as a medium for communication, 
information and self-expression, is that it greatly increased the amount of feedback and 
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comments one gets on expressions of identity. Web applications go along with the 
process of the growing reflexive dimension of personal identity as I showed it to be a 
prime characteristic of the (late) modern age in section 3.3. By adding advanced 
applications to the already extensive palette of tools for self-expression and 
communication, the web provides its users with countless incentives to reflect on their 
identities. After all, maintaining a weblog or personal homepage simply forces you to 
think about who you are and which aspects of yourself you want to show on the web. 
Equally important, it exposes your (alleged) self-conception to the critique of visitors 
of your site or blog. As such, the web can easily serve as a virtual mirror (for example, 
by means of chatting, reactions on blogs, comments on social netwotk site postings, or 
conversation in MUDs) and thereby unveil aspects of the identities of producers of 
homepages and blogs they were hitherto unaware of.  
  But even without the responses of others, the mere fact of working on a personal 
profile greatly boosts reflection on one’s identity. Expressing oneself on the web urges 
people to develop a well worked-out understanding of who they are and invites them to 
pose questions such as ‘Who am I?’, ‘Which photos do I publish?’, ‘What information 
can I put into my profile and what not?’. Research has shown that young people 
engaging in social network sites are “predominantly busy managing their identity: who 
am I, whom can I be, how do I come across. What do others think of me and how can I 
adapt to their opinions?”(Est, Van ‘t Hof & De Haan 2006: 180).82  
  In chapter 2 I explained the social nature of personal identities and showed how not 
only other people, but also culturally mediated symbols and practices reflexively have a 
bearing on the construction of identities. Often the person in matter is unaware of these 
cultural biases and social mechanisms steering the construction process. Now, the 
world wide web offers a gamut of ways to influence users’ behaviour and the reflexive 
process of identity construction. Many e-companies – of which book and music stores 
are a famous example– use intelligent software in order to be able to ‘suggest’ 
purchases to their customers, by keeping record of past purchases or comparing one’s 
preferences to those of other customers. In this manner, the site’s visitor is unwittingly 
pushed towards a certain preference and will either identify or not identify with the 
suggestions shown, in any case, though, she is forced to reflect upon her consumption 
and behavioural pattern. The same goes, for example, for the widespread practice of 
                                                
82 Author’s translation.  
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posting reviews about products on dedicated websites. Imagine you very much like 
going to a certain restaurant in your hometown, which turns out to be reviewed very 
negatively on dinner sites. Would you not start questioning your sense of taste? Would 
you dine there just as enthousiastically again after having read the reviews?  
  These days, the web offers thousands of sites that put visitors in a position to gather 
all sorts of medical and psychological information and to engage in personality tests 
that measure, for instance, how likely they are to fall prey to depressions or other sorts 
of mental illnesses. Just like that, websites dealing with the illness anorexia nervosa 
have recently been put under severe censorship. If one googles the subject it has 
become nearly impossible to find any other than medical sites that strongly warn 
against its health risks and that show shocking pictures of the devastating effects this 
illness can have on the human body. The reasons for such dramatic measures are 
obvious: fan communities talked more and more young women into a life-threatening 
diet. Supplemented by thousands of images of nearly perfect female bodies that hit our 
retinas through various media channels day after day, the psychological pressure on a 
lot of girls to live up to those photoshopped role models became just too high. This 
logic of the impact of media on our self-images can easily be extrapolated to sites about 
all sorts of bodily illnesses, but also to fan communities, political sites or network sites 
and the pressure they put on users. 
  These examples provide us with some evidence of how the web is not a simple, one-
way tool we may use to our likings without running the risk of any backfiring, but that 
the web is – just as any other medium by the way – mutually shaped by users on the 
one, and by commercial and technological parties on the other hand. That is, we do 
build the web and its content and decide on what we publish or not; but the web also 
reflexively influences the quality of our lives, the things we desire, how we deal with it, 
they way we work, communicate, consume and make plans, what we expect of each 
other, in short: our way of life. In his book Society & personality Shibutani quotes a 
research on the impact (mediated) opinions have on people: “When Coates and 
Pellegrini interviewed 50 top executives and 50 first line supervisors in a variety of 
bureaucratic organisations, they found that most of the exectives conceived of 
themselves in the manner in which their category is popularly characterized. They 
described themselves as having drive and a strong desire for achievement, a 
sympathetic view of authority, decisiveness, the ability to organise, and a realistic 
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orientation” (Shibutani 2006: 242). The web reinforces this process by which people 
tend to place themselves in existing categories and use the way in which such a 
category is commonly portrayed as a point of reference for self-understanding.  
 
Not only is there an exponential growth in the means for people to express themselves 
and to receive feedback on their expressions; the speed of communication skyrocketed 
also. In contrast to ‘slower’ media, such as print or appearance on television, the web 
allows (and calls) for immediate response to our blog entries, photos, movie clips and 
other postings. What mostly characterizes the current web – next to its social network 
features and its potential for personalization and user-generated content – is probably 
its immediacy, the quality of providing its users a platform for ‘always being on’. Next 
to the constant updates users receive from their software providers, they are fanatically 
being kept up-to-date on the lives of their friends and relatives via applications such as 
Facebook and Twitter. On Facebook, for example, friends are informed immediately 
about changes in your profile and they can monitor entries and disussion on your wall. 
Each of your friends knows where you are and what you are doing. From this culture of 
‘being logged in’ we can draw the conclusion, that in the web era connectedness 
precedes selfness. Identity has become even more relational than it already had been 
before the introduction of the world wide web.  
  As far as the construction of identities is concerned, another important difference of 
the web in regard to pre-internet media lies in the space presented for experimenting 
with identities. It is often heard that on the web one can be who ever one wants (after 
all, “on the internet no one knows you’re a dog”). Social science research buttresses the 
idea that the self-exploration motive (discovering who they are) is the most important 
one for adolescent users to deliberately present themselves differently than they are on 
the web (Valkenburg, Schouten & Peter 2006: 51). In doing so, they are able to test 
identities and monitor their peers’ reactions. 
  In addition, an important barrier for open communication is taken away on the web, as 
users, because of the smaller amount of audiovisual information people have to reveal 
about themselves (think of chatting) when communicating via the web, might feel less 
inhibited to expose certain intimite aspects of themselves. A process sometimes 
explained as the ‘stranger-on-the-train’ phenomenon, meaning that people are inclined 
to disclose intimite information about themselves to a stranger they happen to sit next 
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to in a train or an airplane rather than to their close ones (Cf. Valkenburg, Schouten & 
Peter 2006: 48). In case of the web this logic applies a fortiori: conversations via 
messenger are valued by asolescents as ‘more entertaining, more intimate, more open 
and more agreable’ than face-to-face conversations (Ibidem: 35). It gives a safe feeling 
of an environment that allows them to show who (they think) they really are. In a 
scientific experiment in which two persons were placed in the same room, back to 
back, looking at each other via screens solely, it turned out that this absence of 
unmediated visual contact was enough to make the subjects feel less inhibited and 
consequently expose more of themselves to each other in comparison to the situation in 
which they were able to see the other directly.  
  On the level of the content of identities, most striking about the web’s impact is that it 
confronts users with an endless stream of opinions and ideas. Of course, older media 
such as television and radio also provided an opportunity to get into touch with new 
information, but the amount of knowledge, ideas, opinions and lifestyles on offer on 
the web can by no means by compared to what we take in via other media channels.83 
Dan Gillmor writes: “The Internet is the most important medium since the printing 
press. It subsumes all that has come before and is, in the most fundamental way, 
transformative” (Gillmor 2004: 236). On the web we are able to look for information 
globally, pro-actively, for free and any time we want. Because of the structure of the 
web as a collage of sites that refer to one and another by hyperlinks, we are just a 
mouseclick away from retrieving information that would have stayed hidden to us 
without the use of the web. Blogs are so fast in gathering and publishing information 
nowadays that they no longer get their intell from traditional media channels or the big 
media companies, instead, it is the other way around: blogs are places where a lot of 
news is first made (public).84      
  By implication, this growing supply of information and the ease and frequency of 
encountering other people and their customs and ideas via websites, opens up a range 
of perspectives to the individual user, which she will have to take into account in her 
                                                
83 NB. Google derived its name from a Googol, which is the name of a 1 with 100 zeros, meant to signify 
the endeavour of organizing the incredible amount of information in the world (Cf. Lehmann ea. 2005: 
191). 
84 As goes without saying, this euphoric view on the benefits of the web is no exception to the rule and 
can be disputed too. For example, in The saturated self Kenneth Gergen warns his readers for the dark 
side of this (potential) information overload, by pointing at the looming psychological conditions of 
fragmentation and social saturation (See: Gergen 1991: 48-81). 
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own web-related behaviour and expressions. On forming an opinion on the political 
situation in Korea, Thailand or Iran, for instance, it makes a great difference whether 
the vested news channels are the only source of information, or whether the indigenous 
population send out their first-hand experiences and opinions to the world via blogs and 
Twitter. In this sense, the web truly is a forum where a ‘clash of opinions’ can take 
place. Some research has shown that users not only discuss their identities and engage 
in debates; they effectively use the web to develop new identities: “Outside the realm 
of influence of the elder generation and stimulated by digital information, young 
persons from immigrant families discuss the meaning of their islamic identity. Apart 
from their religious identity, they also redefine their gender and cutural idenity” (De 
Haan & Van den Broek 2006: 103).85  
  On the other hand, though, the web can just as easily put a pair of blinkers on users’ 
heads. It is no secret that the surf behaviour of most web users is very conservative and 
that people visit a relatively small and stable number of sites. In reaction to this 
fragmentation of identities and the many impressions that reach them via the web, this 
very same web gives people a chance to reinforce their local identities and express and 
discus them on social network sites or forums. As such, the web serves much more as a 
bonding medium, as a medium to find the like-minded and create a comfort zone, than 
serving as a bridging medium that continuously challenges one’s identity.  
Having said all this, let us have a look how blogs actually change our world.  
 
 
 
5.2  Green blogs : the bearable lightness of playing 
 
Be realistic, demand the impossible.  
Antonio Gramsci 
 
On the Dutch environmental weblog new-energy.tv one of the most striking movie clips 
is of an impersonation of former US President George W. Bush addressing the nation 
on the subject of climate change. While stumbling through his speech, Bush hilariously 
fails to explain the phenomenon of climate change to the viewers. ‘Condee’ Rice plays 
                                                
85 Author’s translation. 
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frisbee in the background, and Bush’s primary concern turns out to be avoiding to show 
up late for the start of the Rangers’ baseball game.86 The short clip is a perfect example 
of serious issues meeting political satire, of a humorous way of bringing weighty 
matters to the public's attention and exercising political criticism at the same time. This 
clip is, as we all know, no unique phenomenon: around the globe growing 
environmental awareness and the daily nascence of new initiatives on how to secure 
our common future can be witnessed. They range from movies made by former vice-
presidents and large music festivals on World Climate Day to people deciding to 
upgrade their neighbourhood with solar cells. A cooler climate is a hot topic. Going by 
numbers, in particular so-called green blogs or eco-blogs seem remarkably successful 
in getting through to a big audience and in bringing alternative ways of living and new 
technologies to the attention of the public. Individuals from all over the planet are 
joining in their efforts towards creating a sustainable society and gather on sites such as 
Gristmill, Worldchanging, Treehugger, Sustainablog and Greenmap.87  
  These developments prompt us to investigate the role of the web in this burgeoning 
'green revolution'. Why are those weblogs so appealing? Can we really expect them to 
make a difference? Are these networks merely benefiting from a general mentality-
turnover or might there be a medium-specific explanation for the impressive increase of 
green blogs and the number of their readers?88 Is there a proper way to reflect on this 
cyber-surge of environmental concern philosophically? I believe there is. I will take 
French philosopher and psychiatrist Felix Guattari’s visionary theory of the Three 
Ecologies, published in 1990, as a starting point in answering these questions. 
Guattari’s work will serve as a theoretical background for analyzing how the web is 
currently used by the ‘green-minded’. However, since it was written well before the 
real breakthrough and mass-proliferation of the world wide web, Guattari’s version 
needs some drastic updating. After expounding his theory, I shall therefore move 
beyond Guattari in an attempt to ‘rejuvenate’ his ideas and render them fit for today’s 
(cyber)reality. I do so by introducing the notion of playfulness as a contemporaneous 
way of online, subversive action.  
                                                
86Visited:http://www.new-
energy.tv/categorie.php/8/145/opwarming_bush_spreekt_natie_toe.html?trailer=145 
87 To underpin these claims: Treehugger receives 35 posts per day, has more than 64.000 persons on 
their mailing list, and already had more than 10 million pageviews (June ’2010). Worldchanging has 
800.000 views each month.  
88 Blog index Technorati lists more than 500 blogs on the environment, tendency upward.  
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5.2.1  The Three Ecologies 1.0 
 
First, let us consider the two concepts of environmentalism and ecology in order to 
establish what is at stake here. Manuel Castells explains the difference between the two 
of them as follows:  
 
By environmentalism I refer to all forms of collective behaviour that, in their 
discourse and in their practice, aim at correcting destructive forms of 
relationship between human action and its natural environment, […] By 
ecology I understand a set of beliefs, theories, and projects that consider 
humankind as a component of a broader ecosystem and wish to maintain the 
system’s balance in a dynamic, evolutionary perspective. In my view, 
environmentalism is ecology in practice, and ecology is environmentalism in 
theory (Castells 2004: 170). 
 
Ideally, one could say, weblogs serve both these ends: stimulating ecological awareness 
by offering educational content and, as a consequence, stimulating concrete action. 
Ecologists usually define their own discipline as the one dealing with living creatures 
in their relationship to both their biotic and a-biotic environments. The prefix ‘eco’ 
derives from the (ancient) Greek oikos (‘home’), which tells that considering something 
ecologically, always means considering it within its ‘housing’, its environment, instead 
of as an isolated phenomenon. Take the human body as an example: the body is no 
self-sufficient container, but relies for its survival on the intake and excretion of air, 
fluids, energy. Our metabolisms are constantly gearing up to their environments in 
order to sustain a life-supporting equilibrium in terms of energy expenditure, heat and 
water management and anticipate and react to (possible) outer threats. Similarly, 
environmental ecologists comprehend natural phenomena as parts of relationships of 
mutual dependence. Since we generally fail to acknowledge this system of mutual 
dependence and fail to act accordingly, the environment (and ultimately man himself) 
has to pay the prize. As Ian Pindar and Paul Sutton write in their introduction to the 
Three Ecologies: “We have upset the delicate symbiosis between ourselves and nature, 
with largely unforeseeable results” (Pindar & Sutton in: Guattari 2000: 4). 
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  This is Guattari’s theoretical starting point. One of the causes of this upset, according 
to Guattari, lies in the fact that our understanding of what ecology entails has been too 
narrow – limited to the environmental sphere only. “Guattari’s argument, and it is 
rather simple, is that we have an erroneous conception of ecology […] and that only by 
broadening our views to include the three ecologies will we be able to effect any 
enduring changes in our social/cultural/natural environment”.89 These three 
fundamental types of ecology are environmental ecology, social ecology and mental 
ecology. Environmental ecology studies humans in their interaction with the 
environment. Social ecology refers to humans and their relationships towards each 
other. Mental ecology indicates the relationship a person has towards herself, her 
demands and desires. According to Guattari, these three types of ecological awareness 
together constitute human subjectivity. Human subjectivity in this respect is seen as the 
complex of ways in which humans are ‘aware’, which entails self-awareness, 
awareness of others and awareness of objects and the surrounding world.  
  What these ecologies have in common is that in a lot of respects they are 
technologically mediated. As far as mental ecology is concerned, our self-images are to 
a large degree imbued with meanings derived from media – TV, books or the web – 
and we express ourselves increasingly via websites such as blogs and homepages. And 
as Guattari observes himself, human desires are largely created by media. Furthermore, 
social ecology, too, is increasingly practised online as is shown by the rapid growth in 
social network sites’ popularity. (Besides that, on top of all the social applications the 
web offers, telephones are still used most to communicate, and have been for almost a 
hundred years.) With regard to environmental ecology finally, one sees a strong 
tendency among politicians as well as entrepreneurs to put their money on more – 
smart and sustainable – technology, rather than on changing habits. They look for a 
cleaner future in the technical instead of in the ethical and mental realm.  
  Guattari calls the field in which those three branches of ecology merge ecosophy. 
Dealing with environmental matters ‘ecosophically’ means involving social, ethical and 
political arguments as well, instead of merely looking for solutions in the economic and 
technical realm. Compare it to the popular slogan of the three p’s in ecology-studies: 
that of people, planet and profit. Guattari argues against the one-sided technical 
                                                
89 Wolf-Meyer, web article. See: http://reconstruction.eserver.org/BReviews/revEcologies.htm 
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approach, by rightly asserting that successful ecological changes depend on the factors 
of economic development (profit), environmental conservation (planet) and social 
justice (people). Ultimately, what Guattari hopes for are changes in the field of human 
subjectivity in its broadest sense: changes of lifestyle and identity. The ‘ways of living’ 
on this planet are under discussion (Guattari 2000: 28).  
  The big culprit causing a lot of ecosystems to slide down the ladder towards 
ecological disaster is what Guattari calls Integrated World Capitalism (IWC). His text 
evolves around a critique of capitalist society. Guattari particularly blames the 
development and expansion of world telecommunications, which contributed to 
shaping a new type of passive subjectivity, saturating the unconscious in conformity 
with global market forces. More precisely, facilitated by mass media IWC causes a 
kind of environmental numbness, making people live inside the dream of eternal 
economic growth and endless physical resources. Through advertising the mass media 
feed a constant expansion and transformation of wants, and one-sided emphasis on the 
economic interests of our society – just watch some random news show – cause a 
neglect of attention for the underlying processes of resource depletion, bio-spherical 
imbalances and social injustice that ultimately matter. What all the talk of growth, 
consumption and comfort makes us forget, is that resources are not endless. As Guattari 
remarks: “Ecology in my sense questions the whole of subjectivity and capitalistic 
power formations, whose sweeping progress cannot be guaranteed to continue as it has 
for the past decade” (Guattari 2000: 52). It has been calculated, for example, that in 
order to provide current world population with their means of subsistence were they to 
adopt Northern American standards, it would take at least two additional planets to 
provide them with all the necessary resources. This is evidently an unsustainable 
development. 
  How to avoid this looming catastrophe? As indicated above, in Guattari’s view media 
played a crucial part in its genesis. Mass media and the culture of capitalism are 
inextricably linked to each other: “IWC’s most potent weapon for achieving social 
control without violence is the mass media. […] The mass media is involved in the 
creation of demand […] Guattari’s contention is that IWC is not only destroying the 
natural environment and eroding social relations, but is also engaged in a far more 
insidious and invisible ‘penetration of people’s attitudes, sensibility and minds’” (from: 
Introduction to The Three Ecologies, Guattari 2000). This explains why he calls 
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capitalism ‘integrated’: it pervades all aspects of life, indoctrinates people’s minds and 
homogenizes human subjectivity. According to Guattari, post-industrial capitalism 
tends to move away from structures producing goods and services towards structures 
producing signs, syntax and subjectivity (Guattari 2000: 47). 
  In reaction to this shift within capitalism, what we really need is another paradigm 
shift, a change in mentalities, on top of merely erecting windmills and using bio-fuels. 
This is where the internet90 comes into the equation. Guattari believes that the internet, 
as a post-(mass)-medium91, holds potential for democratization and for restructuring 
human subjectivity. In his time he was familiar to Minitel, one of the primitive 
precursors of email, of which he already heralded its potential of the ‘proliferation of 
spontaneous and co-ordinated groups’. He expects the situation of consumer passivity 
not to last indefinitely, because technological evolution will introduce new possibilities 
for interaction between the medium and its user, and between users themselves. He 
hopes the junction of the audiovisual, the telematic and the computer screen leads to a 
reactivation of a collective sensibility and intelligence (Cf. Guattari 2000: 61). 
Guattari’s post-medium should transform consumer passivity into a non-slavish, critical 
use of media, and invite users to rethink their lifestyles, to be susceptible to the impact 
of their lives on the environment and change their behaviour for the better. “By what 
means, in the current climate of passivity, could we unleash a mass awakening, a new 
renaissance?” Guattari asks in Remaking social practices (1990). Three years later the 
world wide web went online. Let us see what it brought us.  
 
 
5.2.2  Green blogging: from mass-medium to multi-medium 
 
What does this post-medium look like and why is it suitable to ‘restructure human 
subjectivity’? Rather than talking of post-media – after all it is still a medium – we tend 
to call the web a multi-medium. The shift from mass- to multi-medium occurred on two 
levels. On a technical level, ‘multi’ refers to the diverse range of media that are 
                                                
90 Since Guattari’s days were well before the launch of the web, I speak of ‘plain’ internet in this section.  
91 Guattari literally calls it ‘post-medium’ in his text, obviously meaning a post-mass-medium. It remains 
a medium though; the prefix ‘post’ does not mean the new device has become something completely 
different. Compare it to the concept of post-modernism, which is used to describe a movement beyond 
modernism, yet carrying its premises firmly within.   
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combined into this one medium. The world wide web offers several, varying ways of 
presenting information, combining words (written or spoken text), images (still or 
moving, graphical or photographical), and sound (music, talk, background noise) (Cf. 
Kattenbelt 2007: 31).  
  More important in this case is the second connotation of the prefix ‘multi’, which 
refers to the multitude of users of weblogs. Here the term ‘multi-medium’ is used to 
underline the inter-activity of websites and the contributions by users of the web in 
comparison to books or TV. Web 1.0 still was a follow-up of traditional one-way 
media: users were able so surf and use hyperlinks, but the content of websites still was 
relatively fixed and could not be altered by its readers. Web 2.0, on the other hand, 
introduced a radical new feature by enabling its users to ‘co-shape’ websites. As a 
consequence, modern websites have some features that were unheard of in the 
beginning days of the world wide web: lots of sites are highly dynamic and constantly 
changing, some sites are never the same when you visit them; many sites call for active 
participation by its users in a sense of creating profiles, leaving remarks or altering the 
website itself; sites invite their users to personalize them: passively by ways of keeping 
track of preferences, or actively by uploading clips, photos, personal information 
wallpapers, etcetera. In the age of web 2.0, broadcasting has become narrowcasting: 
rather than few producers of sending out media content to the masses by limited 
television or radio channels, web 2.0 turns anyone with access to the web into a 
potential content provider who can report on specific, idiosyncratic topics to a targeted 
audience.92  
  Guattari already set this agenda when he wrote: “An essential programmatic point for 
social ecology will be to encourage capitalist societies to make the transition from the 
mass-media era to a post-media age, in which the media will be reappropriated by a 
multitude of subject-groups capable of directing its resingularisation” (Guattari 2000: 
                                                
92 It has to be admitted though that ecologically oriented websites often work with a stable pool of 
professional authors. Also, this description will by many be seen as overly optimistic about the benefits 
of web 2.0. Recently authors such as Andrew Keen and Jaron Lanier put serious question marks over the 
cultural and mental progression made thanks to the development of web 2.0. The authors sense the 
danger of cultural regression, mental regeneration, excessive narcissism, amateurism, the shrinking of 
creative powers, and unintendend lock-ins of computerized systems (See: Keen 2007; Lanier 2010).    
More so, the supposed openness of web 2.0 is under discussion as well; a dispute is growing around the 
question whether web 2.0 is liberating or restraining. In 6.1 I will dig into this paradox further. See also: 
http://www.gamespace.nl/content/Wikinomics_and_its_discontents_2009.pdf  
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61).93 For environmental practices this means that now, from all over the globe, people 
gather online in their struggle for a cleaner environment. In her article on 
environmental blogs, Kutner points out that in the pre-internet age ‘citizen activist 
groups’ had to make their case using very limited media channels such as newspapers 
or an occasional radio show. Now on the other hand, “for activist organisations with 
limited resources, internet-based technologies are providing fast, easy, and cost-
effective means through which to access, use, create, and disseminate information. […] 
The decentralized nature of the internet lends itself particularly well to grassroots 
activism. Disenfranchised segments of society who are fighting against environmental 
injustices in their communities no longer need to deal with intermediaries in the form 
of the mainstream mass media and established publishing routes”94. Although Kutner 
still uses the generic term ‘internet’, this last observation perfectly describes current 
internet-based applications reaped together under the header web 2.0. Web 2.0 offers 
users a platform to create and disperse content, instead of merely retrieving information 
from the net.  
  A fitting example of such a web-practice is given by the lifestyle blog Treehugger. 
Although this blog is made by experts, it is dedicated to ‘driving sustainability 
mainstream’ aiming at ‘discovering how to maintain your quality of life while reducing 
your harmful impact on the earth.’ Welcoming 3.500.000 unique visitors per month in 
2010, the website informs its readers on a vast range of topics.95 One encounters tips 
varying from re-usable toothbrushes to environmental-friendly chopsticks and 
sustainable fashion. The site contains a TV channel – TreehuggerTV, one can browse 
job advertisements, it has a user generated blog, and one can even get advice on ‘how 
to green your sex life’. 
  This last example on greening your sex life shows that on green blogs news on the 
environment is brought with a trace of humour and irony. The art of presentation 
differs greatly from the one used in the past by environmentalists, such as fearsome 
television broadcastings or printed pamphlets by deep ecologists. I would argue, the 
touch of humour, of interactivity and the trendy styling are what render green blogs 
                                                
93 For clarification: a subject group to Guattari is a group of self-conscious, non-repressed people acting 
autonomously. By resingularisation he means the new way media are dealt with: as a tool of critical 
reflection instead of affirming and spreading the dominant ideology. 
94Kutner:Environmental activism and the Internet. On: 
http://egj.lib.uidaho.edu/index.php/egj/article/view/2774 
95 See: http://www.treehugger.com/about/ 
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appealing to a large audience and explains part of their success. The founders of the 
environmental blog Worldchanging describe their site thus: 
 
      Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this is a conversation, not a sermon. We 
encourage not just feedback, but active participation, and, yes, challenge. Got a 
great idea for a resource we've missed? Let us know – better yet, write your 
own recommendation and send it to us. Think we're off-base with a 
recommendation we've made? Let us know that, too, and what resource you 
think we should have covered instead. Changing the world is a team sport.96  
 
The remark on changing the world as a team sport leads us to the concept of 
playfulness as alluded to in the introduction of this section. I assert that two features of 
playful conduct are particularly important in regard to blogging. The first concerns 
playing as a way of subversive, critical behaviour. The second concerns play’s non-
seriousness, play as a frivolous manner of raising environmental awareness. I consider 
both features below. 
 
Play as subversive action  
The first aspect of playing I want to highlight in relation to weblogs is its potential 
subversiveness. In The ambiguity of play Brian Sutton Smith links this feature of play 
to its frivolity: “But frivolity is not just the puritanic negative, it is also a term to be 
applied more to historic trickster figures and fools, who were once the central and 
carnivalesque persons who enacted playful protest against the orders of the ordained 
world” (Sutton Smith 2001: 11). Those fools put themselves on Youtube nowadays. 
Because postings on blogs often have a hint of irony and because we are prone to see 
them as ‘only a game’ they have so much subversive potential: humour still is the best 
way to exert criticism. One of the key features mentioned in literature on play is its 
‘distance’ to ordinary life: because it stands apart from the normal order of things it is a 
perfect place to practice criticism from. German play-scholar Ingeborg Heidemann 
stresses that play is characterized by its quality of being isolated from normal life, of 
detachment (Heidemann 1968: 9). Play symbolizes an autonomous domain, a domain 
of free thinking. It is in this way that it has been used before by philosophers such as 
                                                
96 See: http://www.worldchanging.com/about/ 
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Schiller and Nietzsche, who used the concept of play to point at human freedom and 
the capacity to rebel against established powers. By negating existing social reality 
playful resistance calls for the emergence of a better world. Schiller and Nietzsche 
thought of the arts when they wrote about play. This form of playful social resistance 
was encountered in for example stage plays, by means of the subject and the dialogues, 
or even in an abstract piece of music that tinkered with conventional harmonies, on 
which Adorno vested his revolutionary hopes in the twentieth century (or both as in 
Wagner’s Operas). 
  Today, web technologies offer their users even more explicit ways of expressing 
critique. Within the ‘play-room’ offered by the technology, a weblog gives its users a 
set of tools that enable them to design their site according to their own wishes and 
upload self-chosen content.97 Open Source Software goes a step further and puts 
technically proficient users in a position to suggest software modifications and possibly 
contribute to its amelioration, or even build software from scratch. It serves as another 
good example of the fusion of playfulness and constructiveness. The creative 
advantages web 2.0 offers compared to older media offer an extra impulse to users for 
generating their own content and participate actively in environmental debates. Blogs 
offer us a platform for critical reflection and the expression of potentially subversive 
opinions. By means of the web “technology has given us a communications toolkit that 
allows anyone to become a journalist at little cost and, in theory, with global reach. 
Nothing like this has ever been remotely possible before” (Gillmor 2004: XII). Another 
example of how web 2.0 helps promoting a green way of living is described by 
Michael Pollan in his prize-winning critique of the food industry The omnivore’s 
dilemma. There he quotes an ecological, Christian farmer who heralds the benefits of 
the web: “The beauty of the internet is that it allows like-minded people to find their 
tribes, and then for the tribes to find their way to us […] It’s never been easier for 
people to opt out” (Pollan 2007: 248).  
  The web is such a unique medium for the spread of subversive messages because of 
its speed, low cost, easy capacity for forwarding messages, freedom from gatekeepers, 
and unlimited capacity (Kutner). Blogs are truly by the people and make people feel 
                                                
97 In literature on play and games, the latter is often seen as a field of rule-guided, pre-arranged conduct, 
whereas ‘playing’ is used to point at rule-transgressing or rule-changing, free behaviour. (See for 
example Carse 1997.) ‘Play-room’ should therefore be grasped as a space for experiments in terms of 
make-up, content and self-presentation.  
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they are able to make a difference. As Dicum observes in a web-article on green blogs: 
“They (blogs, jt) put out information and opinions with the goal of generating 
discussion and providing the space for people to test their own ideas. […] Blogs 
provide a way for readers to examine environmental issues more completely and to 
form their own positions on the matters of the day”.98 Most recently since Barack 
Obama’s election as President of the United States in 2008, Twitter became another 
powerful web-based communication tool in addition to blogs. 
 
The lightness of playing 
The second feature that distinguishes weblogs from traditional media is their enabling 
of a light dealing with matters that were formerly often seen as ‘abstract’, 
‘incomprehensive’, or ‘too big’ for individuals. The phenomenon of blogging renders 
environmental matters more tangible and understandable to the public, improves the 
accessibility of information about them, broadens their dissemination and thereby fuels 
general environmental awareness. In this respect blogs gain educational value: 
blogging mobs become smart mobs. An excellent blog in the slightly more academic 
compartment of the web is Worldchanging.99 Based in eco-capital Seattle, 
Worldchanging publishes articles from specialists world wide. It focuses on solutions 
instead of problems and has an emphasis on technological developments (think of 
biotechnology or nanotechnology). It contains sections on green living, green cities, 
green consumer technologies, green business. In 2006 their best articles were published 
in a hard-copy edition. But also the site Gristmill, the weblog belonging to Grist – an 
Award-winning, online environmental magazine – offers several educational elements: 
links to sites on global warming can be found, to political, scientific and business sites, 
always related to green issues.100 Another section allows readers to ask for advice on 
environmental matters and every week a new podcast with the latest environmental 
news is broadcasted. Wikis and the genre of serious games provide for other examples 
of web applications that educate the public in a playful manner.  
  Whereas in the past the environmental movement was mainly a ‘not in my backyard’-
movement, paying attention to local matters, now global problems such as climate 
                                                
98 Dicum, Green blogs – the green revolution moves online, source:  
 http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/g/a/2006/03/22/gree.DTL 
99 http://www.worldchanging.com/ 
100 http://gristmill.grist.org/ 
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change and energy suppliance are entering the domestic sphere. Take as an example 
short movie clips people post – like the one on Bush – presenting alarming issues in an 
often humouristic way, yet making no mistake about the future dangers we face. Blogs 
seem to close the gap between large, abstract problems of global proportions and 
people’s daily lives. Gristmill is an apt example of such a site. The makers purposely 
try to present heavy and gloomy environmental news with a joke. As can be read: 
“Let's face it: reading environmental journalism too often feels like eating your 
vegetables boiled. With no butter. But at Grist, we believe that news about green issues 
and sustainable living doesn't have to be predictable, demoralizing, or dull. We butter 
the vegetables! And add salt! And strain metaphors!”101 The site’s lay-out resembles a 
kind of menu with a ‘Main dish-section’ containing their main articles, a daily-blog 
section with latest news, and a section with ‘green’ tips, recipes and tastes for your 
kitchen. For those visitors who care less about haute cuisine: in the ‘Muckracker-
section’ they can dig up ‘the dirt on environmental politics and policies’. Eco-weblog 
Treehugger, too, is a site designed for the purpose of down to earth, common use, 
addressing matters of everyday reality. Visitors are taught how to throw an eco-party 
instead of being told big stories on the perilous future of mankind. So, obviously, these 
websites have been set up very broad content-wise, user-friendly, and highly accessible 
to a range of potential readers. Green blogs combine playful web applications, such as 
games and humouristic clips, with serious applications such as political issue sites, 
calls for citizenship and educational and scientific content. Green blogs present the best 
of both worlds: they are clearly playful in their presentation and serious in their 
message.  
 
 
5.2.3  The Three Ecologies 2.0 
 
In his essay Remaking Social Practices Guattari puts the finger on the ecologically sore 
spot as he writes: 
 
Humanity seems to have lost its head, or more precisely, its head is no longer 
functioning with its body. How can we find a compass by which to reorient itself 
                                                
101 See: http://www.grist.org/about/ 
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within a modernity whose complexity overwhelms it? To think through this 
complexity, to renounce, in particular, the reductive approach of scientism when a 
questioning of its prejudices and short-term interests is required: such is the 
necessary perspective for entry into an era that I have qualified as ‘post-media’, 
as all great contemporary upheavals, positive or negative, are currently judged on 
the basis of information filtered through the mass-media industry, which retains 
only a description of events and never problematizes what is at stake, in its full 
amplitude. It is true that it is difficult to bring individuals out of themselves, to 
disengage themselves from their immediate preoccupations, in order to reflect on 
the present and the future of the world. They lack collective incitements to do so. 
 
What is at stake is no thing less than our survival. The question is whether we succeed 
in ‘recovering our heads’. Is Guattari right in vesting his hopes on this new post-
medium? Is his proposed cybernetic cure the panacea for our cultural illnesses? We can 
raise some important questions about how realistic his proposal is. Guattari seems to 
leave unacknowledged the complexity of some things. For one, the danger of idealism 
lurks behind every corner of his plea. It is at best naive, or a sign of an underlying 
technological determinism to expect a ‘mass-awakening’ from a web-like medium. 
Exactly because of its tailoring, its customization, web 2.0 faces big difficulties in 
reaching the masses. Probably, the initial impetus will have to come from elsewhere, 
such as the – cinematic – movie on climate change by Al Gore. Apart from that, the 
cyber revolution introduced a new kind of social exclusion, by opening a digital divide 
between the rich and the poor who cannot afford the technology or who lack the right 
infrastructure to make it work. Von Baeyer notices in his book Information that the 
impact of the information age is not as universal as it may seem. Although to us in the 
affluent West information technology appears to dominate life, it is still largely 
irrelevant to a vast portion of the global population. Von Baeyer thinks the world wide 
web will not solve the problems of poverty when half the people in the world have yet 
to make or receive a phone call.102 No more than self-guided automobiles will improve 
the standard of living of three billion people who survive on less then $2 per day, or 
robotic surgery heals the more than one and a half billion who lack access to clean 
                                                
102 This figure may be a third by now. 
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drinking water. These examples painfully show the “treacherous depth and width of the 
digital divide” (Von Baeyer 2003: 6).103 
  Moreover, Guattari puts mass media and the corrupting effect of capitalism on a par, 
although of course the web is no less commercial than television: marketing directors 
of the big firms ‘penetrate minds’ through websites just as well. Just think of Amazon’s 
customized book offers, the sponsored links that pop up on Google, or the intrusion by 
tracking cookies for advertising purposes. Yet, what Guattari seems to overlook 
completely, is that capitalism did bring a lot of good things too: it led directly to the 
internet-driven information society with its freedom of speech, as it was envisioned by 
Guattari! Although his critique of environmental practices and social inequality may be 
in its place, capitalist society also managed to create prosperity – in some parts of the 
world at least – that was unseen before in history. Besides, mass media like television 
and radio informed, educated and entertained billions of people during the past century 
and created huge economic value.  
  Meanwhile, the new medium addressed here – blogs – is under fierce assault as well. 
As mentioned in section 5.2.2, Andrew Keen launched a head-on attack in his book The 
cult of the amateur, in which he laments today’s ‘amateur monkeys’ who “can use their 
networked computers to publish everything from uninformed political commentary, to 
unseemly home videos, to embarrassingly amateurish music, to unreadable poems, 
reviews, essays, and novels” (Keen 2007: 3). Weblogs in particular corrupt popular 
opinion, and undermine our sense of what is true and false, real and imaginary 
(Ibidem). The danger Keen identifies is of our culture slipping away into what he calls 
the cult of the amateur, in which amateuristic news and knowledge making takes over 
from expertise, experience and talent. Although Keen may be said to depict an overly 
dramatic future for the media, his overall line of criticism is difficult to refute. The 
relative freedom of gatekeepers and censorship I heralded above, clearly does entail 
downsides too in terms of the quality offered. The fact that on average every second a 
                                                
103 There are lots of ways to interpret the digital divide next to the economic interpretation. People also 
lack access to the net because of, for example, deficient computer skills, censorship or because their 
generation ‘missed the boat’. The various forms of the digital divide could be classified into three main 
types: 1) The material divide: the lack of access for economic reasons or for the lack of infrastructure. 2) 
The division of skills: even if computers and networks are available to people, it is still another thing to 
use them properly. For example, this deficiency can be observed among the elderly in rich, developed 
countries. 3) The division of usages: the web can be used for doing serious business, but also for 
watching Youtube all day long. It makes great difference in terms of educational value and economic 
revenue whether the web is being used for, say, commercial gains, gathering information, self-expression 
or for plain entertainment only.     
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new blog is created, certainly does not add to the web’s veracity. In addition to that, the 
sites that rent or offer blogs for free are designed according to certain rules and 
presuppositions – they are ‘scripted’ to use a technical term and serve ends of for 
example software firms – and thereby curtail the creative freedom of their end users.   
  What we also have to keep in mind is that from an environmental perspective there 
are quite some downsides to ICTs themselves. The increase in ‘virtual’ mobility always 
has its physical counterpart, every book ordered on Amazon gets shipped somewhere. 
The ICT industry itself consumes vast quantities of fuel, materials and chemicals and 
causes loads of toxic waste. It has been calculated that one search on Google consumes 
as much energy as turning a low-energy light bulb on for an entire hour. Although it is 
veiled to end users, there is an intertwining of the old and the new economy: brute 
manufacturing of pieces and high-energetic mining of minerals are necessary to 
manufacture computer devices (Zehle 2006). Von Baeyer observes that the real cost of 
information technology has not been generally appreciated either. He quotes an 
assessment suggesting that the manufacture of a single 2 gram computer chip consumes 
thirty-six times its weight in chemicals, 800 times its weight in fuel, and 1600 times its 
weight in water. Nobody knows when this hidden cost will become prohibitive (Von 
Baeyer 2003: 7). Rising prices of crude materials on the world market due to increasing 
scarcity do not add to solving this problem. The irony of this all is that the poor who 
are not able to afford all this high-tech equipment are stuck with its very hazardous 
disposal: we happily ship our e-waste to Africa and Asia.  
 
Green blogs: too light or heavy enough to save the planet?   
Guattari was right in stating that rather than a technical, we are dealing with a mentality 
problem. Our ethics of mobility, for example, the definition of human freedom in terms 
of the ability to move freely, is one of the underlying causes of fossil fuel depletion and 
the explosion of CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere. Currently, ecological issues are 
still too often dealt with in a strictly economic way. The three ecologies boil down to 
exploitation of the environment; atomism, egocentrism and alienation in the social 
realm; and a consumer mentality of materialism and hedonism. Guattari calls this 
predicament an ‘imperium of a global market that destroys specific value systems and 
puts on the same plane of equivalence: material assets, cultural assets, wildlife areas, 
etcetera.’ (Guattari 2000: 29). Put otherwise: all values have become market values. 
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What is needed is no less than an identity change: a new way of looking at ourselves, 
our lifestyles, our relationships towards nature. What is needed, is a new way of doing 
business and using natural resources, one that places durability instead of profitability 
on top of the agenda, one that acknowledges that economic growth is not a law of 
nature. Guattari asserts: “An essential condition for succeeding in the promotion of a 
new planetary consciousness would thus reside in our collective capacity for the 
recreation of value systems that would escape the moral, psychological and social 
lamination of capitalist valorization, which is only centered on economic profit”.104  
  In addition to Guattari, one might state that the problem with value systems is that 
they tend to become outdated rather quickly. Due to technological innovations, altering 
lifestyle patterns, demographical factors or environmental changes, values and derived 
norms are soon overtaken by the course of life. Take our moral (and political!) 
incapacity to deal with newly discovered methods in the field of medicinal genetics as 
an example. The ability to predict future diseases charges us with the burden of making 
far-reaching decisions on treatment or even on life and death, decisions that are 
difficult to make using current moral standards, because they were not devised for such 
a situation. The history of morality is one of a constant catch-up with reality. In relation 
to ecology, this causes us to live with values and customs that originated in an era of 
ecological darkness. Our (Western) values of freedom, growth and mobility developed 
during the course of centuries, finding their ultimate effectuation in modern, 
hypermobile, globalized society. Yet, scientific knowledge in those days was by no 
means comparable to what we know now on matters like pollution, resource depletion, 
biospherical balance, soil regeneration, climate change, and so on. The ideas and 
customs we live by largely stem from an age in which people naively viewed planet 
earth as an inexhaustible, self-regenerating source. It made people claim the right to 
randomly cut forests, pump up billions of barrels of oil from the ground and slaughter 
animals arbitrarily. Traditions, though, do not necessarily provide the best maxims of 
conduct. Since we are gaining more and more knowledge of ecosystems, of the impact 
of our behaviour on the environment, since sustainable technologies flush the market 
and since we are moving up to 8 billion inhabitants on this planet, there is an urgent 
                                                
104 Guattari in Remaking social practices, on: 
http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-9710/msg00015.html 
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call for the updating of our morals. To every densely populated, complex society the 
inverted adage applies: Erst die Moral, dann gibt's vielleicht Fressen.105 
  Guattari recognises this need in an attempt to think beyond the concept of ecology in 
the old-fashioned, capitalistic sense. In doing so, he was influenced heavily by Gregory 
Bateson’s idea – expressed in his book Steps to an ecology of mind – that the 
fundamental unit of survival in nature always is ‘organism plus environment’. “The 
unit of survival is organism plus environment. We are learning by bitter experience that 
the organism which destroys its environment destroys itself” (Bateson 2000: 491). 
Bateson contends that our current, delicate ecological predicament is caused by 
unreflected technological progress, exponential growth of world population, and by 
wrong ideas and values on how to interact with nature. (As Bush remarks in the video I 
referred to in the beginning of the section: ‘Why listen to nature? We have to make 
nature cooperate with us!’)106 
  Following Bateson Guattari writes: “The notion of collective interest ought to be 
expanded to include companies that, in the short term, don’t profit anyone, but in the 
long term are the conduits of a processual enrichment for the whole of humanity” 
(Guattari 2000: 65). Therefore, what is required above all - more than merely an 
environmental - is a new mental ecology, that is, a restructuring of desires and 
demands. This new ‘mental ecology’ will be pushed forward even more by the 
proliferation of environmentally friendly devices that help to change our behaviour 
unconsciously. Frequently, the top-down introduction of some new technology is what 
it takes to convince people of its benefits once it is in place. Think for example of speed 
ramps or speed limiters, which are usually welcomed with little enthousiasm, but 
gradually gain support as people start to witness safety increase. A little techno-
determinism can sometimes do wonders in turning conservative minds around. 
  What this mental turn-around ultimately aims for is nothing less than a whole new 
perspective on the human being in its relationship to its life-supporting environment. 
Instead of being led by the pursuit of short-term gratification, Guattari tries to view the 
relationship between human beings and the planet they thrive on from an evolutionary 
perspective: a new mental horizon which he calls ‘glacial time’, in which short 
                                                
105 This is an inversion of Bertolt Brecht’s famous line in his play die Dreigroschenoper “Erst kommt 
das Fressen, dann kommt die Moral” (first comes eating, afterwards comes morality, jt). 
106 See: http://www.new-
energy.tv/categorie.php/8/145/opwarming_bush_spreekt_natie_toe.html?trailer=145 
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sightedness makes room for intergenerational solidarity. As Petra Kelly observed, this 
transformation boils down to an identity change:  
  
The Green approach to politics is a kind of celebration. We recognise that each 
of us is part of the world’s problems, and we are also part of the solution. The 
dangers and potentials for healing are not just outside us. We begin to work 
exactly where we are. There is no need to wait until conditions become ideal. 
We can simplify our lives and live in ways that affirm ecological and human 
values. Better conditions will come because we have begun .. It can therefore be 
said that the primary goal of Green politics is an inner revolution, ‘the greening 
of the self’.  
(Kelly, cited in Castells 2004: 168) 
 
The question thus is, whether the web can contribute to such an ‘inner revolution’? 
Guattari clearly thought so, but died too early to witness its blossoming. Guattari’s 
essay turned out prophetic in a double sense: for one his vision of a post-medium 
became reality, and his concept of the three ecologies found general acceptance. It is 
hard to find an ecologist nowadays who denies ecology to consist of an environmental, 
economic (mental) and social dimension. On the web we find this threesome embodied 
in a perfect way on the site Oneworld.107 It is a site that captures three problematic 
aspects of the current process of globalization: one can read about environmental 
issues, about cases of social inequity, but also browse their vast list of jobs in the field 
of humanitarian aid and environmental affairs.    
  Whether web 2.0 has the potential to boost a ‘recreation of value systems’ remains to 
be seen. Although blogs may seem initially uncensored and open to whatever entry, 
one should never underestimate the power of their moderators. In reality blogs are 
prone to the danger of becoming quasi-homepages of their founders, embellished by 
entries of others that happen to suit their vision. Green blogs are no exception to that. 
The numbers on bloggers I gave earlier equally do not tell the whole story. The 
profundity of reading is another matter. The fact that a website has 800.000 views per 
month says nothing about its impact on those viewers/readers. It is extremely difficult 
                                                
107 http://www.oneworld.nl 
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to establish a causal relationship between visiting green blogs and actual changes in 
terms of mentality and lifestyle, as Guattari was aiming for.   
  Other signs are more promising though. Big societal changes do not happen over 
night. What we in retrospect call revolutions – like the agricultural or the industrial 
revolution – really were protracted changes in the manner of producing food and goods, 
of labor division and administration that seeped through the layers of society during the 
course of decades or even centuries. The transition to a sustainable society will remain 
work in progress for centuries to come. Research has shown that the proximity of 
problems in people’s perception is of big importance to their evaluation. Therefore, 
weblogs could play an important role in achieving general awareness-raising and 
contribute to the mental foundation that is needed for this transition to stand a chance in 
the first place. Especially environmental hazards creep into people’s heads more easily 
when experienced on an interpersonal level than when they are brought to people by 
mass media (Cf. Nas 2000: 21). In the past media have shown the revolutionary 
potential and power to transform social institutions. The invention of the art of printing, 
for example, made the vast dissemination of dissident ideas possible without which the 
protestant revolution within the Christian church would have been highly unlikely or at 
least greatly postponed. Just like that, web 2.0 may have what it takes to reach a tipping 
point in regard to a global sense of ecological urgency.  
   Up until a couple of centuries ago, people lived on one planet. Now, globalization 
made us all part of one world. Together, we have to cope with some of the biggest 
challenges Homo Ludens ever faced. Even people in the most remote places on earth, 
who never heard of a phenomenon like climate change, who do not have access to 
electricity or a telephone, they all play their roles in the grandest and most hazardous, 
deliberate experiment human kind has undertaken so far: are we able to render our 
world-society fit for a sustainable future? It is a unique experiment: the number of 
people alive on the planet, the amount of resources they use, the almost unlimited 
power of their technologies to change their environment are unseen on the surface of 
the planet to this date. This situation leads us into an unknown future: no one knows the 
consequences of dispersing 70.000 tons of CO2 in the atmosphere day after day. By 
unleashing the ghost from the technological bottle, humankind has – unwittingly – 
devised the means to undermine its own existence. Environmental regression is like an 
assassin who comes up to his prey in stealth mode only to strike when it is too late for 
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adequate counter-measures. In fifty years from now, maybe, will we know the outcome 
of this Promethean experiment.  
   Fortunately, as Bush teaches us in the video clip on global warming, the solution to 
all our global, ecological problems is astonishingly simple: we just need to make nature 
cooperate with us, we do not need to listen to nature! Fortunately too, Bush returned to 
his ranch in 2009. If an American president may not have the powers to make a real 
difference, so we, the people, do. Green blogs show that a small step for one man – to 
buy green energy and separate his waste – can mean a giant leap for mankind towards a 
sustainable society.    
 
 
 
5.3 Conclusion: playful weblogs 
 
In the case about green blogs we see how these blogs are used in several playful ways. 
They are used as awareness tools, as a not-so-serious, accessible way of presenting 
information on ecological affairs, as a tool for playful resistance against vested orders 
and as a podium for painting an alternative world. As such we could call them ‘glocal’ 
phenomena: they provide us with a low-entry, friendly way of entering weighty, global 
issues into our living rooms. Dealing with one of the big issues of global politics – 
global warming and the sustainability of our lifestyles – moves into reach of ordinary 
citizens. Blogs translate global thinking into local action and contribute to the creation 
of sustainable ways of living. In this case, the popular adage really should go like: 
Think and express yourself global, act local. Green blogs form a perfect case of global 
commitment through personal touch and illustrate what Castells means when he says 
that the internet enables an instant relationship between the local and the global.108 
  Hence their influence on people’s identities: in the case of weblogs we come across a 
global medium that is used by people considering themselves global citizens, who take 
part in a global movement of the environmentally-minded people, that has as its goal 
the globe and its preservation and is concerned with global eco-systems. Since global 
problems call for a global solution the web is the pre-eminent medium to handle these 
                                                
108 See 6.1.1  
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problems. In the future it may fulfill a much bigger role than it does now, by informing 
even more people about the hazards of our way of life and by offering sustainable 
alternatives. A hopeful example already in place that, one that clearly demonstrates the 
benefits of the web, is the cooperation of PCs all over the globe, instigated by the BBC, 
that serve as one giant supercomputer and calculate climate models.109 The world wide 
web is used as a global brain in tackling this most dangerous of all global problems.  
  The other side of blogs, though, is that they too are part of an information and 
communication technologies industry that is highly commercial, pollutant and 
consumes vast amounts of energy. As is the case with anti-globalists who use global 
media and global means of transportation to fight globalization, here too the paradox 
applies that the critics are compelled to revert to the system they criticize in order to 
yield any effect. One can only play if one agrees to the game first. The globalization of 
trade, of media and lifestyles is the game that imposes rules upon us that we can bend 
only if we play the game along. At least for the moment. No revolution, no civil 
upheaval appears out of the blue, but is deeply anchored in the society it criticizes. This 
very mechanism of the power of structures over individual agents was painfully 
exposed to everyone of us during the last two years, as the global game of monopoly 
that our bankers were playing suddenly ran out of bank notes. As they were forced out 
of their homes, lost their jobs or were disappointed by ATM machines refusing to 
churn out cash, millions of people around the globe experienced the power of the 
financial game they were unwittingly part of and the impotence of single puppets on 
the global board.     
  For the moment, green bloggers act on the basis of what Manuel Castell calls a 
resistance identity. They are part of a growing, global army of citizens who have 
become aware of the unsustainability of our current economic system and who engage 
in activities that aim at designing a different, sustainable future. As their word spreads, 
already, we see this movement developing into a project identity, substituting a mere 
critique of capitalist ways of doing business with well thought-out ideas about green 
lifestyles and with actual, existing new technologies. Indeed, as Guattari rightly 
claimed, the creation of a sustainable society is first and foremost a matter of identity. 
The principle effort revolves around the creation of a new (self)consciousness towards 
                                                
109 The experiment was launched in 2007 and 250.000 households took part in it. The results of this 
experiment predict a temperature rise of 4 degrees Celsius in the UK by the year 2080.  
See: http://www.bbc.co.uk/sn/hottopics/climatechange/ 
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the ecosphere, towards morality, towards the way we do business, produce and 
consume, and towards the way we treat all the people involved in the process.  
  In what way do blogs contribute to this change of mentality? If we compare the 
current medialandscape – of the last 15 to 20 years – to the one of the decades 
therefore, then the world wide web offered a truly revolutionary potential to the people 
in terms of the potential for communication, the expression and spread of subversive 
views and the actual organisation of resistance, as compared to the ages of the media of 
print, analogous telephony, radio and television. Of course, analogous media played 
their part in the coming of revolutions too. In fact, no social movement can do without 
the spreading of the word. A by now classic example is the role television played in the 
information of the Eastern European countries at the time of the Iron Curtain. The fall 
of the Berlin Wall became the first real ‘television revolution’ as the citizens of the 
former GDR became aware of the living standards they lacked and the freedom that 
was enjoyed by West Germans. The actual toppling of the Communist regime was 
partly a consequence of widespread reception of West German television, as the 
citizens of East Germany learned about the revolutionary happenings in their country.  
  In comparison to those classical ICTs, though, the web offers its users far greater 
speed, flexibility and immediate, worldwide communication; it allows more influence 
on its development, it can leave authors anonymous, and because of its network 
character users are more difficult to trace. (Although not untraceable as the example of 
Chinese internet in section 6.1 will teach us!) The web is the ultimate refuge for the 
construction and expression of (resistance) identities. More so – and this is the quality 
that really sets the web apart from older media – web 2.0 applications are highly 
interactive and offer great fun to their users. In their article New media – new 
pleasures? Kerr and colleagues (Kerr et al. 2006: 63-4) note that in the academic 
discourse surrounding new media the concept of pleasure – in particular the pleasure of 
play and control – emerges with more frequency as theorists try to grapple with the 
uniqueness of new media. From different sources, including their own research, they 
distill five different types of pleasures offered by the use of new media, which are: 
control, immersion, performance, intertextuality and narrative. The overarching 
concept of play is posited as ‘a key concept for understanding the interaction of users 
with new media’ (Kerr et al. 2006: 69). Play is seen as the unique pleasure that is 
experienced when control, immersion and performance are combined (Ibidem: 69-70).  
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  The pleasure of play and control has to be understood in the same fashion as I have so 
far: as being in control (play) or as being controlled (game). Drawing upon Salen and 
Zimmerman’s work on play and games110, Kerr and colleagues describe how 
affirmation and resistance are always inscribed in the process of playing (Ibidem: 67). 
Pleasure is said to be created by submitting to the rules, as well as by testing or 
resisting these rules. If the technical competence of the player allows to do so, play can 
even become transformative play – the pinnacle of interactivity – whereby the player 
actually tries to subvert the original rules and goals of a game (Cf. Kerr et al. 2006: 70).    
  The pleasures uniquely attached to new media arise precisely in this playful tension of 
immersion in an activity – following the rules of the game – and using the space for 
creativity that is offered by the technology. Interactivity in the digital age means that 
we are in a position to play with the medium, to personalize it to a high degree. This is a 
crucial difference with media like books, newspapers and television, which resist active 
audience participation and user-generated contributions to the form and content of 
mediatic expressions. As Kerr and colleagues contend, for this reason new media can 
be viewed upon as causing a pleasurable state of play among their users. Also, 
according to Kerr and colleagues, many new media theorists would now argue that 
narrative is often secondary to other pleasures in new media (Kerr et al. 2006: 68, 76). 
Instead, fluidity, flexibility, open spaces and explorative consumption are new models 
to describe the interaction with new media. Again, elements of playfulness.111       
   Following this line of reasoning, the appeal of green blogs can easily be detected. 
Blogs invite people to contribute: to post their reactions, remarks, ideas. Blogs’ content 
is ‘sticky’- to use a term by Malcolm Gladwell: it is easily accessible, contagious, fast, 
often funny, low-profile, multi-medial, entertaining. In addition to text, blogs consist of 
movie clips, pictures, sounds, music; they offer space for advertisements; they 
comment on lifestyle issues; one gets advise on saving money through energy 
reductions and green household applications. In short, the message they convey is that 
sustainability is fun; more importantly, that it is something you can do yourself! 
Weblogs create pleasure by involvement. This is a crucial aspect of web technology: 
                                                
110 Salen & Zimmerman, Rules of play: game design fundamentals, Cambridge, 2003.  
111 Some of the characteristics I attribute to blogs, can also be found in traditional media; TV, movies and 
comics, for example, can be very playful too. In section 7.1 I go into the unique qualities of web 2.0 in 
more detail. 
 189 
activity and creativity - the idea of being part of it yourself; creating something rather 
than just consuming it.  
  Apart from blogs the strength of interactivity in creating environmental consciousness 
is used by other computer technologies, such as serious games. Serious games address, 
for instance, political or environmental issues that all aim at giving the player the 
impression of what it is like to manage a city, to save an endangered species, to deal 
with climate change or other burning problems.112 The big difference with traditional 
media coverage of these issues is experience: these virtual worlds make the player 
experience herself what it is like to act like a city builder, to make important decisions, 
to take account of environmental damage, to know what is at stake. Games call for 
participation, for creativity and for active thinking about solutions, which is both very 
informing and rewarding.       
  The playfulness of green blogs and serious games creates a user-friendly environment 
with an easy entry to serious matters like the preservation of ecosystems. In general, 
playfulness – in the sense of humouristic presentations and a (seemingly) non-serious 
approach – often is the weapon applied on the web by people who want speak with a 
critical voice. A very entertaining example of these kind of sites is the news-site the 
ONION, which is one grand parody on politics, science and any other subject of public 
debate. By making fun of literally everything – for example by staging fictitious 
debates in videos – the makers succeed in pulling viewers’ attention and triggering 
their critical awareness of what is in the news.  Or take a look at Humour Gazette, 
which is a blog that practices full-on political satire: fierce assaults, but always 
presented with a lot of humour. In the Netherlands Geenstijl.nl is a very popular (and 
populistic) news blog that uses satire as a means of challenging the political and 
cultural establishment.  Apoplectic Press is another site in this same genre, which 
“designs clothing and greeting cards for activists, liberals and counter-culture folk with 
an odd sense of humour”.113 Again, the site is designed in a very playful manner, and 
uses humour as a weapon against societal dissent. As such, the world wide web 
provides much more subtle and entertaining ways of expressing criticism and showing 
our discontent with politics and organisations. Thereby being very different from 
chaining ourselves to nuclear power plants or engaging in mass-demonstrations.   
                                                
112 Some examples of these are: Darfur is dying, SimCity, Baasopzuid.nl, Geography World, Food Force, 
EcoQuest.  
113 See: http://www.apoplecticpress.org/index.htm 
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  The non-seriousness, humour, the doing ‘as if’, they are key to the method – so to 
speak – of playful use of online environments, they pave the way for the web in 
becoming a place to exert critique, share subversive opinions, but also a place for 
innovative ideas. In play a space is opened up for creative, participatory and interactive 
action. This feature of play has also been referred to as ‘playroom’ by some play-
scholars: “Bettelheim has pointed to the fact that children, as well as adults, need 
“plenty of what in Germany is called Spielraum. Now Spielraum is not primarily ‘a 
room to play in.’ While the word also means that, its primary meaning is ‘free scope, 
plenty of room’ to move not only one’s elbows but also one’s mind, to experiment with 
things and ideas at one’s leisure, or, to put it colloquially, to toy with ideas” (De Mul 
2005: 263). As I already stated in the former chapter: playfulness means freedom, 
freedom to toy around, to experiment, to open up new possibilities, to exert critique in 
a harmless manner and resist the prevailing forces without immediately suffering 
severe consequences. Creativity implies playfulness as one has to dare think ‘out of the 
box’, to play with the rules, to transgress boundaries and open oneself up to new and 
different insights. In the case of green blogs: to envision alternative energy sources, 
new ways of producing our goods or a transformation of behaviour. We saw how a 
playful, humorous presentation of affairs, was coupled with a very serious and urgent 
message.  
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Chapter 6 
Playing with paradoxes 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter I conceptually deepen the analysis of playful web use. Building on the 
green Blogs case, I give additional examples of the three paradoxes of identity in the 
realm of the web, and I further explain the concept of playfulness. First, in section 6.1, 
I reflect on the tension between global forces impinging on individuals on the one, and 
local resistance practices and expressions of freedom on the other hand, as 
foreshadowed in the previous chapter in the concrete case about green blogs. The main 
development I aim to illuminate is the paradoxical process of a growing space for 
autonomous behaviour on the one, and the simultaneous spread of heteronomic forces 
in regard to the construction and experience of (in this case: collective) identities on the 
other side, such as commercialization and technological homogenization. The analysis 
presented here serves as a preparation for the overarching argument, stating that 
identities are becoming ever more playful in terms of the strengthening of the tension 
between powers of freedom and powers of force. As I seek to demonstrate on the 
grounds of Manuel Castells’ work, playfulness is the key feature of web-based 
applications for those resisting the new global order, but it is also for those in search of 
new means for enjoying free, personal expression.   
 
 
 
6.1  Playing with rules   
 
In The power of identity, the second part of his information age trilogy, Manuel 
Castells advances the view that the process of techno-economic globalization that 
shapes our world is being challenged, and will eventually be transformed, from a 
multiplicity of sources, according to different cultures, histories, and geographies 
(Castells 2004: 3). As he says it outspokenly: “Where there is domination, there is 
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resistance to domination” (Castells 2004: xvii). Although he claims that global forces 
are reshaping states, ethnicity, ideology and gender over the world, the very same 
information and communication networks also further people’s capacity to construct 
what he calls resistance or project identities (I will explain them below) by which they 
negate existing dominant political or cultural forces.    
  Obviously, Castells did not call his book The power of identity by accident: there is an 
inextricable bond between social movements and identity, even a primacy of identity 
politics in the network society (Cf. Castells 2004: 12). Social change grows from 
communal resistance that is somehow based in a sense of identity of a (repressed, 
neglected or dissatisfied) group of people, identity being the social glue between 
individuals, the common provider of meaning to their actions. A social movement, 
according to Castells, consists of “purposive collective actions whose outcome, in 
victory as in defeat, transforms the values and institutions of society” (Castells 2004: 
3). The way in which this process of transformation of societies unfolds can be 
explained by three forms and origins of identity building.  
  First, starting point is what Castells calls a legitimizing identity: the identity 
introduced by the dominant institutions to extend and rationalize their domination. 
Those suffering this domination, might generate a resistance identity, which is a form 
of collective resistance against oppression, opposing the dominant institutions of 
society. Once those in resistance have succeeded in their actions a resistance identity 
can turn into a project identity, which is the expansion of a resistance identity towards 
the transformation of society. Instead of merely opposing the dominant ideology, it 
projects the building of a different life and new type of society. (Cf. Castells 2004: 8-
10) This threefold sequence means that over time, what starts out as resistance identity 
can become a project identity from there on, and ultimately become the new 
legitimizing identity, that is, the new dominant cultural force. How does this work out 
in reality and what role does the web play in such instances of subversive action? 
 
I want to demonstrate the importance of the web in this process of liberation and 
protest against the vested order by sketching two early forms of political resistance in 
which the web played a decisive role; both of them I draw from Castells’ work. One of 
the social movements typically linked to the network society described by Castells, is 
the rebellion of the Zapatistas against the Mexican government (See: Castells 2004: 
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75-86)114. The Zapatistas – named after the Mexican anarchist Zapata – are a group of 
peasants, mainly native inhabitants, who fight for peasant and Indian rights, for the just 
allocation of land, and who oppose the neo-liberal course of their country in general. 
After Mexico joined NAFTA115 in the beginning of the 1990s, the liberalization of the 
Mexican economy meant a huge blow to an already fragile peasant economy as price 
protections and import restrictions were abandoned, leading to the first – and only – 
violent uprising of the Zapatistas against Mexican armed forces in 1994.     
  The reason why the Zapatistas are very interesting to Castells is – firstly – that they do 
not only fight for their own land and their economic survival, but they collectively turn 
against the new world order in which capitalism, and its excesses, has become 
universally accepted. Secondly, according to Castells the success of the Zapatistas was 
largely due to their communication strategy. He even calls them the first informational 
guerrilla movement. Although there have been violent encounters, the Zapatistas’ main 
objective was to use the media to communicate their message and find support, instead 
of going into a bloody guerrilla war. Castells calls the use of telecommunications, 
videos, and of computer-mediated communication essential in their strategy. The 
Zapatistas used these media to diffuse their message to the world, and to organise a 
worldwide network of solidarity groups. Especially extensive use of the internet116 
helped to produce a movement of international public opinion which made repressive 
and violent intervention in the conflict by the Mexican government impossible. The 
Zapatistas understood the power of information over weaponry: because of their 
internet-based alliances and media connections they were protected from repression 
and raised the issue of social exclusion and political corruption for a global audience. 
As a result, the Zapatistas’ actions helped to bring about constitutional reforms on 
behalf of Indian rights, affirming their cultural identity and improving their living 
standards. To Castells, this history shows that the new global order leaves room for 
local disorder, that communication networks can be used to serve the vested powers, 
but also by those who resist them.     
  
                                                
114 I will not insert any further references in the next couple of paragraphs, for all I write here relies on 
Castells.  
115 North American Free Trade Agreement  
116 Since Castells continuously talks of the ‘internet’, I follow his idiom. The kind of use of the internet 
he describes, falls under the category of the world wide web.    
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The second example of social struggle in the network society I want to discuss in short 
is the anti globalization movement. It provides a particularly apt case of the 
paradoxical use of global communication networks by opponents of capitalist 
globalization in an attempt to undermine the economic, social and cultural forces that 
dominate world economy - and which therefore also dominate the communication 
networks they use - and who put forward an alternative economic order and plea for the 
democratization of global financial and economic institutions. In recent years large 
groups of protestors outside conference centers, closely watched by thousands of 
heavily armed forces, have become a common sight at meetings of the G20 or WTO-
summits. In 1999 in Seattle protest was so fierce that the meeting of the WTO even had 
to be shut down. Although Castells admits that it is highly arguable whether we can 
speak of a social movement at all in this case, because of the very heterogeneous 
composition of protesting groups, lacking a defined ‘identity’, he beliefs what unites 
them is their networked strategy (Castells 2004: 148). For that reason this global 
opposition to capitalist globalization is worth looking into for us too. 
  Groups from all over the world, who all have their reasons for opposing capitalist 
globalization – for some this is environmental degradation, for others income 
inequality or poor labor conditions – are related in their struggles through a 
combination of internet networks, media diffusion, discussion forums and actual 
convergence at events (Ibidem: 151-2). Given their social, ethnic, political and 
ideological diversity, global networking is the main feature of these groups. In fact, 
these various strings of which the movement is built, do not necessarily call into 
question globalization per se (although some will), but rather act in favor of another 
version of globalization, a democratic and fair one. Those actions are to a large degree 
carried out on the internet. Protestors use email lists, chat rooms, forums and other 
places on the web to put their views forward, and they organise a wide debate without 
provoking actual confrontations. It allows for coordination and diversification at the 
same time.  
  According to Castells it is through the internet that relatively isolated movements have 
succeeded in building their networks of global solidarity and support, and have been 
able to post their information in real time, becoming less vulnerable to repression in 
their localities (Ibidem: 155). Although a political utopia for the moment, in some 
cases, the internet was even heralded as a new form of direct democracy, without the 
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intermediation of politicians. Despite the fact that these developments are still very 
much in the making, Castells underlines that the internet really offers a new form of 
social interaction, mobilization and decision-making. It means a lack of central 
authority and an instant relationship between the local and the global, action being 
anchored locally and performed globally (Ibidem: 156). Only because the movement 
actually is a network, can it combine so many interest groups into a collective actor. In 
summary, “the internet is of the essence in the anti-globalization movement, as a 
mobilizing medium, as a form of organisation and debate, and as a blueprint for the 
grassrooted, open, democratic society that the militants oppose to the seclusion and 
isolation of global corporate institutions” (Castells 2004: 164).  
 
On the basis of Castells analysis it is easy to see why the conclusion, which we reached 
back in section 3.4.2 regarding the car system, of being a technology that is enabling 
and restraining at the same time, can also be applied to the world wide web. The 
freedom the car was said to offer in terms of personal transport and movement, is 
attributed to the web in terms of the freedom of self-expression, of publishing and 
gathering information, and of experimenting with one’s identity. But just as the car 
created its own momentum, forcing its users into pre-conditioned ways of conduct and 
contributing to the fortification of car-related social and economic patterns, so the 
freedom the web brought is met with several constraints too. The web is part – or 
maybe the all-encompassing part – of a global system of communication media that 
runs on specific technical specifications, deals with social, cultural and ethical 
presuppositions, is subjected to the laws of economics, and has to cope with the 
political powers that be.  
  It is precisely because of this tension between free and forced behaviour as described 
above, that we can call human identity ludic. In the English language this distinction is 
aptly expressed by the familiar concepts of 'play' and 'game'. Another way of putting it 
is by referring to a game as ‘finit play’ (ludus) and play as ‘infinite play’ (paidea) as I 
explained this distinction with Carse in chapter 4. As I announced in the prelude 
already, by introducing the concept of playfulness we are now in a position to 
understand a phenomenon as complex and antagonistic as late modern identity in its 
coherence, and in its relation to developments in the field of new, digital media.  
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  A game refers to the kind of activity theorists like Gadamer and Huizinga had in mind 
when they wrote about the phenomenon of gaming. That is, playing as a kind of rule-
governed behaviour. Gadamer even dubbed this trait the autonomy of a game.117 When 
leading our lives these days we are faced with multiple restrictions and forces that 
impinge upon us in the economic, technological, cultural and political sphere. The 
global market seems to run by its own logic and saddles us with socio-economic 
imperatives from which it is extremely difficult to withdraw oneself as an individual. 
We all know the example of the Windows versions that come with almost any PC one 
buys and the dominance of Google among the web’s search-engines.118 Mobile phones, 
email and messenger services put tremendous pressure on modern employees in terms 
of availability and required reaction speed. Websites are often run by moderators who 
not only post the majority of the entries on a site, but who are also in a position to 
screen, filter and modify what is posted by users. In general, newsmedia are by no 
means free of censorship: no news coverage is entirely ‘objective’, selections of 
newsworthy items have been made, information assymetry between newsmaker and 
consumers prevails, certain expressions may even be banned legally. As a counterpoint 
to corporate media, maybe user-generated platforms like Youtube provide us with a 
more democratic way of sharing news. All in all, when using the concepts of play and 
game in describing the process of identity formation in this age of digital media, the 
constituting power the social and economic environment, the technology and other 
interest-parties exert on identity formation as well as the freedom users enjoy, get 
emphasised to a degree that is more in accordance with the way the world currently 
works than seeing this process as merely a narrative. The medium’s horizon and its 
parameters determine the playroom that is at the subject’s disposal. Like playing a 
game we are submerged in an environment with its own dynamics, rules and codes that 
we follow up playfully.  
  Yet, because of this growing ‘playfulness’ the amount of freedom humans enjoy 
advances as well. Here we encounter the phenomenon of play in its sense of infinite, or 
free play. It is in this way that it has particularly been used by philosophers such as 
Kant, Schiller and Nietzsche, who all used the concept of play to point at human 
freedom and the capacity to rebel against the forces of nature. We now see why these 
                                                
117 See section 4.2. 
118 In 2005 already, for 80% of all internet searches Google was the first search engine consulted 
(Lehman & Schetsche 2005: 17).  
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two concepts are complementary and meet in modern web technology. As Frédéric 
Beigbeder writes in his novel £ 9.99: “We’re living in the first system in which man is 
dominated by something against which even the concept of freedom is utterly 
powerless. Quite the opposite, in fact, it’s banking on freedom, freedom is its greatest 
find… The system has achieved its goal: even disobedience has become a form of 
obedience” (Beigbeder 2002: 9). Concomitant to the underlying forces of 
commercialization, globalization and cultural domination that it helped spreading, the 
web banks on the illusion of freedom it creates. The world system is like a game that is 
so good that it makes its players forget about it. Still we have no alternative but to play.  
  As goes for most media these days, the web flourishes within a cultural field that is 
predominantly a global, commercial field ran by the logics of capitalism. In order to 
boost worldwide trade and the expansion of economies freedom often serves force: free 
trade and individual liberty of choice are heralded and proudly proclaimed as our 
dearest assets and precious rights, but in reality they serve to enforce vested 
commercial interests. For example, sponsored ads at Google and search engine 
optimizers – illegal programs that ensure a high ranking on the result list of search 
engines – are clever ways of targetting consumers without them being aware of their 
biased judgements. In Modernity and self-identity Anthony Giddens witnesses this 
paradox occurring when he writes about contemporary individuals: “In conditions of 
high modernity, we all not only follow lifestyles, but in an important sense are forced 
to do so – we have no choice but to choose” (Giddens 1991: 81). Today, identities are 
designed in this tension of compliance with structures and with cultural maxims, which 
– ironically – demand the same from anyone of us: to become individuals, to develop 
unique personalities, like the crowd in Monty Python’s Life of Brian are proudly 
shooting out: ‘we’re all individuals!’. One could say that we are almost being forced to 
be free: on the one hand there is a freedom of choice, and a room for self-creation that 
no human being on the face of earth has experienced ever before, but on the other hand 
we can hardly be called autonomous actors given the superimposed ideology of 
individualization, self-creation and the beleaguering of individuals by commercial 
parties.   
  As we saw in section 3.4 the car already provided a striking example of this paradox. 
Although it gives a great deal of freedom to the individual driver – the freedom to 
move and the breaking of the constrictions our physiology places us under – it also 
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created a culture of mobility that leaves no option for slowing down. The same can be 
said about web technologies. Consumers may be called prosumers (producer-
consumers) nowadays because of the creative freedom modern computer programs and 
web applications offer. A weblog offers its user a set of tools that – within the margins 
offered by the blog’s creators – enable her to ‘playfully’ design her site according to 
her own wishes. Open Source Software goes a step further and puts technically 
proficient users in a position to suggest software modifications and possibly contribute 
to its amelioration. Equally, though, we are stuck with all kinds of electronic devices 
that call for frequent updating or replacement, in order to stay in touch with those who 
already updated their devices. At a certain point in time a personal computer becomes 
simply too meager in calculating and storage capacity to run the newest software, 
compelling the user to either seriously upgrade it or to buy a new one altogether. The 
same goes for software updates, which in many cases even download themselves 
automatically onto our computers. Refusing to ‘go with the flow’ therefore is no longer 
an option, neither for professionals nor private users, and equals opting out by 
committing digital suicide. Our freedom to use or stay away from certain hardware or 
software applications is severely limited by technological developments outside the 
realm of influence by the individual, choices made by employers or providers, and by 
the sheer power of numbers.  
  In that sense computer technologies are no different from any other technology. Our 
dependence on both media of communication and media of transport has nothing but 
steadfastly grown during the two century-old course of progressing industrialization 
and the even older history of globalization. It might not be at the forefront of our 
awareness all the time – if at any moment at all – but without the help of modern 
computer technology our societies would swiftly grind to a devastating halt. The 
internet – and the web: its best known and most used incarnation – created their own 
technological momentum in their hitherto short lives (Cf. section 3.4.1.3). The stronger 
our grip on nature becomes, the more dependent on media we become. Until nature 
strikes back, of course. Imagine a vast power failure hitting our most densely populated 
areas due to extreme weather: this means no more television, no more electronic data 
traffic, no more mobile phones operating, no radio, not even artificial light in our 
homes, plus thawing refrigerators! And I am not even talking about hospitals, schools, 
office buildings, traffic lights, elevators, industrial complexes, an so on, and so on. 
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Modern life as we know it and want to live it simply ceases to be for the time of the 
outage. This shows our dependence on modern energy, communication and 
transportation technology, as well as how little autonomous we have become in 
choosing whether we want to use these or not. Our survival literally depends on them.  
  It is a feature of technology in general to deploy itself in manners unforeseen by its 
inventors. When adopting new technologies societies find themselves confronted with 
the so-called control dilemma. Stakeholders have to decide on the adoption of a certain 
technology when its later effect on society, and the way the technology itself will be 
used and its further development, are not yet known. Shortly after its introduction, 
when a technology is only scarcely diffused and little known among the public, a 
technology might still be highly pliable. But once it has locked into society on a vast 
scale, it tends to gain momentum of its own and deliberate attempts at steering it in a 
certain direction become ever more difficult. Again, the case of automobility in chapter 
three provided clear evidence of the almost unsurmountable task to alter a proven and 
widely established technology, even if its downsides are overwhelming and known to 
its users, as is the case with cars in regard to their pollution levels, huge energy 
consumption and CO2 emissions. Antropomorphising slightly, one could purport that 
technological artefacts have their ‘own agendas’: with the design and introduction of 
them a bit of new reality is designed as well (Cf. Smit & Van Oost 1999). A race car is 
not built to drive 30 miles an hour; neither can we expect the web ever to be free of 
spam and porn. Or as the popular proverb goes: ‘The things you own, end up owning 
you’.  
  
Another important force that puts restrictions on our use of the web, one that we should 
by no means underestimate, is the power of governments. I only need reminding the 
reader of the origins of the internet, which came into being as a communications 
network of the American Department of Defense, and which is for its swift workings 
and infrastructure still highly dependent on governmental systems such as cables, 
satellites, energy systems and legal regulations. An example might show the limits of 
freedom experienced on the web. In the spring of 2006 the Chinese internet pioneer 
Isaac Mao visited the Netherlands to talk about the millions of weblogs that are being 
created in his home country. Approximately five million of them appeared in the years 
2003 to 2006 alone. According to Mao people who blog on a daily basis 'get to think 
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more freely'. He recounts that by having discussions on the web and building websites 
the Chinese learn to express their individuality. A new sense of openness and 
connectedness to the world is arising. Meanwhile, Mao himself had to alter his IP-
adress due to a blockade by the Chinese government and his current weblog is still not 
accessible in China. (Source: NRC-Handelsblad, dd. 31-03-2006) Google and Yahoo 
cut lucrative deals with the Chinese authorities just to access the immense Chinese 
market, yet agreeing to work within severe limitations of their information supply. 
Google even actively screens its search results to not fall out with the Chinese 
government. Yahoo, eBay and Microsoft had already placed themselves under self-
censorship on their websites. Economic value seems to outweigh the moral value of 
freedom of speech.119  
  At the moment, Chinese internet serves as a scaring example of the restrictions 
governments can – if they choose to – impose on their citizens: every bit of information 
deemed dangerous by Party officials is kept out of the country by powerful 
gatekeepers: a Chinese citizen looking for information about Free Tibet, for example, 
will not be able to get to the websites searched after.120 Also internally web traffic is 
closely monitored and if necessary officials take action. The Chinese themselves have 
put 30.000 (!) 'digital servants' on monitoring-jobs, so as to control discussions held in 
chatrooms and on webforums. Several webloggers already have been arrested, after 
they spoke out critically of politically sensitive issues. Lots of other Chinese too have 
been apprehended and sentenced because of their actions and utterances online (Cf 
Goldsmith & Wu 2008: 87-104). 
  One might object here that inventive users will always find ways to get around 
controls and get to the information they desire. This is of course true, but the Chinese 
situation clearly shows that the web is by no means the revolutionary cyberterritory 
which transgresses national boundaries and laws, in which everyone can act in utmost 
freedom as control mechanisms fail, such as might have been hoped for in the early 
days of the web. Even the world wide web turns out to be firmly anchored nationally, 
                                                
119 In January 2010, Google announced they were no longer willing to censor their search results and 
would review their business operations in China after several hacking attempts seriously compromised 
the privacy of users, as the attackers tried hacking Gmail accounts of both Chinese and Western human 
rights activists. 
120 The Chinese government does so by using gatekeepers at nodes where international data lines enter 
their country, blocking foreign websites that are deemed a ‘danger’ to the State. Chinese web users will 
get a message like ‘website temporarily out of order’ (See: Goldsmith & Wu 2008: 93). 
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regionally and locally, in language, legislation, culture and in infrastructure. 
Governments in particular can wield a lot of power as they are able to block sites, 
criminalize the possession of unethical information, or even take sites off the air 
altogether. In Who controls the Internet? Goldsmith and Wu reach the conclusion that 
“What we have seen, time and time again, is that physical coercion by government – 
the hallmark of a traditional legal system – remains far more important than anyone 
expected” (Goldsmith & Wu 2008: 180). According to them this is the most important 
thing missing from predictions of where globalization will lead and from visions on the 
future shape of the internet.    
 The China example epitomises the antagonistic forces the web evokes, both enabling 
the Chinese government to practice more control over its citizens, and at the same time 
handing those citizens a medium for potential subversive action.121 History will tell 
which side played the game best. But China is by far not the only example of the 
liberating powers the web possesses.   
 
 
 
6.2 Playing with others: the web as social network   
 
The person has become the portal. 
Barry Wellman 
 
From a social point of view, a lot of modern technologies are highly ambivalent in their 
nature. For one they provide a window to the world, they open up lives, but they also 
close people in and serve as capsules. Technologies such as the mobile phone, the I-
Pod and cars connect people and turn their lives public, but they are also very private 
media and enable their users to shield from others. As I stated in the prelude already, 
on the web we are more than ever caught between these tendencies of individualization 
and capsularization on the one, and communication and community building on the 
other hand. The web is both a source of reflexive uncertainty and computer-mediated 
                                                
121 In addition to blogging, in the spring of 2010 it was made public that Twitter was working on ways to 
get round blockades in China and Iran. Co-founder Evan Williams told an audience at the World 
Economic Forum in Davos that Twitter is developing technology aimed at preventing the governments 
of China and Iran from censoring Tweets. (On: http://www.wired.com) 
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isolation, and it serves as a new, high-tech layer of social cement. In this section, I 
explore this paradox further by looking – among other things – at the social network 
site Facebook, which is not only one of the most popular sites on the web, but which 
constitutes also a prime example of this paradox.122 I seek to illustrate in which way 
Facebook reinforces the paradox by introducing aspects of playfulness. 
 
 
 
6.2.1  Facebook: individualized society or social individuals? 
 
If you want to understand what is happening in the field of new media, then it is always 
insightful to look at the newest generation of users. In a double sense they are generally 
the ‘early adaptors’ of new media appliances. To adolescents the web serves more as a 
medium for communication than as a medium for information, clearly in contrast to the 
post-war generations who – besides their professional use – still use the web 
predominantly as a tool for collecting information.123 The difference between young 
and older users is not so much the use of the web itself – we all google – but it lies in 
the frequency of use and the multimedial combination of social media they apply. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, persons born after 1980 are commonly referred to as being part 
of the digital generation. Journalists and scientists have given this generation many 
different names, ranging from internet generation, to dotcom generation, network 
generation, Nintendo generation, sms generation, screenagers, generation M (media) 
and generation C (content) (Cf. De Haan & Van ‘t Hof 2006: 11). Recently, a label 
with very positive connotations was added to this list: Generation Einstein.124 One of 
the pre-eminent characteristics of this generation is their savvy use of social network 
sites and the impact this has on their identities. According to Jos De Haan: “Young 
people of the same age group give birth to peer-to-peer networks, within which 
                                                
122 In June 2010, Alexa.com, a company which rates internet traffic, places the two best-known social 
network sites, Facebook and Youtube, among the top 3 sites visited, only beaten by search engine 
Google. Other big social network sites are: MySpace, Sugababes/Superdudes, CU2, Partypeeps. 
123 See for a stat: www.marketingfacts.nl/berichten/generatieverschil_in_internetgebruik/nl 
124 See: Boschma & Groen, Generatie Einstein – slimmer (‘smarter’), sneller (‘faster’) en socialer 
(‘more social’). The authors claim that in order to understand the current generation of young, techno-
savvy users, we have to realize that instead of seeying them as lazy screen addicts who have forgotten 
how to read a book and write decent papers, we should acknowledge the fact that in terms of 
communication through new media they have become smarter, faster and more social than their parents’ 
generation.  
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youngsters discuss taboes and life choices and experiment with their identities. [...] 
Online ‘experiments’ teach them who they are and what their position within the social 
network is”.125  
  As I said above, Facebook is worldwide the largest of those social network sites. 
Founded only in February 2004, in July 2010 Facebook already had more than 500 
million active subscribers.126 Due to its make-up, Facebook can be seen both as a site 
for individual entertainment, and as a tool for maintaining and building communities. 
Next to the ‘standard’ features of typical social network sites, such as creating an 
(elaborate) personal profile, searching for and adding friends and communicating with 
them by using private messages, wall comments, pokes or chat, Facebook also offers a 
range of game-like applications (micro-games) and hosts numerous groups and 
communities one can subscribe to.    
  The 2006 report The Strength of Internet Ties shows the big advantage of online 
social networking for users in terms of performing their social identity.127 The authors 
found that using internet and email expands and strengthens the social ties people 
maintain in the off-line world. Pay-offs especially come when people use the internet to 
press their social networks into action as they face major challenges and have to make 
important decisions. Facebook is particularly suited for reinforcing so called ‘weak 
ties’, for example for finding old classmates or colleagues. Facebook keeps chapters 
open of books that otherwise would have been firmly closed, apart maybe from the 
occasional coincidental real-life encounter. In that sense, Facebook keeps the past alive 
in the present. The report strongly disputes that heavy use of the internet might 
diminish people’s social relations: email for example, rather than replacing it, 
supplements the communication people have with others in their network. 
  Social network sites in particular create this peculiar paradox among their users of 
being alone in front of a terminal and talking to buddies at the same time. The web not 
only brings the world into your living room; it also keeps you there. Also, social 
network sites are the ultimate embodiment of the identity paradoxes caused by 
progressing globalization, such as I drafted them in section 3.4. Social network sites are 
                                                
125 De Haan & Van ‘t Hof 2006: 17,18. Author’s translation 
126 For more mind-boggling figures on Facebook see: 
http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics#!/press/info.php?statistics 
127 This paragraph is based on: Boase, J., Horrigan, J., Wellman, B. & Rainie, L., The Strength of 
Internet Ties, Washington, 2006.  Full report at: 
http://www.pewinternet.org/PPF/r/172/report_display.asp 
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prime examples of what it means to live in a highly mediated, globalized world, but 
they also provide the tools for the construction, expression and experience of highly 
personal (and often local) identities. The global and the local intermingle in such a way 
as to create a ‘glocal’ form of contemporary life, infused by multiple media, in which 
we chat with someone in India but sometimes no longer even know our neighbours. On 
the one hand network sites facilitate encountering the like-minded, on the other hand 
they give us a platform to cross swords with intellectual opponents: it can widen our 
horizon, but also dangerously narrow it. The web may easily serve as a ‘homophilic’ 
medium: if so wished, it can be used to drive you around in familiar circles, until the 
point where opinions become certainties. As Kenneth Gergen observed about social 
technologies: “The major point here is that the technologies that bring people together 
also allow them to remain together, to insulate themselves in a way that permits the 
sacralization of a dangerously restricted view” (Gergen 2000: xvi). Religious 
extremism is a dangerous example of this ambivalence. In doing so, a website like 
Facebook is in danger of creating what can be called ‘bounded solidarity’: groups (of 
interest, or ideas) are being reinforced to such a high degree, their ‘tie’ becomes so 
strong, that it causes them to close themselves off from other parts of society.  
  A medium as universal as the world wide web was simply non-existent until two 
decades ago. Therefore, the task of adjusting all the possibilities in terms of 
communication and all the information that comes with it, presents a monumental task 
to its users, and forces them into reassessing their identities. Not in the last place, the 
world wide web with its capacity of linking people, transactions and money globally by 
a mere mouse click, contributed to, or maybe even was the final stage – the missing 
link so to speak – of the process that turned us into truly global citizens. Incredible for 
someone living a mere thirty years ago, the world wide web placed the world – literally 
– within arm’s reach. I only need picking the right website to watch live what is 
happening in China, Australia or the Americas, while I chat with a colleague in Africa 
and check my banking account in the Netherlands! There we see why it is called the 
world wide web.   
  In the past, several other media showed the same tendency of spurring both 
individualistic and social forces. Modern technologies have always advocated 
schizophrenic lifestyles. The novel opened up universes of the mind to its readers, but 
it also confined them to small reading spaces and a very constricted field of attention. 
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The vacuum cleaner was supposed to liberate wives from streneous, physical tasks, but 
turned them into housewives instead as the housekeeper was no longer needed. In 
chapter 3 I mentioned modern appartment blocks, which bring hundreds of people in 
close proximity, but the doors of which often remain tightly shut. A fitting early 
example of this paradox is the so-called flaneur, a typical product of the modern city: 
“The anonymity of the crowd provided asylum for those on the margins of society who 
could walk about unnoticed, observing and being observed, but never really interacting 
with those encountered. The flaneur was the modern hero, able to travel, to arrive, to 
gaze, to move on, to be anonymous, to be in a limited zone; in other words to be out in 
public and moving about in the city’s paved, public spaces among strangers” (Urry 
2007: 69). Paul Virilio noticed a similar phenomenon about the introduction of cinema: 
“This machine plunges inert cinemagoers into an unprecedented form of solitude, 
multiple solitude, since, as Marcel Pagnol so aptly puts it, a thousand spectators are 
reduced to one in the cinema auditorium!” (Virilio1998: 9).  
  Facebook not only takes Pagnol’s multiple solitude to the next level; rather, it couples 
multiple solitude to soloistic multitude: its users are on their own embedded in groups. 
Barry Wellman coined the appropriate expression of ‘networked individualism’ to 
explain the social consequences of social network sites. Users of modern technologies 
are less tied to local groups and increasingly tied to looser and more geographically 
scattered networks. Wellman writes: 
 
“The personalization, portability, ubiquitous connectivity, and imminent 
wireless mobility of the Internet all facilitate neworked individualism as the 
basis of community. It is the individual, and neither the household nor the 
group that is becoming the primary unit of connectivity: gleaning support, 
sociability, information and a sense of belonging. [...] It is I-alone that is 
reachable wherever I am: at a house, hotel, office, highway, or shopping 
center. The person has become the portal.” 
(Wellman ea. 2005: 34).   
 
In section 5.2.2 I explained that one of the distinguishing features of web 2.0 is its 
artificial intelligence: in many respects the web has become smart and it sometimes 
even (pro)acts instead of its users. This smartening of the web gave users an 
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opportunity for greater customization, for making the web not only more social, but 
again, also more individualistic. To take Facebook as an example again: its 
shareholders gain their revenue almost exclusively through advertising, which can be 
targeted very specifically due to data mining users’ profiles. This introduces one of the 
biggest downsides Facebook users face: over the years Facebook developed a policy of 
sharing more and more information from subscribers’ profiles. Actually, its success to 
a large degree depends on this strategy: Facebook became really popular when its 
builders tweaked the site in such a way that users were given the (unasked for) 
functionality of tracking all their friends’ moves on Facebook. A company with access 
to your profile may get information on who your friends are, where you live, what your 
hobbies are, your age, education, etcetera. In short: on your identity. In 2010 the debate 
on Facebook’s ‘open access’ policy became more heated and forced its designers to 
implement some changes to limit users’ visibility for the sake of their privacy and 
safety.128  
  Following the line of reasoning about identity I deployed in chapter 3, the question 
rises whether web communities replace traditional off-line communities as as source of 
meaning? How much do Facebook contacts really mean to us? Does blogging and 
chatting take the place of the local pub, school and workplace? Philosopher of 
technology Albert Borgmann coined (after Heidegger) the concept of ‘focal object’, by 
which he meant that technological objects ‘assemble’ people and activitities in a certain 
way (Cf. Borgmann 1984: 196-210). In old times the fireplace (‘focus’ = hearth) was 
the designated spot for people to gather and bond by telling stories and by experiencing 
physical warmth and intimacy. Although Borgmann laments its loss in modern times 
(central heating system), the concept of ‘focal object’ is a very fitting metaphore to 
describe the role of media in modern day lives. Television and radio in particular have 
for decades been the focal objects in homes around which families got together to 
watch the evening news and subsequent television shows. In this sense television is 
characterized by the very same paradox of making life more individualistic, as 
individual families withdraw from the streets into their homes. Yet, this process also 
meant the strengthening of inner-family bonds, which is why it contributed to a 
stronger sense of (the nuclear) community.   
                                                
128 Go for an overview of the debate to: 
www.readwriteweb.com/archives/facebook_privacy_explanation_debate.php 
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  The web ‘collects’ people in an entirely different way than television does. First of all, 
television gathers people physically: people who watch together share a designated 
space together; they talk about what they see on the screen, laugh about it, sometimes 
even cry.129 A desktop computer or laptop on the other hand hampers the physical 
sharing of experiences. At best two people – though already uncomfortable – can watch 
web pages or internet movies together. In case that the movie clip or site is shared with 
someone else, that person will likely watch the clip on her own computer. Personal 
computers are not designed for being used by multiple people at the same time, such as 
a television invites people to watch together. In that spatio-temporal sense, PCs 
separate people, whereas television unites them. Communicating via social network 
sites on a personal computer is characterized by this paradoxical feature of isolating 
people and bringing them (virtually) together at the same time.  
  Second, another important difference between the web and television/radio as tools 
for social cohesion is the tailoring of information that takes place on the web (2.0). 
Whereas television and radio are broadcasting media, that is, one program is sent out to 
a multitude of viewers or listeners who all receive the same program, the web is 
typically a narrowcasting medium: users can specifically target and retrieve the 
information they desire. As the technology behing the web grows more sophisticated, 
the presentation of information and the manner of communication become ever more 
attuned to individual users’ desires. Because of this ‘interactive’ feature of the web, one 
could purport that the web’s influence on users’ identities is a rather conservative one, 
as users’ interests, opinions and desires are increasingly mirrored by the web itself. The 
eight o’clock news does not discriminate between its viewers, but someone wachting 
the news on her smartphone may decide about which news to download into her 
podcast and which not. Despite the option of ‘zapping away’ on television, on the web 
the consolidation of one’s identity in terms of held interests and opinions is much more 
likely to happen than on television, which can be very shocking and confronting at 
times.   
 
 
 
                                                
129 Of course, people not present, but who saw a certain program form a reference group as well, be it 
later, when the show is commented on. Especially in the context of on-demand TV.   
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6.2.2  Serious play in the digital world? 
 
In chapter 4 we concluded that playfulness is the expression of the ambivalence 
between seriousness and non-seriousness that is constitutive of all playing. On the 
grounds of the analysis presented in the above section, we can now argue that 
Facebook is an outstanding example of how web 2.0 applications hand users the tools 
to practise this (in late modern identity) characteristic mix of seriousness and frivolity. 
Even more so, by means of social network sites the web provides the perfect stage to 
people to apply playful, light and frivolous self-presentations as a way of dealing with 
the utter seriousness and social pressure underlying the process of gaining status and 
the building of group identities. Raessens writes: “The most important play media in 
this context are undoubtedly mobile telephones and so-called social media, such as 
weblogs and social networks, including Facebook, Hyves, LinkedIn and Twitter. These 
are ideal social connections that playfully express what the users think they are and 
how they wish to be seen by others” (Raessens 2009: 68). 
  In reminiscence of the examples presented in section 6.1, in the case of social network 
sites we come across the same paradox of the technology offering its users extra 
playroom for expressing themselves freely, but at the same time web 2.0 applications 
pre-arrange online actions more than the ideologists of freedom might wish for. In the 
case of Facebook, users may decide on the content of their profiles, but they are 
certainly not free to redesign the software or tell Facebook what advertisers to allow on 
the site. Also, strong pressure from peers is exerted to take part in social networking 
and to develop attractive and impressive personal profiles with preferably many 
friends. In this sense, users are more or less ‘forced’ into self-reflection by means of 
constructing personal profiles.  
  Social network sites have become increasingly important within the context of leading 
a modern day’s life. As I explained by paraphrasing Barry Wellman in the former 
section, people derive their sense of belonging from the ‘placeless’ networks they 
create around themselves. The same can be observed in mobile devices, such as mobile 
phones, which for their part are said to create ‘lonely crowds’, in which people are in a 
public space, but are completely absorbed by their communication with someone who 
is physically not present. Mediated communication seems to precede physical presency, 
thereby creating new social effects formerly unheard of. Who we are is determined by 
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the relations with other people we engage in. Had he known Facebook, Descartes 
would probably have reached the conclusion “I am linked in, therefore I am”!  
  The individualization media have caused, starting with written texts millennia ago, 
gave an impulse to self-reflection and threw people back on their own by creating the 
perfect stage for self-dialogues. The construction of weblogs, personal profiles and 
homepages add the voice of others to this process; others who comment on expressions 
of identity. This growing reflexivity obviously reflects on users’ identities: a lack of 
contacts/friends on Facebook can be an important (negative) element of someone’s 
self-understanding. In this respect Facebook resembles a competition, with excellence 
in the social realm as a goal: the more friends, the higher someone’s status. Just as 
Twitter is all about one’s followers, Facebook too has become a sport of collecting 
online friends. 
  The playful character of these web applications renders this ‘burden’ of constant 
reflection and updating one’s social network bearable. For example, social network 
sites allow a playful handling of photos, pictures and the moderation of them. They 
leave exuberant room for jokes, for the posting of funny messages or clips, and for the 
challenging and teasing of friends. The speed one can react with and the flexibility to 
adjust one’s profile any time render the long-term effects of these profiles less grave. In 
an article on social network sites Pearson comes to a similar conclusion: “In essence, 
online performative space is a deliberately playful space. The fluidity and self-
conscious platforms of performance allow individuals and networks of users to play 
with aspects of their presentations of self, and the relationship of those online selves to 
others without inadvertently risking privacy” (Pearson 2009: 6). Social network sites 
resemble games, because acting on them is characterized by a playful mood and has 
playful elements to it (humour, competition, teasing), but also because they constitute a 
world on their own. A world in which we can experiment a bit with our identity, 
without suffering immediate and direct consequences outside of the cybersphere.  
  Because of their ‘networked individualistic’ features, Valentina Rao calls applications 
such as facebook in an article on playful cultures ‘third places’ (a concept she took 
from Oldenburg): “The general mood in third places is playful and marked by frivolity, 
verbal wordplay, and wit” (Oldenburg, in Rao 2008: 2). Third places “exist in addtition 
to ‘work’ or ‘home’, a contemporary version of the agora, the tavern, the café, where 
people can be together and unwind. The dichotomy between organised play (often 
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sustained by corporate interests) and free play and playfulness as in socialization is 
especially visible in social networks” (Ibidem). As another example of such a ‘third 
place’, that is, a novel kind of semi-public, mediated sphere, one can think of the social 
websites developed and used by immigrants. Maroc.nl, for instance, is a site on which 
an extremely playful approach is applied to the utter serious matter of finding one’s 
way around a new culture. Maroccans are clearly trying to steer a middle course, and 
develop a sort of ‘third way’, caught between two cultures. They do this by coupling 
self-mockery to profound discussions about who they are and where they belong. As a 
result, next to cartoons of Dutch right-wing poilitician Geert Wilders, heated 
discussions are being held on forums about topics immigrants are concerned with. 
Again, humour and irony prove an important factor in dealing with important issues.    
  In section 5.1 I pointed at the risk of ‘capsularization’ in the context of establishing 
group identities on the web: very closed, inward looking communities of like-minded 
people. Without judging this development and calling this feature of social websites 
‘right’ or ‘wrong’ – after all, technologies have always been used for the worse or the 
better, for war or peace – we can understand this phenomenon as an example of the 
ludification of the web. Similar to what happens in games, these people create 
meaningful worlds of their own, the logic and the sense of which is hard to understand 
to outsiders. Just like in games, community members ‘play’ these games alone, in front 
of their terminals, but are – by virtue of playing – part of a very strong, wider 
community. 
  The dividing line, though, between the playworld and the ‘serious world outside’ is a 
thin one. Identity theft, to mention a frequently heard threat, is just one of the very real 
consequences avid users of online services might experience. In section 4.3, where I 
explained the phenomenon of play, I drew quite a sharp distinction between the play 
world and the world outside play. As many examples show, this distinction is by far not 
as solid as I might have presented it there. Not only is all playing ambivalent by its 
nature, that is, serious and ‘only play’ at the same time, but even more so, a general 
intertwining of play and (social) reality appears to exist.  
  In Homo Ludens Dutch historian Johan Huizinga (1950) demonstrated the play-
element of culture. Instead of mentioning mere practices of play within cultures, he 
convincingly presented his argument that human culture as such evolves playfully. In 
social reality many processes run by the logic of ‘make believe’, as if all of us were 
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playing a game. Think for example of the purchasing power of money, or the 
legislative powers we invest in our politicians: politicians own power because people 
bestow it on them. As soon as a people by majority decide to stop ‘playing the game’, 
rulers lose their authority. Therefore, in many social instances the choice is not between 
play or non-playful, serious reality, but play and reality really are one. The same goes 
for social network sites: their affordance (see section 3.4) is their playfulness: they 
invite users to playfully interact with each other and with the medium, knowing of the 
serious social mechanisms that are at play. Social network sites are ‘serious games’: the 
line between play and reality is inevitably blurred. Online, all identities are to some 
degree playful identities. 
 
 
 
6.3  Playing with reality  
 
When you get right down to it all pleasure consists in playing around with one’s own 
boundary, or someone else’s… 
Daniel Dennett  
 
In 1995 Sherry Turkle wrote her prophetic work Life on the screen – identity in the age 
of the internet. In this book she described the – then novel – internet as a network 
system that was able to link millions of people and which changed ‘the way we think, 
the nature of our sexuality, the form of our communities, our very identities’ (Turkle 
1995: 9). According to Turkle in the real-time communities of cyberspace, we are 
dwellers on the threshold between the real and the virtual, unsure of our footing, and 
inventing ourselves as we go along (Ibidem: 10). The central thesis put forward by 
Turkle involves the view that it was cyberspace, which made experimenting with 
identities truly possible, as opposed to merely playing different social roles in more 
primitive societies under the rule of analogous media. The difference between ‘old’ and 
‘new’, online media, lies in the latter’ simultaneity. Turkle writes about Multi-User 
Domains/Dungeons (MUDs):  
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“As players participate, they become authors not only of text but of themselves, 
constructing new selves through social interaction. One player says, “Your are 
the character and you are not the character, both at the same time.” Another 
says, “You are who you pretend to be.” MUDs provide worlds for anonymous 
social interaction in which one can play a role as close to or as far away from 
one’s ‘real self’ as one chooses. [...] MUDs make possible the creation of an 
identity so fluid and multiple that it strains the limits of the notion. Identity, 
after all, refers to the sameness between two qualities, in this case between a 
person and his or her persona. But in MUDs, one can be many.” (Turkle 1995: 
12)  
 
The feature of cyberspace which renders this multiplicity and fluidity possible, 
according to Turkle – a feature we no longer acknowledge as anything special 
whatsoever – is modern PCs capacity to work in simultaneous windows. Although 
users are attentive to only one of the windows on their screens at any given moment, in 
a sense they are a presence in all of them (Turkle 1995: 13-14). It lead one of Turkle’s 
interviewees to the famous sentence “Real Life is just one more window”. Turkle sees 
in the practice of playing simultaneous roles in multiple windows a decentering of the 
self, on a much more profound level than just the stepping in and out of characters in 
social settings. “MUDs, in contrast, offer parallel identities, parallel lives” (Turkle 
1995: 14).     
 
These analyses by Sherry Turkle make it clear why, on many occasions, it is difficult to 
draw a clear-cut line between play and non-play in online environments, and between 
reality and appearance. As I explained in chapter 4, when playing we seem to engage in 
our ‘second lives’: shifting between the worlds of being and appearance. Playful 
environments encourage us to do ‘as if’. Supposed fixed identities in the material world 
give way to multiple identities in the (virtual) playworld. The more we identify with 
our online characters, the smaller the gap between reality and appearance. As a result, a 
hybrid type of identity emerges, which is no longer completely explicable in terms of 
narrative identity. In chapter 2 I emphasised that the theory of narrative identity 
formation is particularly instructive to explain and concordate the biographical 
elements of someone’s identity. But, as we have seen above, many aspects of modern 
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identities expressed and experienced online elude sheer narrative accounts of identity. 
In addition to the theory of narrativity, the concept of playfulness emphasises the 
openness and multilinear character of identity, just as a game virtually has an endless 
number of possible variaties and outcomes. Like the way games are played over and 
over again, human identities remain under construction during the course of a life. And 
just like life, games have a high degree of uncertainty (about the outcome) attached to 
them: their course cannot be pre-determined. In Joost Raessens’ words: “It is a 
characteristic of new digital media that they do not restrict the user’s playing space to 
this interpretive flexibility (or creative receptiveness), but expand it into the 
reconfiguration of existing texts or (re)construction of new texts” (Raessens 2009: 68). 
  Therefore, more justice is done to the experimental qualities of the web in a theory of 
playful identities, than it is in a theory of narrative identity. The web enables a playing 
with reality, which advances the paradox of identity vs. multiplicity, and which 
provokes a continuous shifting between the worlds of being and appearing, in a way 
that is many steps beyond the realm of possibilities the traditional book offers. Sherry 
Turkle explicitely compared this process to playing:    
 
 “Play has always been an important aspect of our individual efforts to build 
identity. The psychoanalyst Erik Erikson called play a ‘toy situation’ that 
allows us to ‘reveal and commit’ ourselves ‘in its unreality’. While MUDs are 
not the only ‘places’ in the Internet in which to play with identity, they provide 
an unparellelled opportunist for such play. On a MUD one actually gets to build 
character and environment and then to live within the toy situation. A MUD can 
become a context for discovering who one is and whishes to be. In this way, the 
games are laboratories for the construction of identity, ..” (Turkle 1995: 184).  
 
Playful web environments encourage us to do ‘as if’, to take on roles out of the 
ordinary order. Erika Pearson reaches the same conclusion as she writes: “In essence, 
online performative space is a deliberately playful space” (Pearson 2009: 6; Italic: jt). 
This role playing can become so strong an experience as to forget what the ‘real’ world 
is or import characteristics into it. The gap between reality and appearance closes. Play 
always contains an element of make-believe: it goes accompanied by an awareness of a 
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second reality against real life.130 Even the development of the web itself, from web 1.0 
to web 2.0, can be explained as a development from linear to playful.     
  One of the main features of this playful web is the user mobility it advances. Not 
physically, obviously, but mobility in regard to all the different online ‘worlds’ and 
social contexts users can be part of. As networks grew faster, databases increased their 
capacity, and the calculating power of microchips rose, it became increasingly easy for 
web users to engage in multiple online activities simultaneously and keep track – in 
almost real time – of what was happening in many places, and even play their part in 
those happenings. From one, principle (biographical) story people in late modernity 
used the web to go to many instances of play. Social networks and virtual worlds 
undermine the unity of time and place, which was characteristic of the plot in 
traditional storytelling. Therefore, instead of narratieve identity, we should rather speak 
of micro-narratives, which are part of the playful construction of collages of identity.    
  The narrative is surely not gone, as I will explain further on - at the beginning of 
section 7.1, but thanks to the advancement of the world wide web it has been 
encompassed by a culture of constructing and expressing highly mobile, flexible and 
multi-facetted modern day identities, in which users playfully switch between their 
many roles, situations and hence, their identities. Ironically, this caused the narrative to 
be much more pervasive in our culture than it used to be. In the old days only a handful 
of people were in a position to write a log, an autobiography or a novel and publish it. 
Now that billions of people have access to online facilities such as blogs, homepages, 
network sites and Twitter, these micro-narratives abound on the web.  
  Because of the multiple paths one can follow on the web, does computertechnology as 
a hypermedium create a world characterized by processes without closure, which are 
multilinear, repeatable, and offer virtually endless possibilities. Kenneth Gergen 
observed about living in an age of social media of saturation: “Under postmodern 
conditions, persons exist in a state of continuous construction and reconstruction; it is a 
world where anything goes that can be negotiated. Each reality of self gives way to 
reflexive questionning, irony, and ultimately the playful probing of yet another reality” 
(Gergen 2000: 7)”. Being playful means one seizes the opportunity of stepping out of 
                                                
130 Roger Silverstone came to a similar observation in 1999, when he wrote about media: "To 
acknowledge that so much of culture, our culture, our media culture, consists in the acceptance of the 'as-
if'ness' of the world. […] Play is 'as-if' culture par excellence" (Silverstone 1999: 59-60).  
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oneself for a moment, seeing oneself with different eyes, with a touch of irony, critical 
distance and room for relativization, in order to reach a higher level of self-
understanding. Winter, Thomas, and Hepp even go as far as to deny the possibility of a 
‘closed, lineair biography’ in late modernity, and talk of ‘strings that cross one another’ 
instead, as constituent of reflexive identity construction (Winter, Thomas, Hepp 2003: 
11).  
  Those crossing strings are an apt symbol for how hypertext influences identity 
construction. Identities are the temporary knots where strings meet: firm, but never 
lasting. Dealing with identity in a highly mediatized, network environment means 
walking those strings, acting like the spider in her web. A spider who is continuously 
working her web, but never knows what virtual insect will get caught in her web next. 
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Chapter 7  
Conclusion -  
Playful identities on the web 
 
 
 
 
7.1  Beyond narrativity: playful identity 
 
As has been shown in chapter 2, the theory of narrative identity formation is a very 
powerful theory to describe to process of constructing and expressing human identities. 
To a large extent, it also adequately describes the mechanisms of online identity 
construction. Let me ennumerate three pivotal elements of the theory, which apply to 
both off-line and online identity construction. First of all, according to the theory of 
narrative identity, all construction of identities takes places via the detour of 
expression. That is to say, no identity exists beyond its expression and by reflecting on 
our expressions we polish and continuously rephrase the narrative we tell about 
ourselves, a narrative we use to reach self-understanding. In the case of web 
expressions of identity, homepages and social network sites in particular, this feature is 
even more present and easier to achieve than in the case of told or written stories, since 
the expression of identities and the interactive process of entering into dialogue about 
identities are the essence of web pages and online profiles.  
  Also, equal to expressing identities orally or written on paper, introspection forms a 
crucial moment in the experience and expression of identities. Both books and the web 
are highly reflexive media. This brings me to the second element of narrative identity 
formation that is shared by online identities: the fact that all identity, in its construction 
as well as its expression, is always mediated. The narrative serves as a means for 
reflecting on ourselves, on others and on the world. This threefold mediation also 
applies to websites. In order to express our identity we need to at least think about it, 
say it, or act in a certain way. All three of these elements of the expression of identities 
are present in online identity expression: before composing a homepage, for example, 
one is forced to think about one’s identity; then one tells others by means of the content 
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one makes visible on the site; and the process of composing the site, thinking about 
what to put on it, discussing it and receiving feedback, is a way of acting in an online 
environment, comparable to acting in an off-line world. In this way, compared to the 
oral or written story, the web serves as an all-encompassing multi-medium for 
achieving self-understanding, in which there is still room for the actual telling of 
stories.   
  In the third place, homepages, blogs and social network sites play a similar role in 
people’s (professional) lives as stories did before, by handing them a tool for – literally 
– grasping their lives. The expression of identity, of life plans, opinions, interests, 
etcetera. is the perfect way to organise one’s life. The difference between stories and 
websites lies in the mode of espression; whereas a story is extremely explicit, 
“Facebook users predominantly claim their identities implicitely rather than explicitely: 
they ‘show rather than tell’ and stress group and consumer identities over personally 
narrated ones” (Zao, Grasmuck, Martin 2008: 1816).131 Although narrative elements 
are still abundantly present on websites, we can, due to the visual nature of the web, 
safely argue that online identities have become much more pictorial rather than 
narrative.  
 
Of course I would not need writing this thesis, if there were only similarities between 
stories and websites. The final observation already indicated the point where ‘old’ and 
‘new’ media diverge: the web has properties that elude the written or spoken narrative, 
and which are therefore beyond the reach of the theory of narrative identity formation. 
What are these properties?   
  One of the most striking extra-narrative features of the web is its appeal to 
interactivity. The interactivity of the web can be found in multiple modes of use: we 
can speak of ‘user to system interactivity’ (surfing), ‘user to user interactivity’ (social 
sites), and – lately – user to document interactivity’ (programs that help with in 
creating files; work-sharing; cloud computing) (Cf. McMillan 2002: 162-82). Whereas 
in its early days in the nineties web 1.0 was mainly concerned with presenting 
                                                
131 “Facebook users predominantly claim their identities implicitly rather than explicitly; they ‘show 
rather than tell’ and stress group and consumer identities over personally narrated ones”: What the 
authors found is that 91-95% of expressions of identity are very implicit (wall posts, pictures), 48-73% 
are implicit/slightly explicit (eg.membership of interest groups), and only 8-37% of expressions are 
explicit (“about me ..”) (Zhao, Grasmuck & Martin 2008: 1816, 1824-26).  
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information, one could purport that, during its 20 years of development, the web too 
went from broadcasting – sending few messages to few large audiences – to 
narrowcasting – sending many messages to many small audiences. As the development 
of web 2.0 progressed, the web became ever more of a two-way street.  
  Cantoni and Tardini write about the interactivity of websites: “In the case of 
hypertexts, interactivity can be seen as a particular kind of dialogue: by means of links, 
hypertext readers engage in a continuous dialogue with the hypertext system. The 
peculiarity of hypertextual dialogue is that in them the system/hypertext poses the 
question, the user/reader answers, and the system in its turn re-acts to the answer 
posing another question: […] “What do you want afterwards?”” (Cantoni & Tardini 
2006: 77). In general, hypertextuality is probably what sets traditional, written stories 
and websites most apart. The term ‘hypertext’ was coined in 1965 by Theodor Holm 
Nelson, who defined it as ‘a body of written or pictorial material interconnected in such 
a complex way that it could not conveniently be presented or represented on paper’ 
(Cantoni & Tardini 2006: 90-1). In hypertext “elements can be arbitrarily connected to 
each other; by means of links every object can be made the sign of any other object. In 
this way, the hypertextual structure can proceed endlessly” (Cantoni & Tardini 2006: 
95).  
  This feature of websites is in obvious contrast to the written narrative, where there is 
no choice at all for readers in terms of what they want to read afterwards: turning the 
page is their only option. Because of hypertextuality, the linearity of traditional 
identity expression in the form of biographical books gives way to biographical 
patchworks of digital elements, referring to each other through links; a process, which is 
characterized by fragmentation, openness and multilinearity. In order to understand 
websites such as blogs, homepages or profile sites properly, we have to understand the 
wider context in which these sites are embedded. The links that make up this context, 
on their part, can be added by the author of the website herself, or by others who link to 
this website.  
  As a result, web ‘stories’, or better ‘collages’ of identity pieces, are continuously 
under siege by systemic external intruders, such as pop-ups, updates, cookies, ads, 
etcetera., as well as the comments and reactions one gets from others. So, in sharp 
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contrast to classical theory of narrative identity, processes of innovation and 
sedimentation of new information and new life’s happenings not only take place in the 
life of the author, who has to give them a concordant place in her self-narrative; but 
online, the expression of identity itself, in the form of a personal page, is constantly 
being beleaguered by outer influences. To mention a couple of examples: readers react 
to each other’s blogs, they tag their profiles, invite others to interest groups, criticize 
photos, hit on one another, and so forth. Each ‘intrusion’ prompts a user to react and 
reassess her profile, by implication – since expression affects content – altering her 
identity. In addition to that, readers in hypertext have the option of following different 
reading paths. Once a classical story has been written, by contrast, the reading path is 
fixed: readers do not themselves rewrite autobiographies or novels. Only on Wikipedia 
they do.  
  Sherry Turkle describes this process of the online ‘bricolage’ of identities as follows: 
 
“On the Web, the idiom for constructing a ‘home’ identity is to assemble a 
‘home page’ of virtual objects that correspond to one’s interests. One 
constructs a home page by composing or ‘pasting’ on it words, images, and 
sounds, and by making connections between it and other sites in the Internet or 
the Web. Like the agents in emergent AI, one’s identity emerges from whom 
one knows, one’s associations and connections. People link their home page to 
pages about such things as music, paintings, television shows, cities, books, 
photographs, comic strips, and fashion models” (Turkle 1995: 258).  
 
Although written in 1995, this description is still surprisingly accurate in the heydays 
of web 2.0. Because of the versatility and ease of composing a personal homepage or 
blog, users can play with virtual – often fictional – identities. A website is an empty 
form, so to say, which can be molded into many virtual – potential – identities, each of 
which can just as easily be reconsidered and recomposed. As I wrote in chapter 5, web 
2.0 introduced a new feature by enabling its users to co-shape websites. Modern 
websites have some features that were unheard of in the beginning days of the world 
wide web: lots of sites are highly dynamic and constantly changing, some sites are 
never the same when you visit them. Due to the speed and flexibility of websites in 
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terms of changing content, online expressions of identity are always ‘under 
construction’ (Cf. Frissen & De Mul 2000: 43) For that reason, one might argue that 
websites are a better metaphore and are closer to real life identities in late modernity 
than narratives, since in real life too, identities are never completely fixed and always 
open to revision.  
 
 
 
7.2  Playful identities and the ludification of culture 
 
Der Mensch ist nur da ganz Mensch, wo er spielt. 
Friedrich Schiller 
 
Overseeing the whole thesis, the three main insights it yielded are: 
1. The three paradoxes of the late modern identity, as I analyzed them in chapter 3, 
prevail on the world wide web; indeed, they are reinforced by web practices.  
2. For that reason, instead of seeing the web as a radical breach with history and 
seeing it as a medium that brought along a completely new way of dealing with 
identity, we had better acknowledge the fact that, despite some important 
transformations, web identities are in line with our pre-digital history. 
3. As far as our identity has been transformed in the light of using the world wide 
web, a theory of playful identities does far more justice to online identity 
construction and identity expression than the theory of narrative identity does.   
 
If we add up all the paradoxes we encountered during the research and place them in 
three main categories – as I did at the end of chapter 3, then we could summarize the 
process of identity formation in the present age of digital media as a continuous 
oscillation between the opposite poles of personal autonomy on the one hand, and 
technological, cultural and commercial determinism on the other hand; between 
individuality and collectivity; between the fixed and the flowing. In addition, two 
concomitant oppositions are particularly distinctive fot the web era, namely the tension 
between the local and the global, and between the real and the virtual. These last two 
paradoxes helped shaping the three classical paradoxes of identity into their current 
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form. Sherry Turkle emphasised these influences as she wrote: “We are encouraged to 
think of ourselves as fluid, emergent, decentralized, multiplicitous, flexible, and ever in 
process. […] The ability of the Internet to change popular understandings of identity is 
heightened by the presence of these metaphors” (Turkle 1995: 264).  
  As I made clear in part 1 of the thesis already, we should certainly not exaggerate the 
influence media – the web in particular – have on identities. Despite all the new features 
the web offers in terms of identity experiments and transformations, people still have a 
relatively stable sense of their identities. In fact, as Turkle’s research showed, the web 
may be the perfect medium for identity experiments, but in the end this helps people in 
their search for their identities. The number of people portraying themselves as 
truthfully as possible greatly outnumbers the amount of people who purposely distort 
their self-images. It has been calculated, for example, that 80 percent of the Avatars in 
Second Life closely resemble their off-line creators. As Turkle showed for MUDs, a lot 
of users feel more ‘authentic’, that is, closer to who they really think they are online 
than in the off-line world. She writes that interviewees reportedly mentioned to feel 
more in tune with their identities online than in the real world (Turkle 1995: 185).  
  Clear limits exist in regard to identity experiments on the web. Not only do users not 
leave behind their real-life character, gender, ethnicity, and culture as they enter the 
world wide web; like any other medium, the web too is subjected to all sorts of cultural 
practices that pre-condition its users. Whatever believers may claim, no user can shed 
off her nationality, language, gender, etcetera. when going online. Even more so, as 
was shown in chapters 1 and 2, the bodily and ecological foundations of our identities 
prevent us from losing ourselves completely in web experiments. Again, talking of the 
‘playful probing’ of identities, would be a better way to describe current web practices 
than the much stronger ‘experiment’. In their research about online identities De Haan 
and colleagues also came to conclude that “Despite the fact that blogging or building an 
own homepage is a very popular activity, young people admit having built a personal 
page or homepage in the spur of the moment or because everyone else did so” (Hermes 
& Janssen 2006: 165; author’s translation).  
 
Multiple reasons appeared on the scene why a theory of playful identities suits web 
practices better than a theory of narrative identity. Let me summarize the argument in 
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favour of the theory of playful identities once more. First of all, play, because of its 
multi-facetted, mobile and ambivalent nature, is capable of doing justice to the typical 
features of web practices, including multimediality (5.2), virtuality (6.3), interactivity 
(7.1.), connectivity (6.2), hypertextuality (6.3), non-linearity (6.3), reflexivity (5.1), and 
flexibility (6.3). Second, we saw that humour plays a pivotal role in many web 
applications – on ecological websites, social network sites, but also news media –, 
which invites users to playfully behave and perceive. Playfulness expresses the co-
existence of seriousness and frivolity that is constitutive of many usages of the web.  
  In the third place, because of its rich offering of tools for self-expression the web – 
more than traditional media do – puts people in a position to express their identities 
publically, and to take a critical, yet playful stance towards themselves. The feedback 
mechanisms built in the web encourage people to reflect on themselves without 
suffering the burdensome, grave off-line consequences, which come with publishing an 
autobiography or any other hard-copy document. Furthermore, the increased amount of 
information available, the acquaintance with exotic lifestyles, knowledge of different 
life practices; they all force people active one the web to added reflection on their own 
identities and life’s course.   
  In the fourth place, the web entices people’s creativity: as during play, it invites users 
to explore new paths and leave the known, pre-fabricated roads behind. Because of its 
playful nature the world wide web opens up a realm of possibilities – a playroom – 
which allows users to discover the new, the dangerous, maybe even brush the illegal, 
without immediately suffering severe ‘off-line’ consequences. The web allows to carry 
out all sorts of experiments with ideas and practices in  a relatively ‘safe’, playful 
mode.  
  Fifth, the phenomenon of play slowly but decisively encroaches upon our culture, 
under the guise of, for example, entertainment games, serious games, role playing 
games, workshops, brainstorm sessions, adventure parcs, 3D movies, and so forth. We 
are living in an age in which our thoughts and actions are characterized by a ‘ludic 
prefiguration’. Play has become an intrinsic part of the prevailing ideology in our 
‘experience economy’. This may seem an odd idea, far from our ‘serious’ reality with 
all its problems and weighty matters, but we only have to look at the field of economy, 
for instance, to see why this idea is not far fetched at all.  
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  In The age of access (2001) Jeremy Rifkin puts forward the view of our current 
economy as one that is less about things and services, but increasingly about meaning, 
experiences, entertainment, symbols and, above all, creativity. In the nineteenth century 
the industrial revolution gave a boost to the economy of things. From the fifties 
onward, in the Western world this industrial economy transformed into an economy of 
services. Since the year 1990, Rifkin witnesses the development of an economy of the 
production of meaning(s). For that reason, we should place any discussion about 
contemporaneous identity in the light of this overarching, cultural change from an 
economy of things to an economy of experiences. Rifkin writes: 
 
 “The metamorfosis from industrial production to cultural capitalism is being 
accompanied by an equally significant shift from the work ethic to the play 
ethic. While the industrial era was characterized by the commodification of 
work, the Age of Access is about, above all else, the commodification of play 
– namely the marketing of cultural resources including rituals, the arts, 
festivals, social movements, spiritual and fraternal activity, and civic 
engagement in the form of paid-for personal entertainment. The struggle 
between the cultural sphere and the commercial sphere to control both access 
to and the content of play is one of the defining elements of the coming era” 
(Rifkin 2001: 7). 
  
The music industry, the sports industry, the arts industry, to mention a few; they all 
proved his prediction right. In this sense, digital culture as such is becoming 
increasingly playful too. Living in conditions of late modernity increasingly gives the 
impression of life being just a game. Life sometimes equals a pendulum that goes back 
and forth between jobs, lifestyles and opinions. After the demise of a lot of traditional 
institutions, the disappereance of religion from the lives of many and the break down of 
family life in affluent countries, the concept of play expresses the search for identity of 
late modern homo zappens (De Mul 2010) to the point.  
  In the sixth place, all identity bears an element of artificiality. Identities always are 
temporary compositions, marked by an attempt to create a relatively fixed beaken of 
comfort and recognition in an ever-fleeting world. The concept of playfulness captures 
this artificiality thanks to its intrinsic quality of creating a world of its own, a world that 
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both is, and is not, forming a hybrid of being and appearance. Playing we are allowed 
to enter the ‘magic circle’ (Huizinga), to step outside the realm of the ordinary. We 
enter a world of pleasure, fun and intense experiences, which creates its own – new – 
playing field, beyond the mundane opposition of reality and appearance. Paradoxical 
about play itself, is that precisely the boundary between what is real and what is play 
diffuses: as one plays with vigor, it becomes difficult to tell play and ‘normal’ reality 
apart. Particular of the web is the disappearance of these boundaries – as I 
demonstrated in section 6.2, in which social network sites served as an example of 
spaces for being together virtually.  
  In the seventh, and final place, playfulness accurately describes how the three 
paradoxes of identity, as they underly our current self-conceptions in the Western 
world, were transformed under the influence of the web, by emphasizing the as-if 
character of late modern identities, the non-seriousness and frivolity, which are trade 
marks of web-based behaviour. By acting playfully online the identity paradoxes, as 
laid bare in the third chapter, are deepened. Not only does the concept of play catch the 
ambivalent nature of the late modern identity better than the concept of a story does; it 
accounts for the process of ludification as it has actually been furthered by online 
practices. In fact, as was explained in chapter 4, playfulness is the criterium of play. 
Being playful means performing actions in such a way that there always is a high 
degree of ambivalence involved: for one it is only play and people recognise it as such, 
but somehow there is always an element of seriousness involved, either within or 
standing behind playful conduct. Playfulness is the expression of the ambivalence 
between seriousness and non-seriousness that is constitutive of all playing, and it is 
increasingly constitutive for how we go about our business.  
  For all those reasons, the theory of playful identity provides us with a better toolkit to 
understand today’s identity than the less versatile theory of narrative identity does. 
Although the listed features of web 2.0 do surely not obliterate the theory of narrative 
identity construction, they do urge us to reassess its effectiveness and exhaustiveness in 
terms of describing the present expression and formation of identities. In the prelude I 
put forward the question whether the theory of narrative identity was tenable in the 
light of recent web developments? Looking back at this research, I can now say that it 
still is tenable, but, only as part of a new, larger theory of playful identities, a theory 
that captures aspects of current identities that are non-comprehensible within the 
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framework of narrative identity formation. In return to the Hegelian logic I deployed in 
the early stages of this research, the theory of narrative identity could be said to be 
‘Aufgehoben’, that is, it has not simply been surpassed by the theory of playful 
identity, but it is preserved in it, and as such it contributes to reaching a higher level of 
understanding reality. Therefore, in order to fully grasp current, web-related identities, 
we have no choice but to expand the theory of narrative identity towards a theory of 
playful identities. 
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Afterplay 
 
 
By setting foot on this planet, each of us is thrown into the big play, the 
rules of which we have not been allowed to choose. In this world, human 
actions are no events we can determine freely, but we always have to steer 
a middle course between the play’s rules and the playroom in which 
human freedom resides. For as long as extra-terrestrial journeys to other 
live-sustaining planets remain confined to science fiction movies, this 
earthly stage will be beginning and end, past and future, fate and hope of 
the play of life as it unfolds. The boundaries of this playing field constitute 
the limits, within which seven billion tragicomedies are performed. 
Therefore, to all of us, the most important question in life is: ‘wanna 
play’? 
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Dutch summary 
(Nederlandse samenvatting) 
 
 
Het doel van deze studie is te onderzoeken in hoeverre de theorie van de narratieve 
identiteit, zoals die door onder andere de Franse filosoof Paul Ricoeur is gepropageerd, 
houdbaar is in ons tijdperk van steeds verdere digitalisering van de samenleving - met 
name de opkomst en vergaande verspreiding van het world wide web. 
Webtoepassingen als Facebook, Twitter, Google, Hyves and LinkedIn bijvoorbeeld zijn 
niet meer weg te denken uit het moderne bestaan. Welke implicaties heeft dit voor onze 
identiteit? Meer in het bijzonder: kunnen we de vorming en expressie van identiteiten 
nog wel zien als een proces waarin het narratief – het verhaal – het vormgevende en 
bepalende principe is? De titel van deze studie verraadt het antwoord op deze vraag al: 
we hebben aan de theorie van de narratieve identiteit niet langer voldoende om 
adequaat te beschrijven hoe identiteiten in ons tijdsgewricht tot stand komen. Ik doe in 
deze dissertatie dan ook het voorstel de theorie van de narratieve identiteitsformatie uit 
te breiden tot een theorie van speelse (=ludische) identiteiten.   
  Bezijdens het feitelijke oprukken van het spelelement in onze cultuur – denk aan de 
zogenaamde vermaakscultuur waarin sport, spel, ontspanning, vertier en avontuurlijke 
ervaringen een steeds grotere (zingevende) rol spelen – valt er veel te zeggen voor een 
meer impliciete ‘ludificatie’ van het identiteitsproces. Daar waar het klassieke verhaal, 
waarop de narratieve identiteitstheorie is gebaseerd, uitgaat van een logica die wordt 
gekenmerkt door eigenschappen als monolineariteit, afsluiting en sequentialiteit, is 
deze logica maar moeilijk te rijmen met een wereld waarin mensen dankzij webmedia 
virtueel omnipresent zijn, multitasken, continue in netwerken opereren, door 
flexibiliteit getekend worden en deel uitmaken van een constant veranderende, in 
wederzijdse afhankelijkheid verkerende wereldsamenleving. Anno 2010 betekent het 
hebben en ontwikkelen van een identiteit een voortdurende bevraging door een persoon 
van zichzelf. Wie ben ik? Waar wil ik heen met mijn leven? Hoe zien de mij 
omringende mensen mij? Tel ik nog wel mee zonder Iphone? Kom ik zonder LinkedIn 
nog wel aan een baan? Hoe en in welke sociale netwerken wil ik mij positioneren?  
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 Het spreken over identiteit is gemeengoed geworden. Werd een jongen vroeger slager 
omdat zijn vader het was, was een Marokkaan vroeger interessant omdat hij uit een 
ander land kwam, zo moet diezelfde slagerszoon vandaag op het MBO uit honderden 
opleidingen kiezen op grond van wie hij is, en worden Marokkaanse jongeren op basis 
van hun etnische identiteit alleen al gerekend tot de risicogroepen. Religieuze 
identiteiten leiden in extreme gevallen tot daden van terrorisme; onze levensstijl pleegt 
een welhaast onhoudbare aanslag op de leefomgeving; onze voetbalsupporters 
gebruiken hun mobiele telefoons om rellen te regisseren. Journaaluitzendingen 
springen even gemakkelijk van een item over online identiteitsdiefstal, naar een item 
over integratieproblematiek, als naar een item over homo-emancipatie. Al deze zaken 
betreffen de menselijke identiteit: de persoonlijke identiteit die we gebruiken om 
mensen te herkennen, groepsidentiteiten als onderdeel van een proces van culturele 
identificatie, en identiteit als verzet tegen verouderde zienswijzen en discriminatie.  
  Hoewel het onmogelijk is alle aspecten die aan het identiteitsvraagstuk kleven in één 
proefschrift recht te doen, heb ik in het eerste deel van het werk gepoogd de 
problematiek in zijn breedte uiteen te zetten. Het boek is opgezet volgens een logica die 
een filosoof Hegeliaans zou kunnen noemen: beginnend met een vrij abstracte analyse 
van het fenomeen identiteit in hoofdstuk 1, daal ik stapje voor stapje af naar de 
concrete invulling die mensen aan hun identiteiten hebben gegeven om uiteindelijk in 
het tweede deel bij een bespreking van webidentiteiten te eindigen. Het mag dan ook 
niet verwonderen dat we hier een kwestie bespreken die de sporen van grote filosofen 
uit het verleden in zich draagt. Theorieën van zo uiteenlopende wijsgeren als 
Aristoteles, Descartes, Locke en Kant zullen in het eerste hoofdstuk de revue passeren 
om de zaken helder te krijgen. Hun gedachtegoed vormt de conceptuele basis waarop 
het huidige debat over identiteit is gebouwd. Ik besteed aandacht aan begrippen die een 
belangrijke rol spelen in het identiteitsvraagstuk zoals subjectiviteit, zelfheid, 
narrativiteit, de verhouding tussen lichaam en geest, geheugen, karakter en ecologisch 
zelfbewustzijn. Deze analyse heeft uiteindelijk geleid tot een definitie van persoonlijke 
identiteit als het reflexieve, symbolische zelfverstaan van een persoon, waarmee zij 
zowel haar gelijkheid in tijd als de haar onderscheidende merkmalen uitdrukt, als 
waarmede zij uitdrukking geeft aan haar morele oriëntatie in het leven. Betreffende die 
morele oriëntatie – wat ik de ‘inhoud’ van identiteiten noem - kom ik in hoofdstuk 3 tot 
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de conclusie dat historisch een drietal paradoxen zijn gegroeid en aldus kenmerkend 
zijn geworden voor de huidige, laatmoderne identiteit.  
 De eerste van deze paradoxen is wat ik heb genoemd de paradox van autonomie versus 
heteronomie: de spanning tussen een denken over de mens in termen van vrij en 
zelfbeschikkend, en het voortschrijdende inzicht in sociale, psychologische, 
commerciële en technologische processen die onze autonomie inperken. De tweede 
paradox heb ik die van individualiteit versus collectiviteit genoemd, waarmee ik 
refereer aan het op het oog tegenstrijdige verschijnsel van een leven gericht op 
hyperindividuele ontplooiing enerzijds, en de steeds groter wordende sociale druk tot 
gemeenschaps- en netwerkvorming anderzijds. De derde paradox tenslotte bestaat in de 
tegenoverstelling van het idee dat we een vaste, stabiele identititeit hebben – iets dat op 
een dagelijks niveau van wederzijdse herkenning moeilijk ontkend kan worden – en het 
contrasterende idee van de veranderlijkheid van identiteiten en het primaat van (sociale 
en technologische) omgevingen in onze identiteit. Een inzicht dat ons noodzaakt het 
idee van een ‘kernidentiteit’ los te laten. 
   Het tweede deel van het proefschrift probeert te laten zien hoe bovenstaande 
paradoxen onder invloed van het gebruik van het world wide web versterkt worden en 
uitnodigen tot de introductie van het concept van ‘speelsheid’ ter beschrijving van de 
dienovereenkomsitge identiteitsconstructie. Deze ‘speelsheid’ van identiteiten kan op 
een viertal – uit het begrip van wat een spel is voorvloeiende – manieren worden 
uitgelegd. Ten eerste zijn identiteiten speels voor zover ze ontstaan in het 
spanningsveld tussen sociale, technologische en commerciële bepaling enerzijds 
(‘regelgebonden spel’), en de creatief-autonome toe-eigening van media anderzijds 
(vrij spel). Ten tweede drukt het spelen de spanning tussen individuele en collectieve 
gedragen en belangen uit zoals dit aan elk (traditioneel) spelen eigen is, waarin het 
zowel om samenspel als om individuele excellentie gaat. In de derde plaats duidt 
speelsheid op het ‘spelen’ en ‘experimeneren’ met de werkelijkheid zoals online 
toepassingen dit steeds meer mogelijk maken en zij daardoor gebruikers de 
mogelijkheid geven meerdere identiteiten te testen. In de vierde en laatste plaats wijst 
de speelsheid van identiteiten op het voorlopige, vrijblijvende karakter van identiteiten 
zoals ze op het web veelal beleefd worden: het gegeven dat webpraktijken met veel 
humor en frivoliteit gepaard gaan en zij de ernst van het dagelijkse, serieuze leven 
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tijdelijk opheffen. In de breed uitgemeten studie naar ecologische weblogs in hoofdstuk 
5 laat ik zien hoe al deze elementen van speelsheid in een online praktijk samenkomen.    
  Kort samengevat laat ik daar zien dat interactiviteit in het digitale tijdperk betekent 
dat we in toenemende mate in staat worden gesteld te spelen met het medium dat we 
gebruiken en dat we ons dit medium in hoge mate voor zelfbepaalde doeleinden eigen 
kunnen maken. Dit vormt mijns insziens een cruciaal verschil met traditionele media 
als boeken en televisieprogramma’s, die een geslotener karakter hebben en zich veel 
minder lenen voor actieve gebruikersparticipatie. Ook het niet-serieuze, humoristische 
karakter van veel websites, het gegeven dat ze ons in staat stellen te doen ‘als of’, 
maakt van het web een bakermat voor het uiten van kritiek en subversieve meningen en 
het experimenteren met innovatie ideeën. Spelenderwijs wordt in veel weblogs, door de 
mogelijkheden die ze bieden een vrije ruimte – een speelruimte – geopend voor 
creatieve en interactieve participatie.  
  In de daaropvolgende hoofdstukken worden verscheidene aspecten van webgebruik 
besproken die de geschetste ontwikkeling van narrativiteit naar speelsheid verder 
onderstrepen. Er wordt gewezen op de ontwikkeling van het web naar web 2.0; de 
hypertekstualiteit van het web en het daarmee samenhangende fenomeen van de 
multilineariteit; de constructie van webidentiteiten als een collage in plaats van een 
verhaal; het gefragmenteerde karakter van webidentiteiten; de onafgeslotenheid en 
voorlopigheid van het medium in combinatie met toegenomen gebruiksflexibiliteit; de 
virtualiteit, multimedialiteit en connectiviteit van het web; en het reflexieve karakter 
van het web. Daarbij heb ik aangetoond hoe speelsheid – in de zin van humoristische, 
niet-ernstige benadering van de zaken, als waren ze slechts een spel – een 
onderliggende constante is bij het gebruik van veel hedendaagse webtoepassingen. 
Kenmerkend voor een speelse omgang met de dingen is nu dat juist achter deze 
speelsheid altijd – zoals Johan Huizinga al schreef – de ernst staat. Het begrip van de 
speelse identiteiten drukt treffend deze co-existentie van seriositeit en frivoliteit uit, die 
zo kenmerkend is voor hoe we met het web omgaan. In het zesde hoofdstuk laat ik deze 
vorm van speelsheid in praktijk zien aan de hand van een bespreking van de sociale 
netwerkpagina Facebook.  
  Het hele onderzoek overziend zijn de drie belangrijkste inzichten die het heeft 
opgeleverd de volgende. In de eerste plaats is duidelijk geworden dat de drie 
kenmerkende paradoxen van de laatmoderne identiteit, zoals ik deze in het eerste deel 
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uiteen heb gezet, door webpraktijken versterkt worden. Daarom kunnen we, in de 
tweede plaats, vaststellen dat het accurater is de komst van het web in onze levens te 
beschouwen als een voortzetting en intensivering van ontwikkelingen uit ons pre-
digitale verleden, in plaats van het web en zijn implicaties te beschouwen als een 
radicale breuk met het verleden en onze omgang met media. In de derde plaats heb ik 
vastgesteld dat voor zover menselijke identiteiten zijn veranderd in het licht van het 
gebruik van het world wide web, een theorie van de speelse identiteiten meer recht doet 
aan de huidige constructie en uitdrukking van identiteiten dan de theorie van de 
narratieve identiteit dat doet.  
  Het denken over identiteit in termen van speelsheid drukt treffend uit hoe de drie 
geschetste paradoxen van de identiteit onder de invloed van webgebruik zijn 
getransformeerd. Een theorie van de ludische identiteit benadrukt het ‘als of’, het 
onserieuze en frivole karakter, maar tegelijkertijd ook de verheven ernst die 
kenmerkend zijn voor online uitingen van identiteit en het proces van 
identiteitsconstructie voor zover dat door webpraktijken wordt geschraagd. Hoewel een 
theorie van de speelse identiteit de theorie van de narratieve identiteit zeker niet 
overbodig maakt, dwingt het web ons door zijn mediumspecifieke kenmerken deze 
theorie op zijn minst te heroverwegen. Willen we goed begrijpen en beschrijven hoe 
menselijke identiteiten heden ten dage tot stand komen, dan kunnen we mijns inziens 
niet anders dan de theorie van de narratieve identiteit uitbreiden tot een theorie van de 
ludische identiteit.  
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